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1 Introduction
Economic Inequality has been rising according to various measures and in many countries over
the last four to ve decades (e.g. Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018). Rising
inequality is widely regarded as a major social problem. It is hence an important task for economic
research to explore the ways in which economic policy can reduce inequality.
To solve a problem one should understand its roots. In the same way, to design policies that
eectively address the rise in inequality, one should understand why inequality is rising.
The present thesis contributes to this understanding. Specically, it advances our understanding
of the forces that shape income inequality in a market-based economy and studies implications for
the design of redistributive policy. Thereby, it extends the economic theory of the income distri-
bution. The focus on economic theory is natural in so far as policy design requires counterfactual
analysis; counterfactual analysis in turn requires theory.
1.1 Overview of the thesis
The thesis is composed of three, largely independent, research papers. The rst two papers take
a macroeconomic perspective, while the third paper zooms in on a particular aspect of income
inequality, pursuing a more microeconomic approach.
Directed Technical Change In a market-based economy, production technologies operated
by rms are a key determinant of the distribution of income. Hence, to understand changes in
income inequality, an important step is to understand what drives changes in technologies.
This question is studied by the theory of directed technical change. According to the basic
premise of this theory, which type of new technologies are introduced in an economy depends on
the choices of prot-seeking agents (e.g., the management of rms, commercial researchers) and
hence responds to the economic environment.
As a central result, the theory predicts that new technological developments are complementary
to those input factors that are in abundant supply. Related to wage inequality, this means that
the degree to which new technologies favor high- relative low-income earners depends on the
relative supply of workers with qualications that allow them to earn high incomes. If these
1
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workers are abundant relative to workers with less well rewarded qualications, technologies
will be developed that further raise their relative wages and thereby income inequality. Previous
work has established this result for models that impose tight restrictions on the set of feasible
technologies (allowing only for so-called labor-augmenting technologies, see Acemoglu 2007).
Chapter 2, based on the research paper “An Elementary Theory of Directed Technical Change
and Wage Inequality”, shows that the result is true in much more general environments. This is
an important insight because digital technologies have enabled the development of machines that
directly replace workers in a growing range of tasks. These labor-replacing technologies, however,
are not well captured by models with labor-augmenting technology (e.g. Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2018a). Thus, my work makes central insights from directed technical change theory applicable to
the growing set of models developed for the explicit study of such automation technologies.
Redistributive Income Taxes Given the strong impact of technology on the income distribu-
tion, an important question is how public policy can make rms use technologies that give rise to
a more equal distribution of incomes. A natural approach is to consider taxes imposed directly on
the use of certain technologies. Yet, recent research has shown that the scope for such direct taxes
to reduce inequality is severely limited (see, e.g., the recent study of robot taxes by Thuemmel
2018). The main reason is that we lack reliable information about exactly which technologies, and
applications thereof, are responsible for high inequality. Moreover, even if this information were
available, monitoring the actual use of such technologies in rms may well be prohibitively costly.
Whenever policy cannot be directly conditioned on an undesirable activity – the use of dise-
qualizing technology in the present case – economic theory prescribes to target complementary
factors. Complementary to disequalizing technology are those factors that benet from it, that is,
high income workers.
This suggests to target the use of disequalizing production technologies indirectly via the
income tax. Chapter 3, based on my research paper “Redistributive Income Taxation with Directed
Technical Change”, studies this policy option in detail. It rst augments the canonical Mirrlees
(1971) model of income taxation to include endogenous technology development and adoption
choices of rms. Then, it analyzes how the presence of endogenous production technology alters
the model’s prescriptions about the optimal design of redistributive income taxes.
My main results show that directed technical change eects make the optimal tax more pro-
gressive, raising marginal tax rates at the top and lowering them at the bottom of the income
distribution. The key mechanism is indeed that, by imposing higher tax rates on high income
earners, labor supply of these workers is discouraged relative to the supply of low income earners.
This induces rms to adopt and develop technologies that are more complementary to low-income
2
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occupations and hence reduces wage inequality before taxes. A more progressive tax therefore
not only reduces post-tax but also pre-tax wage inequality. The optimal tax capitalizes on this
pre-distributive eect. For reasonable calibrations of the model, the new eects are quantitatively
signicant: directed technical change reduces marginal tax rates on below-median incomes by
up to 15 percentage points and increases them for above-median incomes by about half of this
amount.
Credence Goods While income taxes are designed with the purpose to reduce inequality,
other policies aect the income distribution less intentionally, but rather as a by-product of their
intended eects. One such policy is the regulation of markets for expert services. Such markets,
also called markets for credence goods, are subject to heavy regulation of prices and entry in
virtually all industrialized countries. At the same time, occupations active on credence goods
markets consistently rank among the top-earning occupations in most countries, a prime example
being physicians and related occupations. Arguably, these high incomes reect at least in parts
the regulations imposed on the corresponding markets, ensuring high prices and low competitive
pressure. From an equity perspective, deregulation of such markets may be a useful policy.
Chapter 4, based on the paper “Ineciency and Regulation of Credence Goods Markets with
Altruistic Experts”, develops an argument against such deregulation. It proposes an eciency-
based rationale for regulation, specically tailored to markets for credence goods. The dening
characteristic of a credence good is that consumers cannot reliably assess its quality. Hence, they
must trust the expert to provide an appropriate service. In our theory, there is indeed reason for
such trust: experts are interested not only in their monetary payo but also in the utility of their
customers.
The key innovation is that experts’ social motivation is income-dependent: the marginal rate of
substitution between income and customer utility declines in income, such that the expert is more
willing to forgo additional income to the benet of customers when the amount already earned is
high. In a common agency setting, where many consumers are served by the same expert, this
creates an externality across consumers: one consumer’s payment increases the expert’s income,
which in turn makes the expert more willing to forgo additional income in order to provide a
higher quality service to all consumers. Under certain conditions, this externality implies that
regulation that xes prices above their competitive level achieves Pareto improvements. When
market entry of experts is elastic with respect to prots, price regulation must be accompanied by
entry restrictions to seize Pareto gains.
The externality we discover is fundamental in the sense that it arises in any moral hazard
problem, provided that agents have non-linear social preferences and there is common agency.
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Yet, its relevance depends on the availability of mechanisms for the provision of explicit monetary
incentives. By considering the pure credence goods case, we focus on the extreme case where
no explicit monetary incentives can be provided. This arguably makes the externality and its
implications for regulation policy most relevant.
1.2 Contribution to Chapter 4
While Chapters 2 and 3 are based on research papers produced entirely by myself, Chapter 4 is
based on joint work with Razi Farukh and Anna Kerkhof.
The research idea was developed in discussions between Razi Farukh and myself. I developed
its formal representation and the proofs of our formal results. Razi Farukh and Anna Kerkhof
wrote the rst draft of the paper, which I revised.
4
2 An Elementary Theory of Directed
Technical Change and Wage Inequality
Author: Jonas Löbbing
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, many advanced economies have witnessed substantial increases in wage inequality
between groups of workers with dierent levels of educational attainment. A broad empirical
literature attributes parts of this increase to skill-biased technical change.1 Appealing to skill-
biased technical change as an exogenous explanation for the observed changes in the wage
structure, however, is not entirely satisfactory. After all, the technologies that are used in an
economy are eventually chosen by economic agents, about whose decisions economics should
have something to say. This is the starting point for the theory of endogenously directed technical
change (see Acemoglu, 1998; Kiley, 1999).2 Central results of the theory predict how the skill bias of
technical change depends on the supply of skills rms face in the labor market. In particular, they
provide conditions under which (i) there is weak relative equilibrium bias of technology (weak bias,
henceforth), meaning that any increase in the relative supply of skill induces skill-biased technical
change, and (ii) there is strong relative equilibrium bias of technology (strong bias, henceforth),
meaning that the positive eect of the induced technical change on the skill premium dominates
the (typically negative) direct eect, such that the skill premium increases in relative skill supply
(e.g. Acemoglu, 2002, 2007).3 With the notable exception of Acemoglu (2007) (discussed below),
1See Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Goldin and Katz (2008) on skill-biased technical change
in general, and Graetz and Michaels (2018), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019), and Dauth, Findeisen, Suedekum and
Woessner (2017) on the eects of automation technology in particular.
2Henceforth, I use the terms “endogenously directed technical change”, “directed technical change”, and “endogenous
technical change” equivalently.
3In a market economy, rms’ technology adoption and development choices are based on the supply or demand
curves they face in the markets they operate in. The supply of skills in the labor market is therefore a transmitter
for the eects of many other variables on the skill bias of technical change. The analysis of such variables hence
often relies on results that relate the skill bias of technical change to the supply of skills. An important example is
given by the analysis of the eects of international trade on automation in Section 2.5.4.
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these conditions are limited to settings in which aggregate production takes the specic form
F (θ1L1, θ2L2), where L1 and L2 denote the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, and θ1 and θ2
represent the endogenous, dierentially labor-augmenting technology.
At the same time, the most recent literature on the eects of technical change on wage inequality
analyzes labor-replacing (that is, automation) technology, typically in assignment models with
labor and capital where capital takes the form of machines that perfectly substitute for labor in
the production of tasks (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2018a; Feng and Graetz, 2018; Aghion, Jones and Jones, 2017). In these models, the
relevant technology variables can in general not be represented as labor-augmenting technology,
such that they are outside the scope of the main results on directed technical change described
above.
This paper generalizes the central results from directed technical change theory on weak and
strong bias beyond the special case of dierentially labor-augmenting technology and thereby
makes them applicable to automation technology in Roy-like assignment models.4 The rst
part of the paper derives general conditions for the phenomena of weak and strong bias that
are independent of any functional form restriction, drawing on techniques from the theory of
monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Besides making directed technical
change theory applicable to automation technology, the results clarify the general mechanisms,
based on simple notions of complementarity, that underlie the phenomena of weak and strong
bias. The second part applies these results to obtain novel insights about the endogenous determi-
nation of automation technology in a Roy-like assignment model, with potential implications for
redistributive labor market and trade policy.
The rst part starts from a reduced form characterization of wages and equilibrium technology
that is shown to arise from a range of dierent microfoundations of endogenous technical change,
including standard approaches from endogenous growth theory. Building on this reduced form
characterization, conditions are identied under which there is weak bias of technology, meaning
that any increase in the relative supply of skill induces skill-biased technical change. The only
essential condition is that the skill bias of technology is scale invariant, in the sense that a
proportional change in the supply of all skill levels does not induce biased technical change. This
is guaranteed by a restriction close to homotheticity of aggregate production in all labor inputs,
4At rst glance, it may seem that Uzawa’s theorem provides a justication for the restriction to labor-augmenting
technology. But Uzawa’s theorem only applies to the component of technology that grows over time on a balanced
growth path, whereas the literature on endogenously directed technical change has mainly been concerned with the
component of technology that is stationary on a balanced growth path, inducing changes in the stationary long-run
distribution of (relative) wages. Moreover, with the labor share and the (risk-free) real interest rate declining
over several decades (e.g. Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2017), the general
desirability for a model to generate balanced growth is no longer obvious.
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which is remarkably weak compared to existing results (e.g. Acemoglu, 2007, Theorem 1). Most
importantly, the restriction to dierentially labor-augmenting technology from previous work
can be deleted without replacement.5
While an increase in the relative supply of skill tends to induce skill-biased technical change,
it also has a direct eect on the wage distribution, which typically depresses skill premia. The
second set of results provides necessary and sucient conditions for the occurrence of strong bias,
meaning that the eect of the induced technical change dominates the direct eect such that skill
premia increase with relative skill supply. It is shown that the induced technical change eect
dominates everywhere if and only if the aggregate production function is quasiconvex. Reversely,
if and only if aggregate production is quasiconcave, the direct eect dominates everywhere. These
conditions provide an interesting analogy to endogenous growth theory, where convexity of
aggregate production along rays through the origin (that is, increasing returns to scale) is required
to generate persistent growth in a wide class of models (cf. Romer, 1986). As in these models,
the aggregate (quasi-)convexity requirement discovered here has implications for the market
structures needed in a model to analyze the case where skill premia increase in relative skill
supply. In particular, either deviations from perfect competition or spillover eects across rms’
technologies are needed.
While perhaps most natural in settings with two dierent levels of skill, all results in the rst
part of the paper also hold in settings with an arbitrary number of skill levels. Such settings allow
to analyze technical change that is not monotonically skill-biased but causes the returns to skill to
become, for example, more convex (a phenomenon often referred to as wage polarization in the
literature). It turns out that, in principle, the techniques used to derive the monotone skill bias
results can also be used to derive analogous results for non-monotone changes in the returns to
skill.
The second part of the paper uses the techniques developed in the rst part to derive novel
predictions about the endogenous evolution of automation technology in the Roy-like assign-
ment model proposed by Teulings (1995) (see Costinot and Vogel, 2010 for decisive progress in
comparative statics for this model), augmented to incorporate capital as an additional production
factor as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) or Feng and Graetz (2018). In the model, a continuum of
dierentially skilled workers and capital, taking the form of machines that perfectly substitute for
labor in the production of tasks, are assigned to a continuum of tasks, which in turn are combined
to produce a single nal good. In line with recent forecasts on the future automation potential
5The results in this part of the paper imply a LeChatelier Principle for relative demand curves, analogous to the
conventional LeChatelier Principle that applies to absolute demand curves (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1996). For an
explicit formulation of the implied LeChatelier Principle for relative demand see Loebbing (2016), an earlier version
of the present paper.
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for dierent tasks (e.g. Frey and Osborne, 2017; Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn, 2016), machines are
assumed to have comparative advantage in less complex tasks than labor, such that any increase
in the set of tasks performed by machines (automation) displaces low-skilled workers from some
of their previous tasks.6
The rst result pertains to automation itself, as measured by the size of the set of tasks per-
formed by machines. It says that any increase in the relative supply of skills induces automation,
representing a skill-biased technical change. The induced automation, however, will never be
strong enough to outweigh the initial direct eect of the increase in relative skill supply on the
wage distribution, because aggregate production is quasiconcave. In consequence, low-skilled
workers will always benet in total from an increase in relative skill supply.
The second result endogenizes the productivity of machines. It shows that any increase in
relative skill supply does not only stimulate automation but also investment into improving
the productivity of machines, which in turn reinforces automation. The reinforcement between
automation and machine productivity potentially reverses the result from the case with exogenous
machine productivity: now, low-skilled workers’ wages may decline, both relative to high-skilled
workers’ wages and in absolute terms, in response to an increase in the relative supply of skills.
The reason is that the endogenous response of machine productivity “convexies” the aggregate
production function and may thus oset its quasiconcavity. These results provide a promising
starting point for analyzing the interaction between labor market policies and automation, as
many such policies (for example labor income taxation or unemployment insurance) aect rms
primarily by changing the supply of workers they face.
The nal and perhaps most important applied result considers the eect of trade in tasks
between a skill-abundant, technologically advanced and a skill-scarce, technologically backward
country. The trade analysis is a natural step within the assignment framework, because trade
and changes in labor supply are in some sense equivalent here (see Costinot and Vogel, 2010).
It turns out that trade with a skill-scarce country acts like a decrease in the relative supply of
skills and hence reduces incentives to invest into automation technology in the skill-abundant
country. Intuitively, trade makes the performance of low-skilled labor from abroad accessible to
rms in the skill-abundant country. This reduces the incentives to automate tasks performed by
low-skilled labor and hence, via the reinforcement mechanism, also reduces incentives to improve
machine productivity. Analogously to the closed economy setting, this discouragement eect
of trade on automation may be strong enough to overturn the standard Heckscher-Ohlin eect,
according to which trade with a skill-scarce country raises skill premia at home. In consequence,
6This assumption is also broadly supported by recent estimates of the impact of industrial robots (Graetz and Michaels,
2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019) and a wider set of automation technologies in US manufacturing (Lewis, 2011)
on the structure of employment and wages.
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the overall eect of trade on low-skilled workers’ wages in the skill-abundant country may turn
out to be positive, both in absolute terms and relative to more skilled workers’ wages.
From the perspective of the skill-scarce country, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin eect implies a
reduction in skill premia. But there is a countervailing eect in this setting, because trade exposes
low-skilled workers in the skill-scarce and technologically backward country to competition from
the advanced machines of the skill-abundant country. Again, this automation-related eect may be
suciently strong to overturn the Heckscher-Ohlin eect, such that skill premia in the skill-scarce
country increase in response to trade opening.
Both ndings are potentially relevant for trade policy. The negative eect of trade on automation
casts doubt on policies that restrict trade with developing or emerging economies to protect low-
skilled workers in developed countries. By stimulating automation, the desired eects of such
policies may be severely mitigated or even reversed. The exposure of low-skilled workers in
developing countries to competition from advanced foreign machines may provide a rationale for
import restrictions on certain goods or comprehensive trade adjustment programs in developing
countries. Real-world examples of such policies are the frequent exemptions from commitments
to cut taris on agricultural imports granted to developing countries in various WTO negotiations
on agricultural trade.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the reduced form
characterization of wages and equilibrium technology that provides the basis for the general
results on directed technical change in the following sections. Section 2.3 presents these results
for the case with only two dierent levels of skill. Section 2.4 generalizes them to skill supply
of arbitrary dimension. Section 2.5 applies the results to endogenous automation technology in
assignment models, and Section 2.6 concludes.
Related Literature The paper has links to several strands in the existing literature. The rst
part of the paper extends the literature on directed technical change and wage inequality (e.g.
Acemoglu, 1998, 2002 and Kiley, 1999), generalizing the key theoretical results of that literature.
Most closely related to this analysis is Acemoglu (2007), who provides an endogenous technical
change analysis on a similar level of generality. In contrast to the present paper, Acemoglu (2007)
analyzes the eects of technical change induced by changes in the supply of a given skill level
on the absolute wage of that skill, rather than on relative wages between dierent skills. From
a purely theoretical perspective, the rst part of the present paper can thus be viewed as the
completion of a general theory of the eects of skill supply on the direction of technical change,
7Agricultural trade is a particularly tting example, since agricultural production is highly automated in developed
economies, but still very intensive in low-skilled labor in many developing countries (see e.g. de Vries, Timmer and
de Vries, 2015).
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with the rst part on absolute wages given by Acemoglu (2007) and the second part on relative
wages presented here. The analysis of relative wages is indispensable when the goal is to study
implications of endogenous technical change for wage inequality.
The second part of the paper bridges the gap between the literature on directed technical change
and the more recent strand of work on (exogenous) technical change and wage inequality in
Roy-like assignment models (e.g. Costinot and Vogel, 2010 and Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).8 The
analysis of the eects of international trade on automation technology is related to existing work
on international trade in assignment models (see Costinot and Vogel, 2015 for a survey of the
use of assignment models in international economics), but also to Acemoglu (2003) who analyzes
the eects of trade on directed technical change in a setting with dierentially labor-augmenting
technology. Most closely related to the second part of the paper are recent papers by Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018a), Hémous and Olsen (2018), Feng and Graetz (2018), Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018b), and Krenz, Prettner and Strulik (2018). Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) and Hémous
and Olsen (2018) analyze the dynamic evolution of automation technology and its response to
exogenous technology shocks rather than its response to changes in the structure of labor supply
and international trade. Feng and Graetz (2018) provide an analysis similar to the rst result
on endogenous automation in the present paper, but they neither study endogenous investment
into machine productivity nor the eects of international trade, both of which are crucial for
the most important results on endogenous automation in this paper. Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018b) analyze the eects of the demographic structure on endogenous automation, with the
focus on the eects of automation on productivity and the labor share. Finally, in parallel work
Krenz et al. (2018) provide a joint theoretical analysis of oshoring and automation, but, unlike
the model presented in Section 2.5.4, their model does not feature endogenous investment into the
productivity of automation technology and hence (by the results of Section 2.4.2) cannot generate
a reversal of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin eects, which is the main result of the analysis of the
interplay between trade and automation in this paper.
2.2 A Simple Framework for Directed Technical Change
Consider a general equilibrium model with a continuum of rms and a continuum of workers.9
Workers inelastically supply labor L and consume a single nal good. They make no meaningful
decisions. Firms are identical and produce the nal good from labor according to a production
8See Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018c) for a list of advantages of the assignment approach with labor-replacing
technology over the labor-augmenting technology approach in studying the eects of technical change on wage
and income inequality.
9The model is identical to economy D from Acemoglu (2007).
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function F (Li, θi), where Li is rm i’s labor input and θi is a variable denoting rm i’s production
technology. The mass of rms is one.
Labor supply is dierentiated according to skill levels s, that is, L = {Ls}s∈S . Every Ls is a
positive real number. The skill set can be of arbitrary size, that is, S ⊂ R is either a nite set or an
interval. The technology variables θi are restricted to some set Θ. F and Θ satisfy the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. The set of feasible technologies Θ is compact. The production function F (L, θ) is
continuous in θ, continuously dierentiable in L, and the derivative∇LF (L, θ) is strictly positive
everywhere.
Compactness of Θ requires that a topology is specied, which is presupposed. If S is nite, the
derivative∇LF (L, θ) is simply the gradient of F with respect to L, and every partial derivative
is assumed to be strictly positive. If S is a continuum,∇LF (L, θ) is the Gateaux derivative of F
with respect to L, which can be represented as a real-valued function on S. This function is then
assumed to be strictly positive at every s.
Under Assumption 3 it is straightforward to characterize an equilibrium in the model described
above. Since changes in technology will be characterized by their eects on the wage distribution,
it useful to dene an exogenous technology equilibrium at rst, where all rms’ technologies are
xed at some θ ∈ Θ. In an exogenous technology equilibrium, rms choose their labor inputs
Li to maximize prots, taking wages w = {ws}s∈S and their technologies θi = θ as given. In a
symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium, wages must satisfy
w(L, θ) = ∇LF (L, θ), (2.1)
where the nal good is used as the numéraire. Next, consider an endogenous technology equilibrium,
where rms do not only choose their labor inputs to maximize prots, but also their technologies
θi. Again, they take wages as given. In a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium, the
symmetric technology choice of rms, denoted θ∗, satises
θ∗(L) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
F (L, θ). (2.2)
Moreover, wages are given by ∇LF (L, θ∗(L)), so equation (2.1) continues to hold: wages in an
endogenous technology equilibrium are identical to wages in an exogenous technology equilibrium
when technology is xed at the equilibrium technology θ∗(L).
The model described above is special in that rms choose their production technologies inde-
pendently of each other from an exogenous set. More elaborate models allow rms’ technology
11
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choices to depend on each other and technologies to be developed and supplied to rms by a
dierent set of agents, thus introducing a market for technology. Appendix A.2.1 shows that
equations (2.1) and (2.2) continue to hold in such more sophisticated models. In particular, the
appendix considers two models with endogenous production technology that follow standard
modeling approaches from endogenous growth theory. The rst model allows for spillovers across
rms’ technology choices, as in learning by doing models of endogenous growth (e.g. Romer,
1986; Lucas, 1988). The second model introduces a technology sector, where monopolistically
competitive technology rms invest into the development of technologies and supply intermediate
goods embodying their technologies to nal good rms. This specication follows monopolistic
competition based models of endogenous growth such as Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992). In both models, wages and technologies are determined as by equations (2.1) and (2.2) in
symmetric exogenous or, respectively, endogenous technology equilibria.10
Appendix A.2.1 also provides conditions for existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria.
Remarkably, none of the models requires to impose any specic functional form restrictions
on the production function F . The important dierence between the simple baseline model
described above and the more elaborate models in the appendix is that the former requires the
endogenous technology production function F (L) := F (L, θ∗(L)) to be concave for a symmetric
endogenous technology equilibrium to exist at all L. The more elaborate models only require
concavity of F (L, θ) in L alone. The reason is that in the baseline model, equilibrium technologies
and labor inputs are the joint outcome of individual rms’ independent prot maximization
problems, whereas in the more elaborate models they are an equilibrium outcome that arises from
interdependent choices of multiple dierent agents. This distinction becomes relevant in Section
2.3.2 below.11
Since equations (2.1) and (2.2) provide a characterization of wages and equilibrium technology
in a reasonably general class of models, the analysis in the rst part of the paper builds on these
equations, imposing Assumption 3. The goal is to answer the following questions.
10Acemoglu (2007) presents three more models (his economies C, M, and O) of endogenous technical change that
satisfy equations (2.1) and (2.2). His models are related to but distinct from those presented in Appendix A.2.1.
11While all specic models presented in this paper are static, the models in Appendix A.2.1 can naturally be extended
to dynamic versions, which generate constant growth paths with stationary relative wages between skill groups.
These relative wages are then identical to the relative wages that prevail in equilibrium of the static model. The
comparative statics results derived for the static class of models in the following sections can thus be interpreted
as comparative statics on the constant growth path for a corresponding class of dynamic models. For an explicit
treatment of dynamic models see Section 3.2 and Appendix B in Loebbing (2016).
12
2.2 A Simple Framework for Directed Technical Change
Question 1 How do increases in the relative supply of skills aect the skill bias of
technology?
Question 2 How do increases in the relative supply of skills aect skill premia (after
adjustment of technology)?
According to equations (2.1) and (2.2), changes in the supply of skills L aect wages via two
channels. First, when holding technology xed, there is a direct eect as by equation (2.1). Second,
the equilibrium technology θ∗(L) responds according to equation (2.2), which in turn aects wages
as well. Question 1 asks for the second eect (the induced technical change eect, henceforth), while
Question 2 asks for the combined impact of both eects on wages (the total eect). This distinction
follows Acemoglu (2002, 2007) who also organizes his results around these two questions.
To pose the questions formally, precise denitions of an increase in relative skill supply and
skill-biased technical change in environments with more than two skill levels are needed. Let an
increase in relative skill supply be dened as an increase in skill supply ratios along the entire
skill set.
Denition 1. An increase in relative skill supply is a change in labor supply from L to L′ such
that
Ls′
Ls
≤ L
′
s′
L′s
for all s ≤ s′.
We say that L has smaller relative skill supply than L′ and write L s L′.
Similarly, let a skill-biased technical change be a change in technology θ that raises skill premia
along the entire skill set.
Denition 2. A skill-biased technical change is a change in technology from θ to θ′ such that
ws′(L, θ)
ws(L, θ)
≤ ws′(L, θ
′)
ws(L, θ′)
for all s ≤ s′ and all L.
We say that θ is less skill-biased than θ′ and write θ b θ′.
Moreover, if a wage vector w has lower skill premia along the entire skill set than another wage
vector w′ (such as w(L, θ) relative to w(L, θ′) in Denition 2), it will sometimes be convenient to
write w p w′ for brevity. For the relations s, b, and p, the corresponding strict relations ≺s,
≺b, and ≺p are dened as usual.
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Finally note that, without further assumptions, the equilibrium technology θ∗(L) may not be
uniquely determined by equation (2.2). While all results below could in principle be formulated
in terms of sets of technologies or wages, this would substantially complicate the notation. It is
therefore convenient to restrict attention to equilibria in which θ∗ is the supremum of the set
argmaxθ F (L, θ), where the supremum is taken with respect to the skill bias order b. In all
models of this paper that impose more structure on the technology set Θ (either in Appendix A.2.1
or in the applied Section 2.5), weak conditions guarantee that argmaxθ F (L, θ) is a singleton, so
the selection of a unique θ∗(L) does not seem very restrictive.
2.3 Directed Technical Change with Two Skill Levels
Both for general expository reasons and for better comparability with existing results, it is
convenient to start with an analysis of settings with only two dierent levels of skill. Suppose
therefore that labor supply takes the form L = (L1, L2) ∈ R2++, and let L1 denote unskilled and
L2 skilled labor.
2.3.1 The Induced Technical Change Eect
First consider the induced technical change eect addressed in Question 1 above. The following
result identies sucient conditions for any increase in relative skill supply to induce skill-biased
technical change. This phenomenon is called weak relative bias of technology and proved for
dierentially labor-augmenting technology in Acemoglu (2007) (see Corollary 2 below).
Proposition 1 (Special case of Theorem 1). Let L ∈ R2++. Moreover, suppose that the equilibrium
technology θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero in L, and that any two technologies θ, θ′ ∈ Θ can
be ordered according to their skill bias, that is, either θ b θ′ or θ′ b θ.
Then, any increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change:
L s L′ ⇒ θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′).
Proof. The rst step is to note that, starting with any change from L to L′ that raises relative
skill supply, the scale invariance (or zero homogeneity) of θ∗(L) allows to scale L′ up or down
without changing θ∗(L′). We can therefore restrict attention to labor supply changes that keep
output constant while holding technology xed, that is, to changes from L to L′ such that
F (L, θ∗(L)) = F (L′, θ∗(L)). In other words, we can assume without loss of generality that L′
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L1
L2
l(τ)
L
L′
Iex
Ien
Figure 2.1. Iex and Ien are the exogenous and the endogenous technology isoquants through L. The
move from L to L′ is parameterized by l(τ) such that l(0) = L and l(1) = L′. Moving along l(τ)
leaves output constant when θ∗(L) is xed, but must raise output when technology is allowed to adjust
(Ien is above Iex everywhere). This means that technology adjusts in a way that is complementary to
the rise in relative skill supply L2/L1.
is on the exogenous technology isoquant through L, which consists of all points L′′ satisfying
F (L′′, θ∗(L)) = F (L, θ∗(L)).
Let l(τ) = (l1(τ), l2(τ)) parameterize the path from L to L′ along the exogenous technology
isoquant of F . In particular, let l(0) = L, l(1) = L′, and F (l(τ), θ∗(L)) = F (L, θ∗(L)) for
all τ ∈ [0, 1]. Since relative skill supply increases from L to L′, the rst entry of l(τ), l1(τ), is
decreasing, while the second entry, l2(τ), is increasing in τ .
Figure 2.1 illustrates such a change along the exogenous technology isoquant Iex. The dashed
red segment of the exogenous technology isoquant is the image of the path l(τ).
For the second step note that, since θ∗(l(τ)) maximizes F at l(τ), we must have
F (l(0), θ∗(L′)) ≤ F (l(0), θ∗(L)) = F (l(1), θ∗(L)) ≤ F (l(1), θ∗(L′)). (2.3)
In Figure 2.1, this corresponds to the exogenous technology isoquant Iex being located above the
endogenous technology isoquant Ien, which consists of all points L′′ satisfying F (L′′, θ∗(L′′)) =
F (L, θ∗(L)). If now both technologies are equally skill-biased, θ∗(L) ∼b θ∗(L′), the statement of
the theorem is true.12 So we can restrict attention to cases with θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′). In these cases,
at least one of the two inequalities in (2.3) must be strict, because θ∗ is selected as the supremum
of the maximizer set in equation (2.2). (If both inequalities were equalities, we would either select
12The notation θ ∼b θ′ means that both θ b θ′ and θ′ b θ.
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θ∗(L) at both l(0) and l(1), or θ∗(L′).) This implies
F (l(0), θ∗(L′)) < F (l(1), θ∗(L′)),
and, by the mean value theorem, there exists a τ ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
0 < ∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))d l(τ
′)
d τ
= w1(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
d l1(τ
′)
d τ
+ w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
d l2(τ
′)
d τ
. (2.4)
At the same time, by construction of l(τ), F (l(τ), θ∗(L)) is constant in τ , such that
w1(l(τ
′), θ∗(L))
d l1(τ
′)
d τ
+ w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L))
d l2(τ
′)
d τ
= 0. (2.5)
Finally, rearranging and combining equations (2.4) and (2.5) yields
w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
w1(l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))
>
w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L))
w1(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
. (2.6)
Intuitively, if an increase in τ raises output at θ∗(L′) by more than at θ∗(L), then the relative
return to skilled labor must be greater under θ∗(L′) as well. Since, by hypothesis, θ∗(L) and
θ∗(L′) can be ordered according to their skill bias, this implies that θ∗(L′) is more skill-biased
than θ∗(L), that is, θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′).
While the proposition applies to a wide range of specic models (see Appendix A.2.1 and the
discussion in the previous section), it reveals a common thread across all of them: when relative
skill supply increases, rms switch to technologies that are best suited to translate the increased
availability of skilled (relative to unskilled) workers into output gains. Such technologies in turn
are those under which the relative returns to skilled labor are high.
The conditions of the proposition are remarkably weak compared to existing results (see
Corollary 2 below). The scale invariance condition (θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero) is
always satised when F is homogeneous in labor. Indeed, a condition slightly weaker than
homogeneity is sucient to guarantee scale invariance of θ∗.
Remark 1. Suppose F (L, θ) can be written as the composition of an inner function f(L, θ) that is
linear homogeneous in L and an outer function g(f, L) that is strictly increasing in f . Then, the
set argmaxθ F (L, θ) and hence θ∗ are homogeneous of degree zero in L.
The completeness condition (any two technologies can be ordered according to their skill bias)
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is only required because the theorem allows for changes in labor supply of arbitrary size. Once
attention is restricted to local changes, it can be dropped without replacement.
Corollary 1. Let L ∈ R2++ and Θ ⊂ RN for arbitrary N . Suppose that θ∗(L) is homogeneous of
degree zero and dierentiable in L, and w(L, θ) is dierentiable in θ.
Then any local increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change:
∇θw2(L, θ
∗(L))
w1(L, θ∗(L))
∇Lθ∗(L) dL ≥ 0
for any L and dL such that dL1/L1 ≤ dL2/L2.
Proof. The proof of the corollary replicates the proof of Proposition 1 with the tools of dierential
calculus and is provided in Appendix A.1.1 for completeness.
Corollary 1 states that, under scale invariance of θ∗(L), the technical change ∇Lθ∗(L) dL,
induced by a local increase in relative skill supply dL, raises the skill premium.
Results in the existing literature, in contrast, are restricted to dierentially labor-augmenting
technology, that is, to settings where F takes the form F (θ1L1, θ2L2). The most general of these
existing results can be obtained as a further corollary to Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 (cf. Theorem 1, Acemoglu, 2007). Let L ∈ R2++ and Θ = {θ ∈ R2++ | C(θ) ≤ c} for
some constant c > 0 and a twice continuously dierentiable, strictly convex, and homothetic function
C with nite (but not necessarily constant) elasticity of substitution. Suppose that F can be written
as F (θ1L1, θ2L2), F is twice continuously dierentiable, concave, and homothetic with nite (but
not necessarily constant) elasticity of substitution.
Then any local increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change.
Proof. Homotheticity of F , together with the labor-augmenting form of θ, guarantees scale
invariance of θ∗(L). Moreover, the curvature and dierentiability assumptions on F and C ,
together with niteness of the elasticities of substitution, ensure dierentiability of θ∗(L) and of
wagesw(L, θ). Therefore, all conditions of Corollary 1 are satised and its conclusion applies.
The major restriction in Corollary 2 compared to Corollary 1 is that θ takes the labor-augmenting
form F (θ1L1, θ2L2). Corollary 1 shows that this restriction can be deleted without replacement.
This is partly reassuring for existing work, as it shows that the restriction to labor-augmenting
technologies is not essential for the most basic results on endogenous technical change and wage
inequality. But more importantly, it allows to take these results to new types of models, especially
to models with labor-replacing technologies as those discussed in Section 2.5.
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L1
L2
l(τ)
L
L′
Ien1
Ien2
H(L)
Figure 2.2. The gure shows two alternative endogenous technology isoquants, Ien1 for the case of a
quasiconvex endogenous technology production function F and Ien2 for the quasiconcave case. In the
quasiconcave case, moving from L to L′ along the line H(L) reduces F monotonically. Therefore, the
ratio of marginal products w2/w1 must be below its initial value at L on the entire way to L′. The
opposite conclusion applies to the quasiconvex case.
2.3.2 The Total Eect
The preceding analysis shows that under fairly general conditions any increase in relative skill
supply induces skill-biased technical change. But the direct eect of an increase in relative skill
supply on the skill premium, holding technology constant, is typically negative, so the two eects
counteract each other. The following result provides exact conditions under which the induced
technical change eect dominates the direct eect or, in the words of Question 2 above, under
which an increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium after adjustment of technology.
This phenomenon is called strong relative bias of technology in previous work, and again results
only exist for dierentially labor-augmenting technology (cf. Acemoglu, 2007).
Proposition 2 (Special case of Theorem 3). Let L ∈ R2++ and suppose that w(L, θ∗(L)) is
homogeneous of degree zero in L. Then, there exists an increase in relative skill supply that strictly
raises the skill premium, formally: ∃L s L′ such that w(L, θ∗(L)) ≺p w(L′, θ∗(L′)), if and only
if the endogenous technology production function F (L) := F (L, θ∗(L)) is not quasiconcave.
Moreover, any increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium,L s L′ ⇒ w(L, θ∗(L)) p
w(L′, θ∗(L′)), if and only if F is quasiconvex.
Sketch of proof. The full proof is given in Appendix A.1.1. A sketch of it is provided here to convey
its main idea.
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The rst step is to note that, starting from any labor supply L, the scale invariance (or homo-
geneity of degree zero) of w(L, θ∗(L)) allows to restrict attention to changes along the line H(L)
that is tangent to the endogenous technology isoquant through L, that is, to the isoquant of the
endogenous technology production function F (dened in the proposition). Figure 2.2 shows
two alternative shapes of the endogenous technology isoquant through L. In one case (Ien1 ) F is
quasiconvex, in the other case (Ien2 ) F is quasiconcave. In the quasiconcave case, F is decreasing
along the path l(τ) that runs along H(L) from L to L′, in the quasiconvex case it is increasing
along this path.
Second, at any point on l(τ), an innitesimal move in direction of L′ along the line H(L) will
decrease (increase) F if and only if the marginal gain from increasing L2 exceeds (falls short
of) the marginal loss from decreasing L1. At L these two eects cancel each other exactly by
construction of H(L). Therefore, if F decreases (increases) along l(τ), the ratio of marginal
products of L2 and L1, w2/w1, must be smaller (greater) at any point on l(τ) than at L. It follows
that the endogenous technology skill premium w2(l(τ), θ∗(l(τ)))/w1(l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))) falls (rises)
in relative skill supply if F is quasiconcave (quasiconvex). This provides for the “only if” statement
in the rst part of the proposition and for the “if” statement in the second part.
The converse statements are obtained by noting that any failure of quasiconcavity (quasiconvex-
ity) allows to nd L, H(L), and an L′ on H(L) such that F must increase (decrease) in direction
of L′ at some point on the line segment between L and L′.
The requirement that w(L, θ∗(L)) is homogeneous of degree zero in L can be ensured by
slightly strengthening the condition in Remark 1.
Remark 2. Suppose F (L, θ) can be written as the composition of an inner function f(L, θ) that is
linear homogeneous in L and an outer function g(f) that is strictly increasing in f . Then, the
endogenous technology wages w(L, θ∗(L)) are homogeneous of degree zero in L.
Proposition 2 provides an exact link between skill premia that increase in relative skill supply
(strong relative bias) and curvature properties of the aggregate production function F . This reveals
an interesting theoretical analogy to endogenous growth theory. There, increasing returns to
scale in aggregate production are necessary for persistent growth in a large class of models (cf.
Romer, 1994; Acemoglu, 2009). While increasing returns to scale constitute a failure of concavity
along lines through the origin, the failure of concavity required in Proposition 2 concerns the
contour sets of F and is in this sense orthogonal to returns to scale.
From an applied modeling perspective, Proposition 2 is informative about how to set up a
model to analyze the case where skill premia increase in relative skill supply. In particular, it says
that one must depart from the baseline model of endogenous technology choices presented in
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Section 2.2, where identical rms choose their technologies independently of each other and hence
production functions must be (at least locally) concave in labor and technology. Appendix A.2.1 and
A.2.1 discuss two such ways of departure, both of which introduce some form of interdependence
between rms’ technology choices. The rst does so in an ad hoc way, assuming spillovers between
rms’ technologies without further specifying them. In the second model, interdependence occurs
via the market for technologies or innovations, where technology rms supply their innovations
to nal good rms, and non-rivalry of innovations implies that technology rms sell their ideas to
all active nal good rms at once (see Appendix A.2.1 for details on these models). In both cases,
interdependence between rms’ technologies breaks the requirement that production functions
are jointly concave in labor and technology, and hence allows for the failure of concavity required
by Proposition 2.
One can also interpret the baseline model presented in Section 2.2 as describing a process of
pure technology adoption whereas the other models incorporate some features of true innovation
(such as spillovers from imperfect protection of an individual rms’ knowledge, or imperfect
competition from the partial protection of intellectual property). Then, Proposition 2 admits the
conclusion that technology adoption alone is not sucient for strong relative bias of technology.
Some portion of innovation is needed for this to occur.
Previous work has considered a local version of strong relative bias. In the setting with labor-
augmenting technology, Acemoglu (2007) shows that this local version arises if and only if the
elasticity of substitution between the two arguments of the function F (θ1L1, θ2L2) exceeds
some threshold value. Since the labor-augmenting technology setting is a special case of my
analysis, Proposition 2 implies that the elasticity of substitution crosses this threshold exactly
when the upper contour sets of F change their curvature from convex to concave. While the
relation between skill premia that increase in relative skill supply and curvature properties of
the aggregate production function could already be anticipated from the specic existing results,
Proposition 2 formulates this relation precisely.
2.4 Directed Technical Change with Multiple Skill Levels
Consider now the general case with arbitrarily many skills. The next two subsections present the
more general theorems behind Propositions 1 and 2, while the third subsection discusses how to
extend these results to non-monotone changes in skill supply and skill premia. The main insight
is that the results from the previous section are not specic to the two skills case but generalize
quite naturally to settings with arbitrarily many skill levels.
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2.4.1 The Induced Technical Change Eect
For the two skills case, Proposition 1 provides conditions under which any increase in the relative
supply of skilled to unskilled labor induces skill-biased technical change. The following result
shows that the statement of Proposition 1 holds under exactly the same conditions for many skills.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the equilibrium technology θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero in L,
and that any two technologies θ, θ′ ∈ Θ can be ordered according to their skill bias, that is, either
θ b θ′ or θ′ b θ.
Then, any increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change:
L s L′ ⇒ θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Recalling the denitions of increases in relative skill supply and skill-biased technical change
for multiple skill environments, Theorem 1 says that an increase in all supply ratios of more versus
less skilled workers induces technical change that raises all skill premia in the model.
In the application Section 2.5, a slightly dierent version of Theorem 1 turns out to be useful.
This second version builds on a somewhat less demanding denition of skill-biased technical
change. Indeed, from an economic point of view, Denition 2 appears unnecessarily strong, as
it requires technical change to raise all skill premia at any point of the labor supply space to
qualify as skill-biased. What matters from an applied perspective, however, is that the change in
technology raises skill premia at those labor supply levels where it can actually happen; that is,
at those labor supplies where it increases aggregate production F . This leads to the following
alternative denition of skill-biased technical change.
Denition 3. A skill-biased technical change is a change in technology from θ to θ′ such that
F (L, θ) ≤ F (L, θ′)⇒ w(L, θ) p w(L, θ′).
We write θ b′ θ′.
Using this denition, Theorem 1 can be restated as follows.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the equilibrium technology θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero in L,
and that any two technologies θ, θ′ ∈ Θ can be ordered according to their skill bias following the
alternative Denition 3, that is, either θ b′ θ′ or θ′ b′ θ.
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Then, any increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change according to
Denition 3:
L s L′ ⇒ θ∗(L) b′ θ∗(L′).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Theorem 2 provides somewhat more exibility in applications, which is important especially
because the condition that any two technologies can be ordered according to their skill bias can
be quite restrictive in models with multiple skill types. Section 2.5.3 demonstrates its usefulness
in a case where Theorem 1 would not be applicable.
Finally, Appendix A.2.2 shows that there is still some slack in the conditions of Theorems 1 and
2. Indeed, both the scale invariance condition on θ∗ and the condition that any two technologies
can be ordered according to their skill bias can be slightly relaxed. Since this discussion is mainly
technical and does not play a role in the application part of the paper, it is deferred to the appendix.
The appendix also claries the relation of Theorem 1 to the main results of monotone comparative
statics developed by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
2.4.2 The Total Eect
Considering the total eect of an increase in relative skill supply, Proposition 2 says for the two
skills case that there exists an increase in relative skill supply that raises the skill premium if and
only if the endogenous technology production function F fails to be quasiconcave. Moreover,
any increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium if and only if F is quasiconvex. The
following result extends these insights to the general case with arbitrarily many skills.
Theorem 3. Suppose that w(L, θ∗(L)) is homogeneous of degree zero in L. Then, the following
statements hold.
(1) If there exists an increase in relative skill supply that strictly raises skill premia, formally:
∃L s L′ such that w(L, θ∗(L)) ≺p w(L′, θ∗(L′)), then F is not quasiconcave.
Moreover, if F is not quasiconcave along some line in direction of s, then there exists an
increase in relative skill supply that does not lower all skill premia, formally: ∃L s L′ such
that w(L′, θ∗(L′)) p w(L, θ∗(L)).
(2) If it holds that any increase in relative skill supply raises all skill premia, formally: L s L′ ⇒
w(L, θ∗(L)) p w(L′, θ∗(L′)), then F is quasiconvex along all lines in direction of s.
Moreover, if F is quasiconvex, then no increase in relative skill supply will lower all skill premia,
formally: L s L′ ⇒ w(L′, θ∗(L′)) ⊀p w(L, θ∗(L)).
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
The rst statement in Part 1 of the theorem replicates the only if part of the rst part of
Proposition 2: only if F is not quasiconcave, there can be an increase in relative skill supply that
strictly raises skill premia. This result captures the most important insight from Section 2.3.2
and extends it to the many skills case. It implies that one has to use models in which aggregate
production may fail to be quasiconcave to analyze cases where skill premia increase in relative
skill supply. As discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2, the possibility of a failure of quasiconcavity
in aggregate production is closely linked to the specic mechanisms that determine equilibrium
technologies in the model.
The converse of this main result, however, does not extend one-to-one to the many skills
environment. The reason for this is twofold. First, with high-dimensional skill supply, F may fail
to be quasiconcave in directions orthogonal to changes in relative skill supply. Such failures of
quasiconcavity do not have immediate consequences for the response of skill premia to increases
in relative skill supply and hence do not admit the conclusion that skill premia do not decrease in
relative skill supply. Second, in the two skills case, if the skill premium does not fall in relative
skill supply, it must necessarily increase, as it is one-dimensional. With many skills, however,
there may be instances where skill premia fall in relative skill supply in some ranges of skill but
increase in other ranges. The partial converse oered by Theorem 3 thus (i) restricts attention to
cases where F fails to be quasiconcave along lines in direction of changes in relative skill supply
and (ii) says that in such cases not all skill premia fall when relative skill supply increases. When
restricted to two skill levels, this statement becomes a full converse, so Part 1 of Theorem 3 covers
the rst part of Proposition 2 as a special case.
Analogous adjustments are required in Part 2 of Theorem 3 to extend the second part of
Proposition 2 to the many skills environment. Again, once attention is restricted to two skill
groups, Part 2 of Theorem 3 becomes an “if and only if” statement that replicates the second part
of Proposition 2 exactly.
The main takeaway from Theorem 3 is that the principal insight from the two skills case
regarding the type of models needed to analyze the case where skill premia increase in relative
skill supply extends to environments with arbitrarily many skills. The same holds for the analogy
to the non-concavities required for persistent growth in endogenous growth theory (see Section
2.3.2 for detailed discussion).
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2.4.3 Non-Monotonically Biased Technical Change
The previous discussion was focused on skill supply and wage changes that are monotone in skill,
in particular on increases in relative skill supply along the entire skill set and on increases in all
skill premia. Yet the results are more versatile than it may seem at rst glance. This is because
none of them requires wages to increase in the skill index s. Hence, the interpretation of a higher
s as denoting a more skilled type of labor is not implied by any of the formal results so far.
Consider for example a three skill setting with S = {1, 2, 3}. We can now interpret L1 as
the supply of middle-skill workers, L2 as low-skill, and L3 as high-skill workers. Then, under
the conditions of Theorem 1, any change in labor supply such that the low versus middle-skill
ratio and the high versus low-skill ratio increase will induce polarizing technical change; that is,
technical change that raises low-skill workers’ wages relative to middle-skill wages and high-skill
wages relative to low-skill wages.
The common notion of wage polarization, however, does not contain any restriction as to
whether high-skill wages increase relative to low-skill wages or vice versa. Accordingly, the
following denition of polarizing technical change dispenses with such a restriction. The notation
again follows the convention from the previous sections whereby a higher index denotes a more
skilled type of labor, that is, L1 denotes low-skilled, L2 middle-skilled, and L3 high-skilled labor.
Denition 4. Let L = (L1, L2, L3) ∈ R3++. A polarizing technical change is a change in
technology from θ to θ′ such that
w2(L, θ)
w1(L, θ)
≥ w2(L, θ
′)
w1(L, θ′)
and w3(L, θ)
w2(L, θ)
≤ w3(L, θ
′)
w2(L, θ′)
for all L.
We say that θ is less polarizing than θ′.
When adopting such a broader denition of polarizing technical change, the loss of information
about the change in the high to low-skill relative wage implies that the set of skill supply changes
for which we can sign the eect on polarizing technical change becomes smaller. The following
result identies such a set for the three skills case.
Theorem4. LetL ∈ R3++. Moreover, suppose that the equilibrium technology θ∗(L) is homogeneous
of degree zero in L, and that for any two technologies θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, either θ is less polarizing than θ′
according to Denition 4, or vice versa.
Then, any change in labor supply from L to L′ such that low- and high-skilled labor supply change
proportionately to each other and increase relative to middle-skilled labor induces polarizing technical
change.
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Formally, for any L and L′ with
L2
L1
≥ L
′
2
L′1
and
L3
L1
=
L′3
L′1
it holds that
w2(L
′, θ∗(L))
w1(L′, θ∗(L))
≥ w2(L
′, θ∗(L′))
w1(L′, θ∗(L′))
and
w3(L
′, θ∗(L))
w2(L′, θ∗(L))
≤ w3(L
′, θ∗(L′))
w2(L′, θ∗(L′))
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Theorem 4 applies to polarized changes in skill supply that are balanced, in the sense that the
relative increases in the supply of low versus medium and high versus medium skills must be
equal in size. It can be shown by examples that this restriction cannot be dispensed with. Yet, as
discussed above, when adopting a more exclusive denition of polarizing technical change that
signs all relative wage changes, the balancedness restriction can be dropped and the results of the
previous sections are readily applicable.
Since the focus of the paper is on monotonically skill-biased technical change, a more general
treatment of polarizing technical change beyond the three skills case seems inept here. Note at
this point, however, that there are a number of reasons for the focus on monotonically skill-biased
technical change. First, empirically, when identifying skill by education level, skill supply changes
in most developed economies have taken the form of monotone increases in relative skill supply
during the last decades. Second, there is evidence that technical change has been monotonically
skill-biased at least in the United States over the last four decades (Sevinc, 2018).13 Third, the
application part of the paper focuses on automation technology and the existing evidence on the
impact of automation technologies on the wage distribution supports the view that this impact
is monotonically skill-biased (Lewis, 2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019; Dauth et al., 2017). In
addition, recent attempts to forecast the future potential for automation across occupations nd
that the risk of automation decreases monotonically with average occupational education levels,
suggesting a monotonic skill bias of anticipated future automation (e.g. Frey and Osborne, 2017;
Arntz et al., 2016). Fourth, the analysis of changes in relative skill supply serves as a starting point
for analyzing the eects of further potential determinants of the skill bias of technical change such
13This does not contradict the observation that, over some periods, wage growth has been polarized across occupations,
with medium-paying occupations having experienced the smallest mean wage growth (as documented, for example,
in Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006 and Autor and Dorn, 2013). Both ndings are reconciled through the fact
that average skill and average wages are somewhat disconnected across occupations in the bottom part of the
occupational wage distribution, potentially due to systematic dierences in non-wage amenities of jobs (Sevinc,
2018).
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as international trade. Section 2.5.4 shows that in certain environments trade with a skill-scarce
country acts like a monotone decrease in relative skill supply, so the results of Sections 2.3.1 to
2.4.2 apply.
2.5 Endogenous Automation Technology
Dierentially labor-augmenting technology, as analyzed by previous work on directed technical
change, is a fairly abstract concept. Its relation to common intuitive notions of technical change is
loose at best. Moreover, it cannot deliver results on technical change that are directly testable
in empirical work, because labor-augmenting technology variables have no directly measurable
empirical counterpart.14
A more concrete formalization of technical change is given by labor-replacing technology in
models with a exible assignment of production factors to tasks. Such models formalize the
intuitive notion that technical progress allows the production of machines that take over tasks
previously performed by human labor.
An endogenous technical change analysis in this type of model thus has a number of benets
over the labor-augmenting technology approach.15 First, the results align well with intuitive
notions of technical change. Second, they can be tested directly in empirical work, as labor-
replacing technology variables can be identied with empirical measures of concrete automation
technologies.16 Third, they make statements about a form of technical change that is widely
perceived to be among the most important determinants of future changes in the employment and
wage structure. Finally, the literature on assignment models of the type analyzed here is growing
rapidly, with applications in labor (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), trade (e.g. Costinot and Vogel,
2010), growth (e.g. Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a), and public economics (e.g. Rothschild and
Scheuer, 2013). Bringing results on directed technical change to the assignment environment
keeps them connected to the newest strand of the theoretical literature on wage and income
inequality.
The following sections conduct such a directed technical change analysis in assignment models,
14Consequently, empirical examinations of models of endogenous labor-augmenting technology are restricted to
the reduced form relationship between labor inputs and wages, which captures both the direct and the induced
technical change eect and hence does not allow for precise conclusions about either one of them (e.g. Blum, 2010;
Morrow and Treer, 2017; Carneiro, Liu and Salvanes, 2019).
15See Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018c) for a complementary list of advantages of the labor-replacing technology
approach.
16See for example the use of counts of industrial robots as a measure for automation technology by Graetz and Michaels
(2018); Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019); Dauth et al. (2017); Abeliansky and Prettner (2017); Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018b), the use of survey data on the adoption of various automation technologies in manufacturing by Lewis
(2011), and the use of data on harvesting machines in agriculture by Clemens, Lewis and Postel (2018).
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applying the results developed in the previous part of the paper.
2.5.1 Setup
The analysis builds on the assignment model by Teulings (1995), augmented to incorporate capital
as an additional production factor. There is a continuum of tasks (or intermediate goods), indexed
by x ∈ X = [x, x], and a single nal good. Final good producers produce the nal good out of
tasks according to
Y = β
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) 
−1
(2.7)
with β > 0, and  > 0 being the elasticity of substitution across tasks. Task producers produce
tasks linearly from capital and labor,
Yx = α(x)Kx +
∫ s
s
γ(s, x)Ls,x d s,
where Kx denotes the amount (or density) of capital assigned to task x, Ls,x is the amount of
labor of skill s assigned to task x (or the joint density of labor over skills and tasks), and α(x) and
γ(s, x) are task specic productivities of capital and the dierentially skilled types of labor.
There is a continuum of skills, indexed by s ∈ S = [s, s], and labor supply {Ls}s∈S (or the
marginal density of labor over skills) is exogenous. The total amount of capital is denoted by
K =
∫ x
x Kx dx. Capital is produced at marginal cost r from nal good. This mimics the steady-
state of dynamic models in which capital is accumulated over time and the long-run interest rate
is xed by preferences and depreciation.
The nal good is the numéraire, task prices are denoted by px, wages by ws, and the price of
capital by pc. All rms maximize prots and all markets are competitive.
An equilibrium consists of wages, task prices, a price for capital, a joint distribution of labor over
tasks and skills, and distributions of capital and task output levels over tasks such that all markets
clear given prot maximizing behavior by rms.17 To simplify a more detailed characterization of
equilibrium, some of its basic properties are derived rst.
The pattern according to which capital and skills are assigned to tasks is determined by com-
parative advantage and hence by the shape of the productivity schedules α(x) and γ(s, x). Let
these schedules be strictly positive, twice dierentiable, and satisfy the following comparative
advantage assumption.
17Note that workers, who consume the nal good, supply labor inelastically, and own the rms, do not have any
meaningful choices, so they are omitted from the exposition.
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Assumption 2. More skilled workers have comparative advantage in higher x (henceforth, more
complex) tasks, that is,
γ(s, x′)
γ(s, x)
<
γ(s′, x′)
γ(s′, x)
for all s < s′ and x < x′.
Moreover, all workers have comparative advantage over capital in more complex tasks, that is,
α(x′)
α(x)
<
γ(s, x′)
γ(s, x)
for all s and x < x′.
The assumption about comparative advantage across skills gives a meaning to the task index x.
A higher x now indicates a task in which more skilled workers have comparative advantage. In
this sense x can be viewed as a measure of a task’s complexity.
The assumption about the comparative advantage between capital and workers, in contrast,
is more restrictive. It implies that capital will always perform a set of least complex tasks while
workers sort into tasks of higher complexity. Low-skilled workers will thus always be the rst to
lose their tasks to machines when automation technology advances. Though restrictive, there
are good reasons for this assumption in the present context. First, empirical studies suggest that
the use of industrial robots, an important form of automation technology in the manufacturing
sector, has negative eects on low-skilled workers’ wages and employment shares, while results
for medium-skilled workers are ambiguous and high-skilled workers may gain somewhat on
both margins (see Graetz and Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019).18 Second, recent
forecasts of the future potential for automation across occupations predict invariably that the
risk of automation decreases almost monotonically with average education levels of workers in
a given occupation (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Arntz et al., 2016; Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018).
Third, Lewis (2011) shows empirically that investment into various automation technologies in
US manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s was a substitute for the least-skilled but a complement
to medium-skilled workers.
As already noted, the comparative advantage assumption has clear implications for the sorting
of capital and workers into tasks. In particular, it implies that there is a threshold task x˜ such
that capital performs all tasks below x˜ while labor performs all tasks above. Moreover, more
18In more detail, Graetz and Michaels (2018) analyze a panel of industrialized countries and nd negative (positive)
eects of robot use on the share of hours worked and the wage bill share of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers,
whereas results for medium-skilled workers are insignicant. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) nd that across US
commuting zones the eects of robots on wages and employment to population ratios are monotonic over ve
education groups, with the largest negative eects for the least educated group. Observation periods in both studies
start in 1993 and end in 2005 (Graetz and Michaels) and 2007 (Acemoglu and Restrepo).
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skilled workers perform more complex tasks, such that the assignment of skills to tasks can be
summarized by a unique matching function m(s), which assigns a task to each skill s.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, there exists an automation threshold x˜ ∈ X and a strictly increasing
and continuous matching functionm : S → [x˜, x] such that
Ls,x > 0 if and only if x = m(s)
Kx > 0 if and only if x < x˜.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
This representation of the assignment of factors to tasks allows to give a detailed characterization
of equilibrium in terms of the automation threshold x˜ and the matching function m. Accordingly,
an equilibrium consists of
• an automation threshold x˜, a matching function m : S → [x˜, x], an assignment of capital
to tasks {Kx}x∈X , and task output {Yx}x∈X ;
• task prices {px}x∈X , wages {ws}s∈S , and a capital price pc;
such that
(E1) Yx = α(x)Kx if x < x˜ and Yx =
γ(m−1(x), x)Lm−1(x)
dm−1(x)
dx if x ≥ x˜;
(market clearing)
(E2) px = ∂Y∂Yx for all x, where Y is given by (2.7); (nal good rms)
(E3) m(s) ∈ argmaxx∈X γ(s, x)px for all s;

(task producers)
(E4) ws = γ(s,m(s))pm(s) for all s;
(E5) pc = r = αxpx for all x < x˜;
(E6) wsγ(s,x˜) =
r
α(x˜) .
Condition (E1) establishes that the markets for tasks, capital, and labor clear. It derives the
amount of labor used in a given task x (the marginal density of labor at x) via a change of
variable from the exogenous supply of skills Ls (the marginal density of labor at s), using the
assignment of skills to tasks m(s) and labor market clearing. (E2) follows from nal good rms’
prot maximization. Task producers’ prot maximization is reected in the remaining conditions:
each skill is assigned to the task where its marginal product is greatest (E3); this marginal product
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determines the wage (E4); capital is assigned where its marginal product is greatest and this
marginal product determines the price of capital, which in turn must be equal to capital’s marginal
cost (E5); and the threshold task x˜ is determined such that task producers are indierent between
using capital and skill s in this task (E6).
An immediate consequence of task producers’ prot maximization is that relative wages are
fully determined by the matching function. In particular, applying the envelope theorem to
conditions (E3) and (E4) yields19
d logws
d s
=
∂ log γ(s,m(s))
∂s
. (2.8)
As a nal remark, the marginal cost of capital must respect a lower bound to guarantee
equilibrium existence:
r > β
(∫ x
x
α(x)−1 dx
) 1
−1
.
This is because nal good and task production are linear in capital while capital production is
linear in nal good. Such linearity in circular production may enable innite output, analogously
to unbounded growth of the AK-type in a dynamic model, if the marginal cost of capital is too low.
2.5.2 Automation
The threshold task x˜ indicates the size of the set of tasks performed by capital, and hence measures
the extent of automation in the model. To analyze how automation, as measured by the threshold
task x˜, responds to changes in the supply of skills, apply the concepts of exogenous and endogenous
technology equilibrium introduced in Section 2.2. Thereby, x˜ takes the role of the technology
variable θ in the general analysis above. Thus, in an exogenous technology equilibrium x˜ is
xed exogenously while capital and labor sort endogenously into the tasks below (in the case of
capital) and above (in the case of labor) x˜. This sorting is determined by conditions (E1) to (E5),
while condition (E6), which determines x˜, is dropped. An endogenous technology equilibrium in
contrast corresponds exactly to the equilibrium denition above, characterized by the full set of
conditions (E1) to (E6).
Given these rened equilibrium denitions, the following lemma veries that the model ts
into the class of models covered by the general results of the previous sections.
19Conditional on the threshold task x˜, the assignment of labor is analogous to Costinot and Vogel (2010), who consider
the same model but without capital. Hence the determination of relative wages, conditional on x˜, is analogous to
their analysis as well. In the proof of their Lemma 2, they prove dierentiability of the wage function ws.
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Lemma 2. For any x˜ ∈ (x, x) there exists a unique exogenous technology equilibrium. Let F (L, x˜)
denote aggregate net production, that is, Y − rK , and w(L, x˜) denote wages in this equilibrium.
Then:
1. F (L, x˜) is linear homogeneous in L.
2. Wages correspond to marginal products in F , that is, w(L, x˜) = ∇LF (L, x˜).
3. Any increase in x˜ raises all skill premia, that is, x˜ ≤ x˜′ ⇔ x˜ b x˜′ according to Denition 2
of skill-biased technical change.
Moreover, for any labor supply L there exists a unique endogenous technology equilibrium with
automation threshold x˜∗(L) such that
4. x˜∗(L) ∈ argmaxx˜∈X F (L, x˜).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Most of the points of the lemma are straightforward up to some technical details. The economi-
cally most relevant result is that automation, represented by an increase in x˜, raises all skill premia
and therefore constitutes a skill-biased technical change. This is intuitive: since capital performs
the least complex tasks in the economy, any expansion in the set of automated tasks directly
displaces low-skilled workers from their tasks. In search for new tasks, low-skilled workers turn
towards more complex tasks, propagating the eects through the skill distribution. But since all
workers eventually end up at more complex tasks (where more skilled workers have comparative
advantage), skill premia must rise throughout the wage distribution.
Induced Technical Change Eect Consider now an increase in relative skill supply as in
Denition 1, that is, an increase in skill supply ratios along the entire skill set. Theorem 1 implies
that such an increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical change, or, in the
present context, automation.
Corollary 3. Any increase in relative skill supply induces automation, which itself raises all skill
premia, that is,
L s L′ ⇒ x˜∗(L) ≤ x˜∗(L′)⇒ w(L′, x˜∗(L)) p w(L′, x˜∗(L′)).
Proof. Lemma 2 establishes that all conditions of Theorem 1 are satised here, so Corollary 3
follows directly from Theorem 1, given that an increase in x˜ corresponds to skill-biased technical
change in the current model, x˜ ≤ x˜′ ⇔ x˜ b x˜′ (point 3 in Lemma 2).
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Since machines and workers are perfect substitutes in the production of tasks, the interaction
between labor supply and automation runs via task prices. In particular, an increase in relative skill
supply raises the prices of tasks performed by low-skilled workers, which makes it more attractive
for rms to automate these tasks. The more general force behind Corollary 3, as described in
Section 2.3.1, is that the production sector responds to the decrease in the relative supply of
less skilled workers by switching to technologies that are less reliant on low-skilled labor. Here,
low-skilled labor is less important the more tasks are automated, as indicated by the positive eect
of automation on the returns to skill. So, rms automate additional tasks in order to minimize
adverse eects from decreased (relative) availability of low-skilled workers.
Total Eect The total eect of an increase in relative skill supply on relative wages combines
the direct eect (at constant x˜) and the eect of the induced automation. By Theorem 3, whether
the direct of the induced technical change eect dominates depends crucially on the curvature of
the isoquants of aggregate net production in the endogenous technology equilibrium, F (L) :=
F (L, x˜∗(L)).
Here, rms make their automation decisions individually and independently of each other, as
in the baseline model of endogenous technology choices in Section 2.2. Therefore, aggregate pro-
duction is quasiconcave in labor supply and by Theorem 3 the strong bias phenomenon, whereby
all skill premia rise with relative skill supply, cannot occur. In addition, a direct consequence of
the fact that any increase in relative skill supply induces automation (Corollary 3) while capital
productivity remains unchanged is that low-skilled workers’ wages can never fall in absolute
terms in response to an increase in relative skill supply.
Lemma 3. The endogenous technology net aggregate production function, F (L) := F (L, x˜∗(L))
(where F is as dened in Lemma 2), is quasiconcave.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Corollary 4. There is no increase in relative skill supply that raises all skill premia after adjustment
of the degree of automation x˜∗. That is,
L s L′ ⇒ w(L, x˜∗(L)) b w(L′, x˜∗(L′)).
Moreover, any increase in relative skill supply raises the least skilled worker’s wage, that is,
L s L′ ⇒ ws(L, x˜∗(L)) ≤ ws(L′, x˜∗(L′)).
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Proof. The rst part follows directly from Lemma 3 and Theorem 3. The second part follows from
Corollary 3 and the fact that
ws(L, x˜
∗(L)) =
γ(s, x˜∗(L))
α(x˜∗(L))
r
by (E6), noting that γ(s, x)/α(x) increases in x for any s by comparative advantage (Assumption
2).
The result is intuitive: rst, the fact that automation is induced by an increase in the prices of
tasks performed by low-skilled workers implies that the induced automation can never fully oset
this increase in task prices; for if it did, automation would not occur in the rst place. Moreover,
since task production is linear, the increase in task prices is fully passed through to low-skilled
workers’ wages (the second part of Corollary 4). If now skill premia increased as well, all wages
and hence all workers’ marginal products would go up. But then individual rms could choose a
greater relative skill input and a higher automation threshold already in the initial equilibrium,
and thereby raise prots. Since this cannot be true by denition of equilibrium, the case where all
skill premia rise with relative skill supply cannot occur (the second part of Corollary 4).
This reasoning points towards the general force behind Corollary 4, as described in Section
2.3.2: in settings where rms choose their technologies individually and independently of each
other, if skill premia rose in relative skill supply, rms would demand more skilled workers in the
initial equilibrium already and adjust their technology accordingly. An important reason why
the present model of automation falls into this class of settings is that it describes a process of
pure technology adoption: given the productivity of machines, rms decide for each task whether
to use machines or not. The next section shows that once agents can invest into improving the
productivity of machines, quasiconcavity of aggregate net production may fail and strong bias
results can arise.
2.5.3 Automation and Machine Productivity
The decision whether to use machines or labor in a given set of tasks is clearly preceded by
the decision (potentially by a dierent set of agents) to invest into developing machines with a
certain set of abilities. A natural way to include such a decision in the model is to give agents the
opportunity to invest into improving capital productivity α(x). When investing into α(x) is the
only opportunity for agents to spend resources on research and development, the investment into
α(x) is obviously equal to total R&D expenditure. A probably more realistic approach is to give
agents the choice between dierent types of technologies in which to invest, thereby separating
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the factors that aect the direction of R&D spending from those that aect its overall amount. In
the following, agents will therefore face the choice whether to invest resources into improving
machine productivity α or nal good productivity β.20
To endogenize α and β, the market structure must be adjusted, as both nal good and task
production exhibit increasing returns to scale in input factors and technology variables jointly.
Following the monopolistic competition approach from endogenous growth theory, I therefore
assume that α and β are aggregates of monopolistically supplied intermediate goods (see Appendix
A.2.1 for a general version of monopolistic competition based models of directed technical change).
The monopolistic suppliers then invest R&D resources to improve their products.
In particular, nal good production now takes the form
Y =
∫ 1
0
βiq
κ
β,i d i
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)
−1
, (2.9)
where the qβ,i are technology-embodying intermediate goods to be described further below. Tasks
are produced according to
Yx =
∫ 1
0
αiq
κ
α,i d i α(x)K
1−κ
x +
∫ s
s
γ(s, x)Ls,x d s,
where, again, the qα,i are technology-embodying intermediate goods, which are required to
produce tasks using machines. Assumption 2 about comparative advantage is maintained, now
applying to a(x) and γ(s, x). To reduce notation, normalize α(x) ≡ 1. As before, capital is
produced at marginal cost r from nal good. The markets for nal good, capital, and tasks are
still perfectly competitive.
The technology-embodying intermediates, in contrast, are supplied under monopolistic compe-
tition. In particular, there is a continuum of α-monopolists, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], who produce
qα,i at marginal cost ηα from nal good. Analogously, there is a continuum of β-monopolists who
produce qβ,i at marginal cost ηβ from nal good.21 The inverse demand for qα,i, derived from task
producer optimization, is given by
pα,i = καiq
κ−1
α,i
∫ x˜
0
pxK
1−κ
x dx, (2.10)
20Increases in β may be thought of as a stylized description of the invention of new goods or higher quality versions of
existing goods, which generate additional utility for consumers. Increases in α in contrast are process innovations
that allow to produce a given set of goods with fewer inputs.
21In a slight abuse of notation, I use the same index to denote α- and β-monopolists. This shall not implicate that a
given monopolist produces both qα,i and qβ,i, although this would not change any argument.
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which makes use of the result from Lemma 1 (which carries over to the present setting) that capital
is used in a subset of tasks [x, x˜). Analogously, the inverse demand for qβ,i is
pβ,i = κβiq
κ−1
β,i
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)
−1
. (2.11)
Since both inverse demand functions are iso-elastic, monopolists will charge a constant markup
over marginal cost. Intermediate good prices will thus be given by pα,i = ηα/κ and pβ,i = ηβ/κ
in equilibrium.
In addition to supplying intermediate goods, α- and β-monopolists can also invest into the
quality of their products. For a quality level αi, an α-monopolist must employ R&D resources of
α
1/ρ
i , with ρ ∈ (0, 1− κ). Analogously, a β-monopolist must employ β1/ρi units of R&D resources
to obtain a quality level βi. In order to isolate eects on the direction of technical change from
eects on the aggregate amount of resources spent on R&D activities, x the total amount of R&D
resources at D.22 This implies an R&D resource constraint of
∫ 1
0
(
α
1/ρ
i + β
1/ρ
i
)
d i = D.
Denote the unit price of R&D resources by pD . Each α-monopolist then chooses αi to maximize
prots
piα,i(αi) = max
q
{
καiq
κ
∫ x˜
x
pxK
1−κ
x dx− ηαq − pDα1/ρi
}
.
With ρ ∈ (0, 1 − κ), it can be veried that prots are pseudoconcave in αi, so the rst order
condition for the choice of αi is necessary and sucient for an optimum:
ρκqκα,i
∫ x˜
x
pxK
1−κ
x dx = pDα
1−ρ
ρ
i . (2.12)
Analogously, β-monopolists’ prot maximization leads to the following rst order condition for
the choice of βi:
ρκqκβ,i
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)
−1
= pDβ
1−ρ
ρ
i . (2.13)
With this characterization of technology choices, the equilibrium denition from the previous
section can be extended appropriately. Since all α-monopolists and all β-monopolists choose the
same qα,i and αi, or, respectively, the same qβ,i and βi, it is convenient to dene an equilibrium in
terms of their symmetric choices qα, α, qβ , and β.
An equilibrium consists of
22This is equivalent to the assumption of a xed amount of “research labor” often made in dynamic models with
endogenously directed technical change; see, for example, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a).
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• an automation threshold x˜, a matching function m : S → [x˜, x], an assignment of capital to
tasks {Kx}x∈X , task output {Yx}x∈X , technology intermediate quantities qα and qβ , and
productivity levels α and β;
• task prices {px}x∈X , wages {ws}s∈S , a capital price pc, technology intermediate prices pα
and pβ , and a price of R&D resources pD;
such that
(E1)’ Yx = αqκαK1−κx if x < x˜ and Yx =
γ(m−1(x), x)Lm−1(x)
dm−1(x)
dx if x ≥ x˜;
(market clearing)
(E2)’ px = ∂Y∂Yx for all x, where Y is given by (2.9);
(nal good rms)(E3)’ qβ satises equation (2.11);
(E4)’ m(s) ∈ argmaxx∈X γ(s, x)px for all s;

(task producers)
(E5)’ ws = γ(s,m(s))pm(s) for all s;
(E6)’
( pα
κα
)κ ( pc
(1−κ)α
)1−κ
= px for all x < x˜ and pc = r;
(E7)’ wsγ(s,x˜) =
( pα
κα
)κ ( r
(1−κ)α
)1−κ
;
(E8)’ qα satises equation (2.10);
(E9)’ pα = ηακ and pβ =
ηβ
κ ;
(technology rms)(E10)’ α, β, and pD satisfy equations (2.12), (2.13), and α 1ρ + β 1ρ = D.
Compared to the previous section, conditions (E3)’ and (E8)’ to (E10)’ are new. (E3)’ and
(E8)’ determine the quantities of technology-embodying intermediate inputs as demanded by
task producers or nal good rms. (E9)’ and (E10)’ determine prices and productivity levels of
technology intermediates as chosen by the corresponding monopolists. The remaining conditions
are either unchanged or slightly adjusted to account for the fact that nal good and task production
now use the technology-embodying intermediate goods.
The full list of conditions (E1)’ to (E10)’ again denes an endogenous technology equilibrium,
in the sense that the technology variables of interest α and β are determined endogenously. An
exogenous technology equilibrium in contrast is characterized by conditions (E1)’ to (E9)’, given
an exogenously xed pair (α, β).
The following lemma veries that the extended model is still covered by the general results
obtained in Section 2.4.
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Lemma 4. For any (α, β) such that α1/ρ + β1/ρ = D, there exists a unique exogenous technology
equilibrium. Dene F (L,α, β) as a “modied aggregate production function”,
F (L,α, β) := Y − rK − ηα
κ
qα − ηβ
κ
,
with Y ,K , qα, and qβ being quantities in the exogenous technology equilibrium, and let w(L,α, β)
denote wages in the exogenous technology equilibrium. Then:
1. F (L,α, β) is linear homogeneous in L.
2. Wages equal marginal products, that is, w(L,α, β) = ∇LF (L,α, β).
3. For any (α, β), (α′, β′) that satisfy the R&D resource constraint and α ≤ α′ the following
holds:
F (L,α, β) ≤ F (L,α′, β′)⇒ w(L,α, β) p w(L,α′, β′).
Moreover, for any L and any
(α∗(L), β∗(L)) ∈ argmax
(α,β)∈D
F (L,α, β),
where D = {(α, β) ∈ R2+ | α1/ρ + β1/ρ = D} is the innovation possibilities frontier, there exists
an endogenous technology equilibrium with equilibrium productivity levels α∗(L) and β∗(L).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1. The proof also shows that the endogenous technology equilibrium
is unique whenever the innovation possibilities frontier is “suciently convex”, as indicated by
a suciently small ρ. Whenever the endogenous technology equilibrium is not unique, I select
the equilibrium with the highest α∗ in the following, in line with the selection rule imposed in
Section 2.2.
Note that F (L,α, β) here does not exactly correspond to net aggregate production in the model.
Indeed, in the denition of F , the marginal costs of technology intermediates, ηα and ηβ , are
replaced by the intermediates’ prices, ηα/κ and ηβ/κ. The idea behind this change is that, when
marginal costs are replaced in such a way, technology intermediates are supplied at the new
marginal costs in equilibrium, and hence the exogenous technology equilibrium can be analyzed
as if it were generated by perfect competition on all markets. This gives rise to the equality of
wages and marginal products of labor in point 2 of the lemma (see also the analysis of the general
version of monopolistic competition based models of endogenous technical change in Appendix
A.2.1).
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The second notable point of Lemma 4 is point 3: an increase in α, which here necessarily comes
at the cost of a reduced β, raises skill premia whenever it raises F . Generally, an increase in α has
two eects. On the one hand, machines become more productive, displace low-skilled workers,
and therefore raise skill premia. On the other hand, the corresponding decrease in β reduces
wages, while the price of capital remains constant. This sties automation and hence reduces
skill premia. Lemma 4 then shows that the former eect dominates when F increases. Hence, an
increase in capital productivity α that raises “modied aggregate production” F is a skill-biased
technical change.23
Induced Technical Change Eect Consider now an increase in relative skill supply. Lemma
4 establishes that all conditions for Theorem 2 are satised, so the theorem immediately implies
the following result.
Corollary 5. Any increase in relative skill supply induces an improvement in capital productivity,
which itself raises all skill premia, that is,
L s L′ ⇒ α∗(L) ≤ α∗(L′)⇒ w(L′, α∗(L), β∗(L)) p w(L′, α∗(L′), β∗(L′)).
Proof. Lemma 4 establishes that all conditions of Theorem 2 are satised. Theorem 2 then
immediately implies the corollary.
The result is closely related to Corollary 3 of the previous section. Corollary 3 says that an
increase in relative skill supply induces automation as it raises the prices of those tasks that are
technologically most prone to automation. The increase in automation in turn raises the incentive
to improve the productivity of machines, as they become more widely used.
Total Eect Indeed, automation and improvements in machine productivity reinforce each
other: the more widely machines are used, the greater is the incentive to improve them; and the
more productive machines are, the more widely they are used. This reinforcement mechanism
tends to “convexify” aggregate production and may thus, following Theorem 3, generate strong
bias results.
To see this concretely, consider the limit case where there is a subset of low-skilled workers
[s, s˜] who have no discernible comparative advantage over machines. Formally, for s ∈ [s, s˜],
γ(s, x) is constant in x and hence proportional to α(x) (recall the normalization α(x) ≡ 1). This
case itself does not satisfy Assumption 2, but it is the limit of a sequence of cases all covered
23More precisely, any increase in α along the innovation possibilities frontier is a skill-biased technical change
according to the alternative Denition 3.
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by the assumption. Since the equilibrium is continuous in the relevant parameters, we can still
analyze the limit case on the basis of Lemma 4 and Corollary 5. The only complication is that the
absence of strict comparative advantage between capital and workers with skill below s˜ means
that the assignment of these factors to tasks is no longer uniquely determined. This indeterminacy,
however, neither aects prices, nor task, nor nal good quantities. So we can safely ignore it when
analyzing the response of wages to changes in labor supply conditional on curvature properties
of aggregate production.
It can now be veried that aggregate net production is not quasiconcave in the limit case when
taking into account the endogenous adjustment of machine productivity.
Lemma 5. The endogenous technology production function F (L) := F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L)), where
F is dened as in Lemma 4, fails to be quasiconcave along some line in direction of s.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
According to Theorem 3, the failure of quasiconcavity established in Lemma 5 generates the
potential for strong bias. That is, skill premia may rise in response to an increase in relative skill
supply. As an example, consider a proportional increase in the supply of all skill levels above
s˜ by a factor of λ > 1. Holding machine productivity constant at its initial level, it is easy to
see that all wages remain unchanged. In particular, let x˜′ be the threshold task such that skills
above (below) s˜ sort into tasks above (below) x˜′ before the labor supply change, and suppose
that the task assignment for skills above s˜ remains unchanged when labor supply changes. Then,
capital adjusts in a way that raises all task quantities below x˜′ by the factor λ. This holds all task
ratios and hence all task prices unchanged, such that, given constant labor assignment, wages
will be unchanged as well. Constancy of wages in turn conrms the initial assumption of an
unchanged labor assignment. So, at constant machine productivity, skill premia do not change
in response to the specic increase in relative skill supply described above. But by Corollary 5,
machine productivity will increase in response to the increase in relative skill supply. This raises
all skill premia above their initial level, because the increase in machine productivity constitutes a
skill-biased technical change (by Lemma 4).
In addition, low-skilled workers’ wages will fall in response to any increase in relative skill
supply. This is because capital is a perfect substitute for low-skilled workers in all tasks, due to
the absence of comparative advantage between these factors. Therefore, when the productivity of
machines rises while their prices stay constant, low-skilled workers’ wages must fall.
Corollary 6. Consider the limit case where γ(s, x)/α(x) is constant in x for all s ≤ s˜ for some
s˜ ∈ (s, s). Then, skill premia may rise in relative skill supply. Consider for example an increase in
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relative skill supply from L to L′ such that L′s = λ1Ls for all s ≤ s˜ and L′s = λ2Ls for all s > s˜
with λ2 > λ1. This increase in relative skill supply raises all skill premia,
w(L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) p w(L′, α∗(L′), β∗(L′)).
Moreover, in the limit case low-skilled workers’ wages fall in response to any increase in relative
skill supply,
L s L′ ⇒ ws(L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) ≥ ws(L′, α ∗ (L′), β∗(L′))
for all s ≤ s˜.
Proof. The rst part follows from Lemma 5 and Theorem 3, the example is proven in the text for
λ1 = 1. It holds for arbitrary λ1 < λ2 by zero homogeneity of wages and technology in L. The
second part follows from the fact that, by the equilibrium condition (E7)’,
ws =
( pα
κα
)κ( r
(1− κ)α
)1−κ
γ(s, x˜), (2.14)
observing that γ(s, x) is constant in x in the limit case under consideration and that α increases in
response to any increase in relative skill supply by Corollary 5. The result extends to all skills s ≤ s˜
by noting that the ratios ws/ws are xed for all s ≤ s˜, due to the absence of strict comparative
advantage between these skills in the limit case.
The central mechanism behind the results of Corollary 6 is the reinforcement between automa-
tion and investment in machine productivity. At xed machine productivity, the automation
induced by an increase in relative skill supply never outweighs the direct eect of the increase in
relative skill supply on the skill premium (see Section 2.5.2). But automation raises the incentives
to improve the productivity of machines, which in turn reinforces automation in a way that may
ultimately overturn the direct eect eect and lead the skill premium to increase in total.
The general force behind this result is the failure of quasiconcavity in aggregate production,
which is enabled by the separation of technology and labor demand choices in the model (see
Section 2.3.2). In the case of strong bias, individual task producers would like to increase skilled
labor input, automation, and machine productivity jointly, as this would raise their prots (see
the discussion after Corollary 4). But machine productivity is chosen by technology rms, and
technology rms do not cater to an individual rm’s demand but to the aggregate demand of all
task producers. Aggregate technology demand of task producers, however, depends on aggregate
labor input, and aggregate labor input is restricted by labor supply. Technology rms therefore
choose machine productivity taking aggregate labor input as given, while task producers demand
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labor taking the available technology as given. Hence, even though all individual rms’ objectives
are concave, the aggregate production function may fail to be concave in labor and technology
jointly.
While Corollary 6 is restricted to the limit case, continuity arguments imply that its results hold
more broadly. In particular, strong bias and the drop in low-skilled workers’ wages are generally
likely whenever there are no tasks in which low-skilled workers maintain a strong comparative
advantage over machines. But even if such tasks exist, it is not clear that they are of great help to
the low-skilled. First, they may already be occupied by more skilled workers with a comparative
advantage over low-skilled workers in these tasks. Second, their number may be small relative to
the number of displaced workers, making their prices fall rapidly as low-skilled workers relocate.
Finally, in reality, though not in the present model, limits to (for example, spatial) mobility may
prevent low-skilled workers from accessing such tasks.
Discussion In summary, this section demonstrates that not only the use of automation technol-
ogy but also its development responds to increases in the relative supply of skill in a way that is
detrimental to low-skilled workers. An increase in relative skill supply induces automation, which
in turn stimulates investment into improving the underlying technologies. Such improvements
then further increase the incentives to automate tasks. In eect, low-skilled workers’ wages may
decline in total, both relative to more skilled workers’ wages and in absolute terms, when the
relative supply of skilled workers rises. This has potentially important implications for a rich set of
policies that aect labor supply dierentially at dierent points of the skill distribution. Minimum
wages, for example, may reduce employment among low-skilled workers and thereby both provide
incentives to replace such workers by machines and stimulate investment into improving these
machines. When the technological feasibility of automation increases, these eects may create
or exacerbate adverse employment eects of minimum wages. This is roughly in line with the
results of Lordan and Neumark (2018) who nd that minimum wage increases in the US over the
last decades, while not having large eects on overall employment, have signicantly reduced
employment in occupations that are particularly vulnerable to automation in terms of their task
mix. As another example, tax and benet systems in many European countries impose particularly
high marginal tax rates on low incomes (cf. OECD, 2011). This arguably restricts the labor supply
of low-skilled workers and hence may intensify automation along the lines analyzed above. Such
eects should clearly be taken into account when designing tax and transfer systems. A detailed
analysis of these issues is left for future research, as well as the pursuit of empirical approaches to
test the derived hypotheses.
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2.5.4 Automation, Machine Productivity, and International Trade
The previous sections have analyzed how the use and development of automation technology
depends on the supply of skills in the economy. The measure of skill supply in these analyses
should clearly capture the entire pool of workers whose performance is accessible to rms via
any type of (competitive) market. In a globalized world, however, rms do not only have access
to domestic workers via the labor market, but also to the performance of foreign workers via
international trade in tasks or, more broadly, intermediate goods. Therefore, the conditions under
which countries trade with each other should have important eects on technologies used in
general and on automation in particular. This section thus extends the model of the previous
section to a two country setting and analyzes the interaction between trade and automation.
To this end, consider two countries called North and South. Under autarky, the Northern
economy is described by the model of the previous section, where both the extent of automation
and the productivity of machines are endogenous. The Southern economy diers from the North
in exactly three aspects. First, it has no research sector but copies the technologies developed in
the North with some loss in productivity. In particular, let αN and βN denote productivity levels
in the North. Then, intermediate good rms in the South can produce goods of quality δαN and
δβN without incurring R&D costs, where δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the productivity loss relative to the
North. In the absence of R&D costs, intermediate goods are supplied competitively and hence
priced at marginal costs ηα and ηβ in equilibrium. It follows that the Southern economy uses less
advanced technologies than the North but does not feature R&D-related monopoly distortions.
Let δ < κ, such that the quality-adjusted price of intermediate goods in the South is greater than
in the North, and the aggregate production process in the South is less ecient. The second
dierence between the two countries is that the South is skill-scarce relative to the North, that
is, LS s LN with LS and LN denoting labor supply in the South and the North, respectively.
Finally, I follow Costinot and Vogel (2010) and assume that labor productivity is lower in the
South than in the North, γS(s, x) = ∆γN (s, x), with ∆ ∈ (0, 1]. While irrelevant for all results
discussed below, this assumption allows for dierences in the wage levels conditional on skill
between North and South, even when tasks can be traded across countries.
An autarky equilibrium is dened as the union of: (i) an endogenous technology equilibrium
as by conditions (E1)’ to (E10)’ for the North, and (ii) an exogenous technology equilibrium,
characterized by conditions (E1)’ to (E8)’ plus the price condition pSα = ηα and pSβ = ηβ (replacing
condition E9’ due to the absence of monopoly distortions), for the South, with Southern technology
(αS , βS) given by (δααN , δββN ).
Autarky is contrasted with a situation where all types of goods, that is, tasks, technology-
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embodying intermediates, and the nal good, can be traded between the two countries.24 In
such a situation, Northern technology monopolists will serve the entire world market, since they
produce output of higher quality at the same marginal cost as Southern technology rms. It
follows that task and nal good producers use the same technology in both countries, with the
exception that Southern labor productivity is reduced by the factor ∆ across all tasks. Under these
conditions world production of the dierent types of goods and world prices will be the same as in
a hypothetical scenario of full integration of both countries where Southern labor, scaled down by
the productivity handicap ∆, moves to the North. This full integration scenario in turn is identical
to an autarky equilibrium in the North with labor supply given by LN + ∆LS instead of LN . We
can hence equate the eects of trade integration on capital productivity αN (the world technology
frontier) and on Northern wages wN with the eects of a change in labor supply from LN to
LN + ∆LS . Appendix A.1.2 derives this equality formally, constructing equilibrium conditions
for world quantities and prices under trade integration that are equivalent to conditions (E1)’ to
(E10)’ from the closed economy setting. The only formal dierence between the conditions for
world quantities and prices and the conditions for an autarky equilibrium in the North is then
that the former use world labor supply LN + ∆LS where the latter use Northern labor supply
LN only.
Induced Technical Change Eect Given that the eects of trade integration on capital pro-
ductivity αN are identical to the eects of increasing labor supply by ∆LS , Corollary 5 implies
the following result.
Corollary 7. Trade integration with the South induces an improvement in the productivity of
nal good production βN at the expense of reduced capital productivity αN in the North; that is,
αNT ≤ αN , where αNT denotes capital productivity under trade integration and αN Northern
capital productivity under autarky.
Proof. It is easy to verify that LS s LN implies LN + ∆LS s LN . Corollary 7 then follows as
a consequence of Corollary 5, given that the eects of trade integration are equal to the eects
of changing labor supply from LN to LN + ∆LS . This equality is derived formally in Appendix
A.1.2.
To understand Corollary 7 on an intuitive level, note that the North imports tasks performed
by low-skilled workers from the South, because the South is abundant in low-skilled labor. In
exchange, the North exports technology-embodying intermediates, nal good, and, potentially,
24The results are robust to alternative assumptions about which types of goods are tradable and which are not. See the
discussion in footnote 26 below.
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tasks performed by high-skilled workers.25 The low-skill-intensive imports from the South reduce
the prices of tasks performed by low-skilled workers in the North. This reduces the wages of
Northern low-skilled workers, while the cost of capital remains constant. It follows that the
incentive to automate tasks performed by low-skilled workers decreases. The thus induced
reduction in the use of automation technology in turn also reduces investment into improving
these technologies, hence αN falls.
Total Eect The reduction in the use of automation technology and the decline in investment
into its improvement reinforce each other. By the arguments provided in the preceding section,
this reinforcement may lead to an overall increase in low-skilled workers’ wages from trade
integration in the North, both relative to high-skilled workers’ wages and in absolute terms. Again,
this is particularly likely if low-skilled workers and machines are highly substitutable, that is, if
machines have no strong comparative advantage in the tasks they would perform in autarky (see
Section 2.5.3). In particular, Corollary 6 implies the following results for the eects of trade in the
North.
Corollary 8. Consider the limit case where γN (s, x)/α(x) is constant in x for all s ≤ s˜ for some
s˜ ∈ (s, s). Then, skill premia may fall in the North in response to trade integration with the South.
Consider for example a situation where LSs = λ1L
N
s for all s ≤ s˜ and LSs = λ2LNs for all s > s˜
with λ1 > λ2. In this situation, trade integration reduces all skill premia in the North,
wNT p wN ,
where wNT denotes Northern wages under trade integration and wN under autarky.
Moreover, in the limit case Northern low-skilled workers’ wages rise in response to trade integration
for any LS s LN ,
wNTs ≥ wNs
for all s ≤ s˜.
Proof. Given that the eects of trade integration with the South are equivalent to the eects of a
change in skill supply from LN to LN + ∆LS (shown formally in Appendix A.1.2), Corollary 8
follows directly from its closed economy counterpart, Corollary 6.
25Indeed, there is some degree of indeterminacy regarding the trade of nal goods and technology intermediates
in equilibrium. The South can either import technology goods from the North and produce the nal good itself,
or import the nal good directly. To which extent the South makes use of either option is unclear. There is a
continuum of possible outcomes, with two polar cases: rst, the South imports all its nal goods but no technology
intermediates; second, it produces all its nal good consumption itself, importing technology intermediates for that
purpose. The indeterminacy, however, only aects the division of nal good production between North and South.
The overall production of goods in the world is unaected, as are prices and wages.
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Intuitively, trade with the South has two opposing eects on Northern low-skilled workers.
First, they are exposed to import competition from the South as tasks produced by low-skilled
workers are cheap in the South due to its abundance in low-skilled labor. This is the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin eect, which puts downward pressure on low-skilled workers’ wages in the
North. Second, the reduction in automation, reinforced by the decline in machine productivity,
expands employment opportunities for low-skilled workers and hence raises their wages. This
eect is especially strong when the productivity proles of low-skilled workers and machines
are similar, such that low-skilled workers can benet a lot from the retreat of machines. In this
case, the automation eect dominates, such that the wages of Northern low-skilled workers
rise, in relative and absolute terms, in response to trade integration, contrary to the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin prediction.
The eect of trade integration on the Southern wage distribution is twofold as well. First, the
standard Heckscher-Ohlin eect reduces skill premia, because the South is skill-scarce relative
to the North. Second, the advanced Northern technology becomes available to the South, either
directly via trade in technology-embodying intermediates or indirectly via trade in tasks. This
exposes Southern low-skilled workers to competition from advanced Northern machines, and
hence raises skill premia. The technology eect is likely to dominate when (i) the productivity
dierence between North and South is large under autarky, that is, δ is large; (ii) the reduction in
Northern investment into automation technology induced by trade integration is small; and (iii)
Heckscher-Ohlin eects are weak, for example, because the supply of skills is similar in the North
and the South.
It is indeed straightforward to prove that trade integration can reduce low-skilled workers’
wages in the South by constructing an extreme example. Suppose that skill supply is nearly
identical between North and South, and that δ  κ such that the South uses much less advanced
technology than the North in autarky. Then, Heckscher-Ohlin eects and the eect of trade
integration on Northern capital productivity will be negligible, as there is hardly any dierence in
the relative supply of skills between the Northern and the world economy. The eect on Southern
capital productivity, however, will be large, because trade makes the much more advanced Northern
technology accessible to Southern rms. This eective increase in capital productivity will reduce
low-skilled workers’ wages in the South if the comparative advantage of low-skilled workers over
capital is weak across tasks, as explained in more detail in Section 2.5.3.
Discussion In summary, trade with a skill-scarce country discourages both the use and the
development of automation technology in a skill-abundant country. Moreover, if the skill-abundant
country is technologically more advanced than the skill-scarce country, trade exposes low-skilled
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workers in the skill-scarce country to competition from the advanced machines of the skill-
abundant country. These eects may overturn the standard Heckscher-Ohlin eects in both
countries.26
From a theoretical perspective, it is insightful to compare the eects of trade on automation
technology with the eects of trade on labor-augmenting technology from Acemoglu (2003).
Acemoglu shows that trade with a skill-scarce country, assumed to have no independent R&D
sector (as above), induces a skill-biased change in labor-augmenting technology. The reason is that
with labor-replacing technology the interaction between labor and technology exclusively works
via task prices. With labor-augmenting technology in contrast there is also a quantity-related
eect, called the market size eect in Acemoglu (2002, 2003), because technology variables multiply
with (instead of add to) labor supply.27
From an empirical perspective, the negative eect of trade on automation seems roughly in
line with the low correlation between measures of exposure to industrial robots and exposure to
Chinese imports across US commuting zones found in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019).28 While one
might expect both industrial robots and Chinese imports to aect a similar set of industries (manu-
facturing industries intensive in low-skilled labor) and therefore a similar set of commuting zones,
the correlation between the two exposure measures, conditional on a coarse set of covariates is
even slightly negative (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019, p. 15). On the industry level, the automotive
industry experienced by far the largest increase in the number of robots per worker between 1993
and 2007, but hardly any increase in the value of imports from China. The increase in the value of
imports from China on the other hand was most pronounced in the textile industry, where the
26Note also that the results are robust to alternative assumptions about which types of goods can be traded and
which not. Whether the nal good is traded in equilibrium, is indeterminate anyway (see footnote 25). The results
therefore do not change if the nal good cannot be traded. In this case, both countries produce all their nal
good consumption themselves, and the South relies on technology imports from the North for that purpose. The
dierence to the baseline case (where all types of goods are traded) is only in the division of nal good production
between the two countries; world quantities and prices are unchanged. If, instead, technology intermediates cannot
be traded, the South imports all its nal good consumption from the North, but no technology goods. Again, only
the division of nal good production is aected, while world quantities and prices are unchanged relative to the
baseline scenario. It is, however, crucial for the results that tasks can be traded. Without trade in tasks, wage
structures and the extent of automation may dier strongly between the two countries. Technology rms will then
cater to a weighted average of the two countries’ demands, and it is unclear how this aects R&D investment and
automation decisions relative to the autarky case.
27The rst part of this paper shows that regarding the eects of changes in labor supply on the skill bias of production
technology, there is essentially no dierence between labor-augmenting and labor-replacing technology. Now I
nd that the eects of trade are opposite under these two regimes. The reconciliation is that for labor-replacing
technology the eects of trade and changes in labor supply are the same, whereas this does not hold for labor-aug-
menting technology.
28These measures are constructed using changes in the number of robots (the value of Chinese imports) in a detailed
set of industries between 1993 (1990) and 2007, and weighting these changes by the industries’ employment shares
at some prior date in each commuting zone.
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number of robots per worker did virtually not increase. A loose interpretation of the developed
theory would suggest the following explanation: since trade costs are higher for automobile parts
than for textiles (due to the higher weight and volume), oshoring low-skill-intensive tasks to
China is more attractive in the textile than in the automotive industry. Via the channels discussed
above, this reduces the incentive to automate tasks in the textile relative to the automotive industry.
Automation technologies such as industrial robots are therefore primarily used (and developed
for use) in the automotive, not in the textile industry. A rigorous empirical analysis of these
issues, building on a richer set of control variables and appropriate strategies to obtain exogenous
identifying variation for the eect of trade on automation, is left for future research.
A further empirical observation that is broadly supportive of the predictions derived above comes
from the debate around reshoring, which denotes the relocation of, primarily manufacturing,
production from emerging or developing countries to developed economies. Backer, Menon,
Desnoyers-James and Moussiegt (2016) report that such reshoring activities are related to increased
capital investment but not to signicant employment creation in the developed economy to which
production relocates. This is in line with the model’s prediction that tasks which are produced
in the advanced economy instead of being oshored to a skill-scarce country are likely to be
automated if they are intensive in low-skilled labor. Automation in response to reshoring would
then explain the observation of increased capital investment without employment growth. Even
more closely related to the predictions of the model, Krenz et al. (2018) nd a positive correlation
between reshoring and the use of industrial robots across several manufacturing industries in
panel of mainly industrialized countries.
From a policy perspective, the negative relation between automation and trade is relevant for the
design of policies regulating the trade between developed and emerging or developing countries.
It casts some doubt on policies that aim to protect low-skilled workers in advanced economies
by restricting trade with skill-scarce countries. In particular, the theoretical results suggest
that such policies may seriously backre: by stimulating use and development of automation
technology, such policies may eventually leave low-skilled workers in the advanced economy
no better or even worse o than before. A rigorous theoretical analysis of optimal trade policy
when automation responds endogenously may be another promising task for future research (see
Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel and Werning, 2015 for an optimal trade policy analysis in assignment
models when labor is the only production factor).
The predicted negative eect of Northern automation technology on Southern low-skilled
workers is related to recent estimates of the share of employment that is susceptible to automation
from a technological point of view in dierent countries. The World Development Report 2016
(World Bank, 2016) estimates this share to be higher in developing than in developed countries.
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The report also notes that barriers to and time lags in the adoption of new technologies are likely
to mitigate the impact of automation on developing countries. To the extent that such barriers
and time lags are related to trade restrictions, this is in line with the predictions of the theory.
A more concrete manifestation of the impact of Northern automation technology on Southern
workers may be the persistent food trade decit of many African countries that evolved in the mid
1970s (e.g. Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate and Paschali, 2012). While subsidization of food production in
advanced economies is often cited as a reason for these decits, the theory developed here suggests
that they might even occur in the absence of policy interventions: since agriculture is highly
automated in advanced economies, it may be at a comparative advantage relative to agricultural
production in developing countries, which still largely relies on human labor.29 Agricultural
imports can then be expected to hurt the typically poor and uneducated rural population in
developing countries. The impact will be particularly severe when opportunities to evade the
competition from foreign machines are rare. In the case of agriculture workers, such opportunities
may consist of manufacturing jobs, which require workers to migrate from rural to more urbanized
areas. Impediments to this form of migration, such as a lack of infrastructure and (aordable)
housing space in the urbanized areas, may then create the shortage of alternative employment
possibilities emphasized by the theory.
2.6 Conclusion
The rst part of the paper develops general results, based on simple concepts, about the eects
of the supply of skills on the skill bias of technical change. The results are independent of the
functional form of aggregate production, hold for a variety of dierent microfoundations of
endogenous technology choices, for settings with more than two and potentially innitely many
dierent levels of skill, and apply to both discrete and innitesimal changes in the supply of
skills. They show that under a scale invariance restriction on the skill bias of technology any
increase in the relative supply of skills induces skill-biased technical change. Moreover, the total
eect of an increase in relative skill supply on skill premia, accounting both for the induced
technical change eect and the direct eect, can be positive only if aggregate production fails
to be quasiconcave. This generalizes upon existing results, which are limited to the special case
of dierentially labor-augmenting technology, two skill levels, and innitesimal changes in the
supply of skills.
29The expectation that free trade may not necessarily improve the food trade position of developing countries is
also implicitly reected in the series of WTO negotiations on agricultural trade. Both the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture from the Uruguay Round of 1995 and the more recent Nairobi Package from 2015 provide comprehensive
exemptions to developing countries from requirements to cut import taris and export subsidies.
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The second part uses the developed theory to derive novel predictions on endogenous automa-
tion technology in assignment models of the type proposed by Teulings (1995). In the model
investigated, a continuum of dierentially skilled workers and capital, taking the form of machines
that perfectly substitute for labor in the production of tasks, are assigned to a continuum of tasks,
which in turn are combined to produce a single nal good. Three results stand out. First, any
increase in relative skill supply induces automation, as measured by the set of tasks performed by
machines. Second, when machine productivity is endogenous, an increase in relative skill supply
does not only stimulate automation but also investment into improving machine productivity.
Such investments and automation reinforce each other, potentially leading to a situation where
low-skilled workers’ wages decrease, both relative to high-skilled workers’ wages and in absolute
terms, in response to an increase in relative skill supply. Third, in a two country setting the
reinforcement mechanism between automation and investment into machine productivity may
overturn the standard Heckscher-Ohlin eects from international trade. In particular, trade with a
skill-scarce country reduces incentives for the use and development of automation technology in
the skill-abundant country, potentially leading to (relative and absolute) increases in low-skilled
workers’ wages. In the skill-scarce country in contrast, low-skilled workers are exposed to compe-
tition from the advanced machines of the skill-abundant country, potentially causing their wages
to decline in response to trade.
There are several starting points for future research. First, the results of the rst part and
the results on the eects of skill supply on automation may serve as a starting point for future
explorations of the implications of endogenous technical change in general and endogenous
automation in particular for the design of redistributive policies, such as redistributive labor
income taxation. The results on the interaction of international trade and automation may as well
be the starting point for an analysis of optimal trade policy along the lines of Costinot et al. (2015).
Second, the predictions on determinants of the use and development of automation technology
from the second part should be of interest for empirical work. Especially the predictions on the
eects of trade on automation are testable once a suitable source of exogenous variation across
observational units in the exposure to trade is found. Finally, moving beyond the analysis of low-
skill automation by relaxing the assumption that machines always have comparative advantage
versus workers in less complex tasks seems an important goal for future theory.
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3 Redistributive Income Taxation with
Directed Technical Change
Author: Jonas Löbbing
3.1 Introduction
Technical change is widely considered an important determinant of changes in the wage structure
of an economy and hence of rst-order importance for the design of redistributive tax schemes.
Existing work analyzes how redistributive taxes respond optimally to exogenous changes in
production technology that aect the wage distribution (e.g. Ales, Kurnaz and Sleet, 2015). But
technologies are developed and adopted by rms pursuing economic objectives (e.g. Acemoglu,
1998, 2007), so they should respond to perturbations of the economy such as tax reforms. In
particular, previous work on directed technical change has theoretically proposed and empirically
substantiated that the supply of skills in an economy is an important determinant of the extent
to which technology favors skilled workers and thereby raises wage inequality (e.g Acemoglu,
1998; Lewis, 2011; Carneiro et al., 2019). At the same time a large literature on redistributive
taxation shows that (non-linear) labor income taxes distort the supply of labor at dierent levels
of skill (e.g. Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Chetty, 2012). Changes in labor income taxes should thus
be expected to induce changes in technology, which in turn aect pre-tax wage inequality. Taking
into account these technology responses in the analysis of income tax policy seems an important
task for taxation theory.1
This paper therefore analyzes the design of non-linear labor income taxes when technology is
determined endogenously through the prot-maximizing decisions of rms. For that purpose, I
develop a general but tractable model of the economy that features both endogenous labor supply
of a continuum of dierentially skilled workers and endogenous technology development and
adoption choices of rms.
1An alternative approach is to consider direct taxes on specic technologies, as, for example, in Thuemmel (2018)
and Costinot and Werning (2018). Yet, it is unlikely that in practice such direct taxes can be targeted perfectly to
all technologies that raise wage inequality. Whenever the targeting of direct taxes is imperfect, there is scope for
exploiting directed technical change eects via the income tax, which is what I focus on here.
51
3 Redistributive Income Taxation with Directed Technical Change
In the model, technical change is driven by technology rms’ decisions in which type of
technology to invest. Some types are more complementary to high-skilled workers, some are
more complementary to low-skilled workers. Technology rms’ investment decisions depend on
nal good rms’ demand for intermediate goods that embody the dierent types of technologies.
This intermediate good demand in turn crucially depends on the structure of labor supply rms
face on the labor market. If there is a relatively large supply of low-skilled workers, rms demand
technologies that are relatively complementary to the low-skilled; if the supply of high-skilled
workers is relatively large, rms demand more skill-biased technologies.
Income taxes interact with technology via the structure of labor supply. For example, raising
marginal tax rates for high incomes and reducing them for low incomes discourages labor supply
of high-skilled and encourages labor supply of low-skilled workers. This shifts rms’ demand
towards less skill-biased technologies, to which technology rms respond by shifting investment
towards such technologies. Intuitively, progressive tax reforms should therefore induce technical
change in favor of less skilled workers.
I examine this intuition formally and investigate its implications for the design of optimal taxes.
To this end, I rst show that the model’s equilibrium has a parsimonious reduced form, which
makes the tax analysis tractable. Importantly, the reduced form equations determining wages
and technology are well studied by the theory of directed technical change (e.g. Acemoglu, 2007;
Loebbing, 2018). Moreover, Acemoglu (2007) shows that they apply to a large set of directed
technical change models studied in the literature. This makes my tax analysis, which is based
exclusively on the reduced form, generic within the theory of directed technical change.
Turning to the analysis of income taxes, I rst study the eects of tax reforms on the direction of
technical change. In line with the intuition developed above, I nd that, under certain conditions,
progressive tax reforms induce technical change that compresses the pre-tax wage distribution.
Hence, a progressive tax reform not only achieves a more equal distribution of post-tax incomes
but potentially also lowers pre-tax wage inequality.
This is reected in the shape of the optimal tax. Compared to a suitably dened benchmark with
exogenous technology, the optimal tax is more progressive, featuring higher marginal tax rates
at the top and lower marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution. Intuitively, the
optimal tax capitalizes on the reduction in pre-tax wage inequality brought about by the technical
change induced by a more progressive tax.
The benchmark scenario with exogenous technology still features a non-linear, concave produc-
tion structure, which gives rise to complementarities between dierent workers’ labor inputs as
in Stiglitz (1982) and Sachs, Tsyvinski and Werquin (2020). Comparing optimal taxes instead to an
appropriately specied scenario with completely exogenous wages (as in Mirrlees, 1971, and most
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of the subsequent literature), the results depend on whether directed technical change dominates
the eects from imperfect worker substitution within a given technology. If directed technical
change dominates – which is theoretically possible and empirically plausible – the optimal tax is
even more progressive than in the scenario with exogenous wages. Otherwise, the optimal tax is
sandwiched between the case with exogenous wages and the case with exogenous technology.
Hence, directed technical change not only mitigates but potentially even reverses the impact of
within-technology complementarity between workers on the optimal tax.
To assess the quantitative relevance of these results, I calibrate the model based on the empirical
literature on directed technical change. I rst quantify the eects of tax reforms on the wage
distribution. In this regard, my theoretical results imply that regressive tax reforms induce skill-
biased technical change. I therefore ask whether the regressive reforms of the US tax system since
the 1970s, via directed technical, have played a role in the concurrent rise of US wage inequality.
For that, I simulate the eects of reversing the cumulative reforms of the US tax and transfer
system between 1970 and 2005, by taking the tax system back from its 2005 to its 1970 state. With
an optimistic calibration of directed technical change eects – in which directed technical change
dominates the eects of within-technology complementarities – I nd that the hypothetical reform
reduces the 90-10-percentile ratio of the wage distribution by up to 2.6%. Inversely, by the same
metric, the regressive reforms between 1970 and 2005 can account for up to 9% (2.6% out of a total
of 30%) of the total concurrent rise in US wage inequality.2
Turning to optimal taxes, the impact of directed technical change is substantial. Relative to the
exogenous technology benchmark, optimal marginal tax rates increase by 3 to 8 percentage points
on high incomes and decrease by 5 to 17 percentage points on low incomes. With an optimistic,
but still empirically plausible, calibration of directed technical change eects, the optimal tax
is also signicantly more progressive than in the benchmark with exogenous wages. With the
same calibration, optimal marginal tax rates increase monotonically over the bulk of the income
distribution, while they follow a pronounced U-shape when ignoring directed technical change
(in the exogenous technology benchmark).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.3 presents the model, introduces special cases,
and denes some key elasticity concepts. Section 3.4 states important results from the theory of
directed technical change, which provide the basis for the analysis in the present paper. Section 3.5
contains the analysis of tax reforms, while Section 3.6 studies optimal taxes. Section 3.7 quanties
2The worker side of the model is kept deliberately simple to enable a non-parametric (or, Mirrleesian) optimal tax
analysis. Thereby, it ignores some adjustment margins to taxes, such as endogenous education or occupation
choices, which might amplify the eects of tax reforms on the wage distribution. The true eect of the regressive tax
reforms on US wage inequality may thus be well above 9% of the actually observed increase. A more comprehensive
analysis of this question is left for future research.
53
3 Redistributive Income Taxation with Directed Technical Change
the results from the preceding sections and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
My analysis connects the literature on (endogenously) directed technical change with the literature
on the optimal design of non-linear labor income taxes.
In the literature on optimal taxation, it is closely related to Stiglitz (1982) and Sachs et al. (2020).
These papers analyze the implications of complementarity between dierent types of workers for
the design of non-linear labor income taxes. They nd that accounting for such complementarity
reduces optimal marginal tax rates at the top and increases them at the bottom of the income
distribution. I extend their analysis to incorporate directed technical change eects. Directed
technical change counteracts (within-technology) complementarity between workers. Hence,
I nd that accounting for directed technical change reduces optimal marginal tax rates at the
bottom and increases them at the top. With a conservative calibration of directed technical change
eects, directed technical change and within-technology complementarity eects oset each
other approximately and the results are close to those obtained with exogenous wages (as, e.g.,
in Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001). With a more optimistic calibration of directed technical change
eects, directed technical change dominates and makes the optimal tax more progressive than
with exogenous wages.
In a conceptually similar contribution, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) extend a model à la Stiglitz
(1982) to incorporate endogenous sorting into occupations. Occupational switching mitigates,
but never overcompensates, complementarity between occupations. Hence, with endogenous
occupation choices, optimal marginal tax rates are bounded between those with exogenous
wages (on the progressive end) and the Stiglitz (1982) case with complementarities but without
occupational switching (on the regressive end). The implications of directed technical change
are qualitatively dierent, because with directed technical change, overcompensation of (within-
technology) complementarity eects is a possibility and the optimal tax can be more progressive
than with exogenous wages.
Ales et al. (2015) and Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018b) (see also Jacobs and Thuemmel 2018a)
analyze the eects of skill-biased technical change on optimal taxes. They treat skill-biased
technical change as an exogenous change in the production technology, whereas in my analysis,
the degree to which technology is skill-biased is endogenous and responds to the tax system. My
approach to the analysis of technical change and taxes is therefore conceptually dierent from
theirs and produces dierent results.
Another set of related studies analyzes optimal direct taxes on specic technologies, such as
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industrial robots (Guerreiro, Rebelo and Teles, 2018; Thuemmel, 2018; Costinot and Werning,
2018).3 In these studies, direct taxes can be perfectly targeted towards a particular technology, the
labor market impact of which is known. While optimal in theory, this is challenging in practice:
besides detailed information about the labor market impact of the technology and its various
applications, it requires that the government be able to monitor which technology is used in
which ways in any given rm. These requirements are unlikely to be satised for more than a
few well-studied examples. My approach, in contrast, does not rely on this type of information or
enforcement capabilities. Hence, it is complementary to work on direct technology taxes in that it
applies to technologies for which a specic direct tax is not available.4
Finally, Jagadeesan (2019) and Jones (2019) analyze optimal taxation in settings where the speed
of technical progress is endogenous. They nd that optimal taxes on labor income are reduced
relative to a setting where technical progress is exogenous. Yet, technical progress is always
unbiased in their models, in the sense that it does not aect relative wages between workers. This
precludes an analysis of the issues that are at the heart of the present paper. I therefore view my
work as complementary to theirs.
Starting from the theory of directed technical change, I build on the seminal ideas of Acemoglu
(1998) and Kiley (1999) and explore their normative implications, in particular for the design of
redistributive labor income taxes. In doing so, I use the theoretical advances by Acemoglu (2007)
and Loebbing (2018) as a building block in my analysis. Specically, their results lend structure to
the relationship between labor supply and production technology, which I exploit to analyze the
relationship between taxes and technology.
I use empirical work on directed technical change to quantify my results in Section 3.7. In
particular, I use estimates from Lewis (2011), Dustmann and Glitz (2015), Morrow and Treer
(2017), and Carneiro et al. (2019) to calibrate the strength of directed technical change eects in
my model. The empirical literature on directed technical change is discussed in more detail in
Section 3.7.
3See also Naito (1999), who provides the general theoretical argument for distorting production eciency to reduce
pre-tax wage inequality when the income tax cannot condition on worker types.
4Slavik and Yazici (2014) analyze the optimal dierential taxation of structure and equipment capital, based on the
assumption that equipment capital is skill-biased. In that case, the concern is not that the targeted technology
is narrow but that the targeting is imprecise: there are many dierent forms of equipment capital, which are
skill-biased to dierent degrees. This again gives a role for indirect targeting through the income tax, even if the
optimal tax dierential between equipment and structures is in place.
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3.3 Setup
I merge a standard Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income taxation with a directed technical
change model in the spirit of Acemoglu (2007).5 While the model is specic in several respects,
my tax analysis only uses a reduced subset of the model’s equilibrium conditions. This subset
is much more general than the model itself. In fact, it can be obtained from any of the models
presented in Acemoglu (2007) and Loebbing (2018, Appendix B.1) once they are augmented to
include endogenous labor supply.6
3.3.1 Model
The model features heterogeneous workers, perfectly competitive nal good rms, monopolisti-
cally competitive technology rms, and a government that levies taxes.
Workers There is a continuum of workers with dierent types θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ R. Types
are distributed according to the strictly positive density function h : θ 7→ hθ, with cumulative
distribution function H .
Workers’ utilities depend on consumption cθ and labor supply lθ according to
uθ = cθ − v(lθ) ,
where v represents disutility from labor. The disutility from labor is twice continuously dieren-
tiable with v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0 everywhere.
Workers’ pre-tax incomes are yθ = wθlθ and income taxes are given by the tax function
T : yθ 7→ T (yθ). The retention function corresponding to tax T is denoted RT . Hence, workers’
budget constraints are
cθ = RT (wθlθ) + S , (3.1)
where S is a lump-sum transfer used to neutralize the government’s budget.
Workers choose their labor supply to maximize utility, taking wages as given. The rst-order
5The model is set up in static terms but it is straightforward to construct a dynamic model with a balanced growth
path that, once detrended, is equivalent to the static model’s equilibrium (see Appendix B in Loebbing, 2016). The
tax analysis in the static model is thus equivalent to a tax analysis on the balanced growth path of a corresponding
dynamic model, where the brackets of the tax function grow at the rate of total output.
6The main reason for presenting a specic model, besides providing guidance to the reader, is that it allows to make
explicit the restrictions on government policy by which the optimal tax in Section 3.6 becomes second best. See the
description of the government below.
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condition is (assuming that the tax function is dierentiable):
v′(lθ) = R′T (wθlθ)wθ . (3.2)
Final Good Firms There is a continuum of mass one of identical nal good rms indexed
by i. They produce a nal consumption good (the numéraire) according to the continuously
dierentiable production functionG(Li, Qi). The rst input Li = {Li,θ}θ∈Θ collects the amounts
of all dierent types of labor used by rm i. The second input Qi = {Qi,j}j∈{1,2,...,J} collects
the variables Qi,j , each of which is an aggregate of a continuum of technology-embodying
intermediate goods:7
Qi,j =
∫ 1
0
φj,kq
α
i,j,k dk .
The variables qi,j,k denote the amount of intermediate good (j, k) used by rm i, while the
parameter α ∈ (0, 1) governs the substitutability of intermediates with the same j-index. The
variables φj,k represent the quality of the corresponding intermediate goods. These quality, or
productivity, levels of the dierent types of intermediate goods are the endogenous component of
technology in the model. Their determination is described in detail below.
With this structure of nal good production, we can write the output of rm i as G˜(Li, φ, qi)
where φ = {φj,k}(j,k)∈{1,2,...,J}×[0,1] and qi = {qi,j,k}(j,k)∈{1,2,...,J}×[0,1] collect qualities and
quantities of all dierent intermediate inputs. I assume that the function G˜ is homogeneous in
q, such that a proportional increase in all intermediate inputs does not change relative wages.
This ensures that the optimal uniform subsidy on intermediate inputs is purely Pigouvian, which
allows for a clean separation of eciency and redistributive concerns (see the description of the
government below).
Moreover, let the function G˜ be linear homogeneous and concave in the rival inputs (L, q),
satisfying the standard microeconomic replication argument (e.g. Romer, 1994). Then, the nal
good sector admits a representative rm and we can drop the index i in what follows.
Final good rms’ prot maximization leads to the following demand for labor:
wθ = DLθG˜(L, φ, q) . (3.3)
The operator DLθ denotes Gateaux dierentiation with respect to L in direction of the Dirac
measure at θ, which I dene rigorously in Section 3.3.2. Labor market clearing requires that the
7The case with a continuum of dierent intermediate good types j, j ∈ [0, J ], can be treated analogously.
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aggregate labor demand Lθ equals the sum of individual workers’ labor supply,
Lθ = lθhθ for all θ .
Demand for intermediate good qj,k is given by
pj,k = αφj,kq
α−1
j,k
∂G(L,Q)
∂Qj
, (3.4)
where pj,k is the price of the intermediate good.
Technology Firms The technology-embodying intermediate goods are produced under mo-
nopolistic competition by technology rms. Each good (j, k) is produced by a single technology
rm, which I label by the index (j, k) of its output. Technology rm (j, k) produces its output at
constant marginal cost ηj from nal good and receives an ad valorem sales subsidy of ξ (see the
description of the government for details). It sets the post-subsidy price pj,k to maximize prots
((1 + ξ)pj,k − ηj) qj,k
subject to the demand from nal good rms (equation (3.4)). Since the demand from nal good
rms is isoelastic, the prot-maximizing price is given by a constant markup over marginal cost
net of the subsidy:
pj,k =
ηj
(1 + ξ)α
. (3.5)
Technology rms can invest R&D resources to improve the quality of their output. In particular,
a quality level of φj,k costs Cj(φj,k) units of R&D resources, where the cost function Cj is smooth,
convex, and strictly increasing for every j. Firm (j, k)’s prots as a function of its quality level
φj,k are
pij,k(φj,k) = max
q
{
αφj,k
∂G(L,Q)
∂Qj
qα − ηjq − prCj(φj,k)
}
,
where pr denotes the (competitive) market price of R&D resources. Via an envelope argument,
the rst-order condition for the choice of quality is given by
α
∂G(L,Q)
∂Qj
qαj,k = p
r dCj(φj,k)
dφj,k
,
where qj,k is assumed to take its prot-maximizing value implied by equation (3.5). One can verify
that the optimal qj,k grows at the rate 1/(1− α) in φj,k, such that the left-hand side of equation
(3.3.1) grows at rate α/(1−α) in φj,k . I assume henceforth that dCj/dφj,k grows at a rate greater
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than α/(1− α) in φj,k, which ensures that the rst-order condition identies the unique prot
maximum. Since prots are symmetric across all rms (j, k) with the same j-index, uniqueness
of the prot maximum implies that the choices of all rms with index j are the same and we can
drop the k-index henceforth.
The supply of R&D resources is exogenous and given by C . Their price adjusts to guarantee
market clearing,
J∑
j=1
Cj(φj) = C .
The assumption of a xed amount of R&D resources allows to focus on the eects of labor income
taxes on the direction instead of the speed of technical change.8
Government The government levies an income tax, a prot tax, and a uniform tax/subsidy on
intermediate goods, which cannot dierentiate between intermediate good types.9
Since nal good rms’ production function G˜ is homogeneous in intermediate goods, a uniform
tax on intermediates can only lead to proportional changes in their quantities, which in turn
leave relative wages unaected. Therefore, the intermediate tax cannot be used to alleviate
the distortions from redistributive labor taxes as in Naito (1999). It follows that the optimal
intermediate good subsidy is purely Pigouvian and set at ξ = (1− α)/α. This ensures that the
price of intermediate goods equals marginal cost, pj = ηj for all j. I assume that this optimal
subsidy is in place throughout the analysis.
The prot tax, levied on technology rms and the owners of R&D resources, is assumed to be
conscatory to avoid a role for the distribution of rm ownership without a meaningful theory of
wealth formation in the model.10
The income tax T is the central object of interest in the paper. Note that, without an income
tax, the equilibrium allocation is ecient due to the Pigouvian intermediate good subsidy. Hence,
the only motive to tax income is redistribution.11
8For an analysis of optimal income taxes when the speed, but not the direction, of technical change is endogenous,
see Jagadeesan (2019) and Jones (2019).
9From an informational perspective, I assume that the government neither observes individual workers’ types nor
the types of intermediate goods produced by individual technology rms. The former gives rise to the standard
restriction that income taxes cannot be conditioned on worker types while the latter implies that the government
cannot tax dierent intermediate goods at dierent rates.
10Note that conscatory prot taxes are part of the optimal tax policy whenever ownership shares of rms increase
and marginal welfare weights decrease in workers’ income levels at the optimum. Alternatively, I could assume that
rm ownership and the ownership of R&D resources are uniformly distributed across workers without changing
any of the results.
11For an analysis of optimal income taxes with Pigouvian elements, see, for example, Rothschild and Scheuer (2016)
and Lockwood, Nathanson and Weyl (2017).
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Taken together, taxes and subsidies generate the following government revenue,
S(y) =
∫
Θ
T (yθ)hθ dθ + p
rC +
J∑
j=1
pij −
J∑
j=1
ξpjqj ,
which is redistributed lump-sum across workers.
Equilibrium An equilibrium of the model, given a tax function T , is a collection of quantities
and prices such that all rms maximize prots, workers maximize utility, and all markets clear.
Despite the detailed micro structure of the model, the equilibrium variables of interest for the
tax analysis can be characterized by a parsimonious set of equations. To derive these equations,
note rst that aggregate production at labor input l and a given set of quality levels φ can be
written as (because intermediate good prices equal marginal cost):
F (l, φ) := max
q
G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ, q)−
J∑
j=1
ηjqj
 . (3.6)
Note that I used labor market clearing (equation (3.3.1)) to replace the aggregate labor input L by
the individual labor input l to save on notation in the following. Via an envelope argument, the
labor demand equation (3.3) then implies that in equilibrium, wages are given by
wθ(l, φ) =
1
hθ
DlθF (l, φ) , (3.7)
where the adjustment factor 1/hθ is necessitated by the switch from aggregate to individual labor
inputs in the aggregate production function.
The condition for prot-maximizing quality choices of technology rms (equation (3.3.1))
coincides with the rst-order condition for a maximum of aggregate production with respect
to quality φ (simply called technology, henceforth) when φ is restricted to the set of feasible
technologies Φ =
{
φ ∈ RJ+ |
∑J
j=1Cj(φj) ≤ C
}
. Thus,
φ∗(l) := argmax
φ∈Φ
F (l, φ) (3.8)
is an equilibrium technology. In the following I focus on equilibria in which technology satises
equation (3.8). Existence of other equilibria can be ruled out by imposing assumptions that
60
3.3 Setup
guarantee strict quasiconcavity of F in φ under the constraint φ ∈ Φ.12
Finally, we can simplify the expression for the government’s budget surplus. To this end, note
that marginal cost pricing of intermediate goods implies that technology rms’ prots are equal
to the total amount of subsidies minus the cost for R&D resources:
J∑
j=1
pij =
J∑
j=1
((1 + ξ)pj − ηj) qj − prC =
J∑
j=1
ξpjqj − prC .
It follows that the revenue from corporate taxes and the expenses on technology good subsidies
oset each other exactly in equation (3.3.1), such that the expression for government revenue
shrinks to
S(y) =
∫
Θ
T (yθ)hθ dθ . (3.9)
The equilibrium values for wages w, technology φ, labor inputs l, consumption levels c, and
government revenue S can now be characterized by the wage equation (3.7), the technology
condition (3.8), workers’ rst-order conditions (3.2), their budget constraints (3.1), and the equation
for government revenue (3.9). These equilibrium conditions provide the starting point for the tax
analysis in the following sections.
The wage and technology equations (3.7) and (3.8) are identical to the conditions characterizing
equilibrium in the directed technical change models presented in Acemoglu (2007) and Loebbing
(2018, Appendix B.1). Introducing endogenous labor supply and a government then gives rise to
the remaining three equations. In this sense, my tax analysis does not depend on the details of the
present model but applies more generally within a large class of directed technical change models.
3.3.2 Derivative and Elasticity Concepts
The tax analysis uses functional derivatives and various elasticities. To simplify the exposition I
dene a specic notation for several frequently used expressions.
12In particular, if the constrained function
F˜ (l, φ−J) := F (l, φ−J , φ˜J(φ−J)), whereφ−J = {φj}j∈{1,2,...,J−1} and φ˜J(φ−J) = C−1J
(
C −
J−1∑
j=1
Cj(φj)
)
,
is strictly quasiconcave in φ−J , the rst-order conditions for a maximum of F˜ in φ−J are necessary and sucient
and there is a unique value φ∗−J(l) that satises them. Equivalently, there is a unique value φ∗(l) satisfying the
rst-order conditions of the program (3.8), which are identical to the equilibrium condition (3.3.1), and this unique
value indeed solves the program.
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Functional Derivatives For derivatives in nite-dimensional spaces I use standard notation.
For perturbations of the tax function T and labor input l I will frequently use the following
functional derivatives.
Let x : (T, z) 7→ x(T, z) be a function of the tax T and, potentially, further variables z. Then,
Dτx(T, z) :=
dx(T + µτ, z)
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
denotes the directional derivative of x with respect to T in direction of the tax reform τ .
Similarly, let x : (l, z) 7→ x(l, z) be a function of labor input l and, potentially, further variables
z. I formalize the derivative of x with respect to labor supply of a given type θ, lθ , as13
Dlθx(l, z) := lim
∆→0
1
∆
dx(l + µl˜∆,θ, z)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
,
where l˜∆,θ : θ˜ 7→ l˜∆,θ,θ˜ is a real-valued function on the type space. For interior types θ ∈ (θ, θ) it
is given by
l˜
∆,θ,θ˜
=

0 for θ˜ < θ −∆
θ˜−θ+∆
∆ for θ˜ ∈ [θ −∆, θ]
θ−θ˜+∆
∆ for θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ + ∆]
0 for θ˜ > θ + ∆ ;
for the highest type θ by
l˜
∆,θ,θ˜
=
0 for θ˜ < θ −∆2(θ˜−θ+∆)
∆ for θ˜ ∈ [θ −∆, θ] ;
and for the lowest type θ by
l˜
∆,θ,θ˜
=

2(θ−θ˜+∆)
∆ for θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ + ∆]
0 for θ˜ > θ + ∆ .
Intuitively, the derivative is obtained by perturbing the labor supply function continuously in a
neighborhood of type θ and letting this neighborhood converge to θ. Appendix B.1.1 demonstrates
13The derivative of a function with respect to aggregate labor supply Lθ is dened analogously.
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that the thus dened derivative works in a natural way by showing in detail that
DLθ
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
L
θ˜
dθ˜ = wθ ∀θ .
This also proves the labor demand equation (3.3).
The tax analysis below often distinguishes between the direct eect of changes in T or l on an
outcome x and the indirect eect mediated through the response of technology φ∗. In particular,
suppose x : (T, φ) 7→ x(T, φ) depends (directly) on taxes T and technology φ. The direct eect
of a tax reform in direction τ , holding technology xed, is then given by Dτx(T, φ) as dened
above. For the indirect eect of the tax reform via technology (the directed technical change eect,
henceforth) I introduce the following notation:
Dφ,τx(T, φ
∗(T )) :=
dx(T, φ∗(T + µτ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
.
Here, φ∗(T ) denotes the equilibrium technology at tax function T . The total eect of the reform
on x is then obtained as the sum of the direct and the directed technical change eect. Writing
x∗(T ) := x(T, φ∗(T )), we get
Dτx
∗(T ) = Dτx(T, φ∗(T )) +Dφ,τx(T, φ∗(T )) .
Analogously, if x : (l, φ) 7→ x(l, φ) is a function of labor input l and technology φ, the induced
technical change eect of a labor input change in direction lθ is
Dφ,lθ = lim
∆→0
1
∆
dx(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
,
where φ∗(l) is given by equation (3.8).
Wage Elasticities The response of wages to labor input changes plays a central role in the tax
analysis. Consider wages as given by (3.7), that is, for each type θ the wage wθ is a function of
labor inputs l and technology φ.
The rst set of wage elasticities is concerned with the direct eect of labor inputs on wages,
holding technology constant. I call these elasticities the within-technology substitution elasticities
(sometimes just substitution elasticities, for brevity), as they describe the changes in marginal pro-
ductivities induced by factor substitution within a given technology.14 The own-wage substitution
14Within-technology substitution elasticities are equivalent to the wage elasticities introduced by Sachs et al. (2020).
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elasticity, that is, the elasticity of wθ with respect to lθ , is dened as
γθ,θ :=
lθ
wθ
lim
∆→0
dwθ(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
.
Alternatively, we could write the wage wθ as a function of φ, l, and type θ’s labor input lθ
separately, as typically a type’s labor input aects its own wage in a way distinct from the labor
input function l (see for example the CES case in Section 3.3.4). Then, the own-wage substitution
elasticity is simply
γθ,θ =
lθ
wθ
∂wθ(lθ, l, φ)
∂lθ
.
The cross-wage substitution elasticity, that is, the elasticity of wθ with respect to a dierent type’s
labor input l
θ˜
(with θ˜ 6= θ), is given by
γ
θ,θ˜
:=
l
θ˜
wθ
Dl
θ˜
wθ(l, φ) ,
with the derivative Dl
θ˜
as dened above.
The second set of wage elasticities captures the directed technical change eects of changes in
labor inputs on wages. These elasticities are called technical change elasticities in the following.
The own-wage technical change elasticity is dened as
ρθ,θ :=
lθ
wθ
lim
∆→0
dwθ(l, φ
∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
.
Again, the CES case in Section 3.3.4 claries why this is a natural denition of the own-wage
technical change elasticity and how it can be expressed in terms of conventional partial derivatives.
The cross-wage technical change elasticity measures how wage wθ is aected by a change in
another type’s labor supply l
θ˜
via directed technical change. Formally, it is given by
ρ
θ,θ˜
:=
l
θ˜
wθ
Dφ,l
θ˜
wθ(l, φ
∗(l)) ,
where the derivative Dφ,l
θ˜
has been dened above.
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Rate of Progressivity The rate of progressivity of a tax schedule T is dened as minus the
elasticity of the marginal retention rate R′T with respect to income,
PT (y) := −R
′′
T (y)y
R′T (y)
.
It measures the progression of marginal tax rates as income increases. If the income tax is linear
such that marginal tax rates are constant, PT (y) is zero. If the income tax is progressive (regressive)
in the sense that marginal tax rates increase (decrease) with income, the rate of progressivity is
positive (negative).
Labor Supply Elasticities To express the eects of tax reforms compactly, I also dene some
standard concepts of labor supply elasticities. The rst is the hypothetical elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the marginal retention rate that would obtain if the retention function were linear:
eθ(l) :=
v′(lθ)
v′′(lθ)lθ
.
Consider now the labor supply of an arbitrary worker type θ, given by workers’ rst-order
condition (3.2), as a function of T and wθ . The true elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
marginal retention rate must take into account potential non linearities of the retention function,
which cause the worker’s marginal retention rate to change as labor supply changes (e.g. Sachs
et al., 2020). This elasticity is given by
Rθ (T, l, w) :=
R′T (wθlθ)
lθ
Dτ˜ lθ(T,wθ) ,
where the auxiliary tax reform τ˜ is chosen such that, as the scaling factor µ of the reform goes to
zero, it raises the marginal retention rate by one innitesimal unit:
∀ y : τ˜(y) = −y , and thus: (y − (T (y) + µτ˜(y)))′ = 1− T ′(y) + µ .
Inserting this into workers’ rst-order condition and dierentiating with respect to µ (at µ = 0)
then gives exactly the local response of individual labor supply to a one unit increase in the
marginal retention rate. This leads to the following expression for the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the marginal retention rate (see Appendix B.1.1 for details):
Rθ (T, l, w) =
eθ(l)
1 + eθ(l)PT (wθlθ)
. (3.10)
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For a locally linear tax function, that is, for PT (wθlθ) = 0, the elasticity coincides with the
hypothetical elasticity eθ dened above.
Finally, dene the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage as
wθ (T, l, w) :=
wθ
lθ
∂lθ(T,wθ)
∂wθ
.
It is a standard result that this elasticity can be written as (see Appendix B.1.1 for details)
wθ (T, l, w) =
(1− PT (wθlθ))eθ(l)
1 + eθ(l)PT (wθlθ)
. (3.11)
3.3.3 Assumptions for the Tax Analysis
The following assumptions are maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 3.
1. The aggregate production function F is twice continuously dierentiable.
2. The derivative DlθF is strictly positive everywhere for all θ.
3. The maximizer argmaxφ∈Φ F (l, φ) is unique for all l and dierentiable in l everywhere.
4. Whenever an exogenous tax T is considered, it is twice continuously dierentiable and satises
T ′(yθ) < 1 and PT (yθ)eθ > −1 for all θ.
The rst three parts of the assumption ensure that the wage elasticities γ
θ,θ˜
and ρ
θ,θ˜
are well
dened. The last part guarantees that workers’ second-order conditions are satised strictly under
a given tax T , such that the labor supply elasticities Rθ and wθ are well dened (see Appendix
B.1.1).
3.3.4 Special Cases
Under further restrictions, we can obtain particularly tractable special cases of the model, which
allow to derive additional qualitative insights in the tax analysis.
CES Production An important special case is obtained when the aggregate production function
F features a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between worker types while the research
cost functions are isoelastic. In this case, aggregate production takes the form
F (l, φ) =
[∫ θ
θ
(κθφθlθhθ)
σ−1
σ dθ
] σ
σ−1
, (3.12)
66
3.3 Setup
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and κ is a continuously dierentiable function that
assigns an exogenous productivity level to each type of worker. The endogenous technology φ
similarly takes the form of a function assigning (endogenous) productivity levels to workers. The
set of feasible technologies is given by
Φ =
{
φ : θ 7→ φθ ∈ R+ |
∫ θ
θ
φδθ dθ ≤ C
}
, (3.13)
where δ governs the substitutability of productivity levels across worker types.
I derive the expressions for aggregate production and the set of feasible technologies from
restrictions on the fundamentals of the model in Appendix B.1.1. There, I also show that wages in
the CES case are given by
wθ(l, φ) = (κθφθ)
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ F (l, φ)
1
σ . (3.14)
Accordingly, the own-wage substitution elasticity becomes15
γθ,θ = − 1
σ
=: γCES , (3.15)
while the cross-wage substitution elasticity is
γ
θ,θ˜
=
1
σ
l
θ˜
w
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l, φ)
. (3.16)
The own-wage technical change elasticity is given by
ρθ,θ =
(σ − 1)2
(δ − 1)σ2 + σ =: ρ
CES , (3.17)
and the cross-wage technical change elasticity becomes
ρ
θ,θ˜
= − (σ − 1)
2
(δ − 1)σ2 + σ
l
θ˜
w
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l, φ)
. (3.18)
Isoelastic Disutility of Labor When the disutility of labor is isoelastic, workers’ utility func-
tions take the form
uθ = cθ − e
e+ 1
l
e+1
e
θ .
15See again Appendix B.1.1 for the derivations of the wage elasticities in the CES case.
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In this case, the hypothetical labor supply elasticity eθ(l) is constant across θ and l:
eθ(l) = e for all θ, l.
Constant-Rate-of-Progressivity Taxes A constant-rate-of-progressivity (CRP) tax function
takes the form (e.g. Feldstein, 1969; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2017)
T (y) = y − λy1−P .
For any CRP tax schedule T the rate of progressivity PT is constant across income levels:
PT (y) = P for all y.
This special case, when combined with isoelastic disutility of labor, ensures that the labor supply
elasticities Rθ and wθ are constant in θ.
3.4 Directed Technical Change
Directed technical change theory makes predictions about the relationship between labor inputs,
technology, and wages as governed by equations (3.7) and (3.8) (copied here for convenience):
wθ(l, φ) =
1
hθ
DlθF (l, φ)
φ∗(l) := argmax
φ∈Φ
F (l, φ) .
The theory requires the following assumption.
Denition 5. A technology φ is more skill-biased than another technology φ˜ if, for any labor
input l, all skill premia are greater under φ than under φ˜, that is,
wθ(l, φ)
w
θ˜
(l, φ)
≥ wθ(l, φ˜)
w
θ˜
(l, φ˜)
for all θ ≥ θ˜.
We write φ sb φ˜.
Assumption 4. Aggregate production F is quasisupermodular in φ under the skill-bias order sb.
In particular: For any labor input l and any two technologies φ and φ˜, if φ weakly raises output
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relative to all technologies φ that are less skill-biased than both φ and φ˜, then there must exist a
technology φ that weakly raises output relative to φ˜ and is more skill-biased than both φ and φ˜.16
Quasisupermodularity requires that changes in technology that raise skill premia in dierent
parts of the wage distribution must not be substitutes. To illustrate, suppose there are two new
technologies, one that raises skill premia in the top half of the wage distribution and one that
raises skill premia in the bottom half. Assumption 4 now requires that, if the new technology that
raises skill premia at the top leads to an increase in output absent the other technology, then it
must also increase output when the other technology is already implemented.
The CES production function naturally satises quasisupermodularity. Reshuing productivity
levels in the upper half of the type space has no bearing on whether a certain rearrangement of
productivity levels in the lower half enhances output or not.
In Loebbing (2018, Section 5), I present further important examples that satisfy quasisupermod-
ularity. In particular, an assignment model à la Costinot and Vogel (2010) satises quasisuper-
modularity in various forms. First, when treating the matching function from skills to tasks as
the endogenous technology variable φ, the baseline model by Costinot and Vogel (2010) satises
equations (3.7) and (3.8) plus Assumption 4. Hence, my analysis encompasses the case where
directed technical change takes the form of endogenous changes in the allocation of workers to
tasks.17
Second, when augmenting the baseline assignment model to include capital as an additional
production factor, the extent of automation, as measured by the set of tasks performed by capital,
can take the place of the endogenous technology variable φ while preserving all of the above
conditions. Finally, we can endogenize the productivity of capital in such a setting and study its
endogenous adjustments as directed technical change (Loebbing, 2018).18
3.4.1 Weak Relative Bias
Under Assumption 4, any increase in the relative supply of skill in the economy induces skill-biased
technical change.
16Note that this slightly deviates from the original denition of quasisupermodularity by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
For their denition, we would rst have to assume that the set (Φ,sb) has a lattice structure, that is, for any two
technologies φ and φ˜ there exist supremum and inmum in Φ. Then, quasisupermodularity would be dened using
inmum and supremum instead of arbitrary technologies below and above φ and φ˜. In particular, for any l and any
φ, φ˜, if F (l, φ) ≤ F (l, φ), then F (l, φ) ≥ F (l, φ˜), where φ and φ denote inmum and supremum of φ and φ˜. My
denition is slightly less restrictive (and suciently restrictive for the present purpose).
17Yet, in this case there won’t be strong relative bias, as there is no source of (quasi-)convexity in the aggregate
production function, see below.
18Note also that the predictions derived under quasisupermodularity (see Lemma 6 below) receive support in the
empirical literature, as discussed in Section 3.7.
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Lemma 6. Take any labor input l and let dl be a change in the labor input such that dlθ/lθ increases
in θ. Then, the technical change induced by dl raises more skilled workers’ wages relative to less
skilled workers’ wages, that is,
1
wθ
dwθ(l, φ
∗(l + µdl))
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
− 1
w
θ˜
dw
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µdl))
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
≥ 0 (3.19)
for all θ ≥ θ˜.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
The intuition behind this result is that an increase in relative skill supply raises the protability
of technologies that are relatively complementary to high-skilled workers and these technologies
in turn raise the relative productivity of the high-skilled.
The within-technology substitution eect of an increase in relative skill supply typically has the
opposite direction and reduces the relative wages of high-skilled workers. An important question
is then whether the directed technical change eect (raising skill premia) or the within-technology
substitution eect (reducing skill premia) dominates.
3.4.2 Strong Relative Bias
When the directed technical change eect dominates, we say that there is strong relative bias of
technology (Acemoglu, 2002). Formally, strong relative bias of technology at a given labor input l
means that
1
wθ
dw∗θ(l + µdl)
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
− 1
w
θ˜
dw∗
θ˜
(l + µdl)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
≥ 0 (3.20)
for all θ ≥ θ˜ and for any labor supply change dl such that dlθ/lθ increases in θ. In Loebbing (2018),
I show that strong relative bias occurs if and only if aggregate production becomes quasiconvex
in labor when taking into account the endogenous adjustment of technology.
In the CES case, there is a simple parametric condition for strong relative bias. In particular,
using the notation for wage elasticities introduced above, the total eect of a labor supply change
dl on the relative wage between types θ ≥ θ˜ is
(ρθ,θ + γθ,θ)
dlθ
lθ
+
∫ θ
θ
(ρθ,θ′ + γθ,θ′)
dlθ′
lθ′
dθ′ − (ρ
θ˜,θ˜
+ γ
θ˜,θ˜
)
dl
θ˜
l
θ˜
−
∫ θ
θ
(ρ
θ˜,θ′ + γθ˜,θ′)
dlθ′
lθ′
dθ′
= (ρCES + γCES)
(
dlθ
lθ
− dlθ˜
l
θ˜
)
.
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For an increase in relative skill supply (dlθ/lθ ≥ dlθ˜/lθ˜), the eect on the relative wage is positive
if and only if
ρCES + γCES ≥ 0 . (3.21)
Hence, if condition (3.21) is satised, directed technical change eects dominate within-technology
substitution eects and skill premia increase with relative skill supply.
3.5 Tax Reforms
Starting from a given tax T , a tax reform is represented by the change from T to T + µτ , where
µ ∈ R+ and τ : y 7→ τ(y) ∈ R is a twice continuously dierentiable, real-valued function. In this
notation, µ is the scaling factor of the tax reform while τ indicates its direction: If τ(y) is positive
(negative) at some income level y, the reform raises (lowers) the tax burden for workers who earn
y.
3.5.1 Progressive and Regressive Reforms
The curvature of τ , relative to the curvature of T , governs the progressivity of the reform.
More precisely, I call a reform progressive if the post-reform tax schedule has a higher rate of
progressivity than the pre-reform schedule everywhere.
Denition 6. Starting from tax T the reform (τ, µ) is progressive if and only if
P
T˜
(y) ≥ PT (y) ∀ y ,
where T˜ := T + µτ denotes the post-reform tax function.
This denition is equivalent to the following characterizations of progressivity.
Lemma 7. Take any tax function T . The following statements are equivalent.
1. The reform (τ, µ) is progressive according to Denition 6.
2. The post-reform tax T˜ = T + µτ can be obtained by taxing post-tax income under the initial
tax in a progressive way, that is, by means of a tax function with increasing marginal tax rates.
Formally,
R
T˜
= r ◦RT
for some concave function r.
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3. The reform (τ, µ) satises
τ ′(y)
1− T ′(y) ≥
τ ′(y˜)
1− T ′(y˜) ∀ y ≥ y˜ .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.
The rst equivalence provides an intuitive interpretation of progressivity: a reform is progressive
if and only if it can be obtained by augmenting the initial tax by an additional tax on post-tax income
that features increasing marginal tax rates. The second equivalence shows that a progressive
reform raises the marginal tax rate relative to the initial marginal retention rate by more for higher
incomes. This equivalence will turn out useful in the analysis below.
A regressive reform is dened as the inverse of a progressive reform: it reduces the rate of
progressivity of the tax schedule everywhere.
In the following I focus on the local eects of a reform in the direction of τ , that is, the eects on
economic outcomes of changing T to T + µτ as µ→ 0. Note that this does not lead to confusion
with the denition of progressivity, because, as indicated by the second equivalence in Lemma 7,
the denition of progressivity only depends on the direction τ of a reform but not on the scaling
factor µ. Moreover, I assume without loss of generality that worker types are ordered according
to their wages under the initial tax schedule, that is, wθ ≤ wθ˜ if θ ≤ θ˜ under the initial tax.
To describe the eects of tax reforms on economic outcomes formally, I write equilibrium
variables as a function of the tax, that is, the equilibrium value of a variable x (e.g. wages or labor
inputs) under tax T is denoted by x(T ).19
3.5.2 Eects on Labor Inputs
A key step in the analysis is to characterize the responses of labor inputs to a given tax reform. Let
l̂θ,τ (T ) :=
1
lθ
Dτ lθ(T )
19Note that in some cases this involves an abuse of notation. I write for example wθ(l, φ) in equation (3.7) to denote
wages as a function of labor inputs and technology; now I use wθ(T, φ∗(T )) to denote wages as a function of the
tax. The latter is meant as a short cut for wθ(l(T ), φ∗(l(T ))), where l(T ) denotes labor inputs under tax T .
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denote the relative change in the labor input of type θ in response to reform τ . Relative labor
input changes must satisfy the following xed point equation (see Appendix B.1.3 for details):20
l̂θ,τ (T ) = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ (γθ,θ + ρθ,θ)l̂θ,τ (T ) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
θ,θ˜
)l̂
θ˜,τ
dθ˜ . (3.22)
In equilibrium, labor inputs respond directly to the tax reform (the rst term in equation (3.22))
but they also cause wages to adjust. These wage adjustments in turn feed back to labor inputs,
which is captured by the second and third terms in equation (3.22). Accounting for these feedback
eects gives rise to the xed point character of equation (3.22).
I characterize the xed point of equation (3.22) by an iteration procedure. Within the iteration
steps I disentangle the feedback eects purely transmitted via directed technical change from
those transmitted via within-technology factor substitution. Thereby, I obtain a decomposition of
the total labor input response into a substitution and a directed technical change component. The
slope of the directed technical change component over the type space can then be signed for the
case of a progressive tax reform, using the structure of directed technical change eects predicted
by the theory of directed technical change.21
Lemma 8. Fix an initial tax T and suppose that
sup
θ∈Θ
[
(wθ ρθ,θ)
2
]
+
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(wθ ρθ,θ˜)
2 dθ˜ dθ + 2
√√√√∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
wθ ρθ,θ
w
θ ρθ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ dθ < 1 (3.23)
sup
θ∈Θ
[
(wθ ζθ,θ)
2
]
+
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(wθ ζθ,θ˜)
2 dθ˜ dθ + 2
√√√√∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
wθ ζθ,θ
w
θ ζθ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ dθ < 1 , (3.24)
where ζ
θ,θ˜
:= γ
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
θ,θ˜
.22
20All elasticities in this section are evaluated at the equilibrium under the initial tax T . I do not write this dependence
explicitly to save on notation.
21The representation of labor input responses in Lemma 8 is dierent from that provided by Sachs et al. (2020) even
when ignoring directed technical change (i.e., when setting ρθ,θ˜ = 0 for all θ, θ˜). I discuss the relationship between
Lemma 8 and the results of Sachs et al. (2020) in Appendix B.3.1. In short, my approach has the advantage that, after
decomposing the total eect, it allows me to derive analytical insights into the structure of the directed technical
change component.
22Conditions (3.23) and (3.24) ensure that the series in equations (3.25) and (3.26) converge. They are sucient but
generally not necessary for convergence. If the conditions are not satised, the equilibrium may be unstable in the
sense that an increase in some types’ labor inputs may trigger a wage adjustment that is more than sucient to
justify the initial increase in labor inputs. I check that the conditions are satised in the quantitative analysis.
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Then, the eect of tax reform τ on the labor input of type θ can be written as
l̂θ,τ (T ) =
∞∑
n=0
l̂
(n)
θ,τ (T ) (3.25)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where
l̂
(0)
θ,τ (T ) = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
l̂
(n)
θ,τ (T ) = 
w
θ ζθ,θ l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ (T ) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ζ
θ,θ˜
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ ∀n > 0 .
The total eect on labor inputs can be decomposed as follows,
l̂θ,τ (T ) = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∞∑
n=1
T˜E
(n)
θ,τ (T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:T˜Eθ,τ (T )
+
∞∑
n=1
S˜E
(n)
θ,τ (T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S˜Eθ,τ (T )
, (3.26)
where (omitting the argument T )
T˜E
(1)
θ,τ =
w
θ ρθ,θ(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
T˜E
(n)
θ,τ =
w
θ ρθ,θT˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
TE
(n−1)
θ˜,τ dθ˜ ∀n > 1
S˜E
(1)
θ,τ =
w
θ γθ,θ(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
S˜E
(n)
θ,τ =
w
θ γθ,θ(T˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ + S˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ ) + ρθ,θS˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
[
γθ,θ(T˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ + S˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ ) + ρθ,θS˜E
(n−1)
θ,τ
]
dθ˜ ∀n > 1 .
If wθ and 
R
θ are constant in θ (e.g. because the disutility of labor is isoelastic and T is CRP), then
T˜Eθ,τ is decreasing in θ for any progressive reform τ .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.
Equation (3.25) expresses the labor input change induced by reform τ as the sum over successive
rounds of general equilibrium adjustments, capturing feedback loops from labor supply to wages
and back to labor supply. The rst summand l̂(0)θ,τ (T ) is the direct eect of the reform on labor
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supply, holding wages constant. The direct adjustment of labor supply in turn changes wages,
which then feeds back into labor supply. This rst-round feedback eect is captured by l̂(1)θ,τ (T ).
The labor supply change l̂(1)θ,τ (T ) then induces another adjustment of wages, which again aects
labor supply, and so on.23
Equation (3.26) decomposes the total labor input change into three components. The rst is
the direct eect of reform τ , holding wages constant. The second term isolates the part of the
general equilibrium feedback in which the eect of labor supply on wages is purely transmitted via
directed technical change. The third term collects the remaining parts of the feedback, containing
within-technology substitution eects from labor supply on wages.
With constant labor supply elasticities across workers, the directed technical change component
T˜Eθ,τ (T ) is decreasing in θ for any progressive tax reform; that is, the directed technical change
component reduces the labor supply of more relative to less skilled workers. This follows from
the weak bias result of directed technical change theory. Intuitively, with constant labor supply
elasticities, the direct eect of a progressive tax reform on labor supply reduces relative skill
supply. By weak bias, this induces technical change reducing skill premia (equalizing technical
change, henceforth). Again under constant labor supply elasticities, such equalizing technical
change feeds back into a further reduction in relative skill supply, which in turn induces further
equalizing technical change. Summing over the thus induced rounds of reductions in relative
skill supply eventually gives rise to the term T˜Eθ,τ (T ), which must therefore reduce relative skill
supply (i.e., decrease in θ) as well.
3.5.3 Directed Technical Change Eects
Consider now the relative wage changes that are caused by the technical change induced by a
reform τ . Using the derivative Dφ,τ introduced in Section 3.3.2, these relative wage changes are
given by
1
wθ
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) .
They can be expressed in terms of directed technical change elasticities and labor input responses
as follows:
1
wθ
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = ρθ,θ l̂θ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
l̂
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ . (3.27)
23Mathematically, the series representation in equation (3.25) is the von Neumann series expansion of the solution to
the xed point equation (3.22). In particular, the xed point equation can be written abstractly as (I −X)l̂τ = Z ,
where I denotes the identity function, X is a linear operator on the space of real-valued functions on Θ, and Z is
the direct eect of τ on labor supply. Inverting I −X yields l̂τ = (I −X)−1Z . By von Neumann series expansion,
this is equivalent to l̂τ =
∑∞
n=0 X
nZ .
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Inserting expression (3.26) from Lemma 8 into equation (3.27) yields an expression for the directed
technical change eects of reform τ , consisting of three terms with intuitive interpretations. The
slope of two of these terms can be signed using the structure of directed technical change eects
imposed by weak bias.
Proposition 3. Fix an initial tax T and let conditions (3.23) and (3.24) be satised.
Then, the relative eect of the technical change induced by tax reform τ on wages can be written as
1
wθ
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = ρθ,θ(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=DEθ,τ (T )
+ ρθ,θT˜Eθ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
TE
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:TEθ,τ (T )
+ ρθ,θS˜Eθ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
SE
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:SEθ,τ (T )
, (3.28)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where T˜Eθ,τ (T ) and S˜Eθ,τ (T ) are dened in Lemma 8.
If wθ and 
R
θ are constant in θ (e.g. because the disutility of labor is isoelastic and T is CRP), then
DEθ,τ (T ) and TEθ,τ (T ) are decreasing in θ for any progressive reform τ .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.
The terms in equation (3.28) follow directly from Lemma 8. The rst line of equation (3.28)
is the technical change eect on wages induced by the direct component of the labor supply
response to the tax reform τ . It decreases in θ for any progressive reform (under constant labor
supply elasticities) because, by Lemma 8, the direct eect of a progressive reform reduces relative
skill supply; and by weak bias, a reduction in relative skill supply induces equalizing technical
change.
The term TEθ,τ (T ) captures the technical change eect induced by the component T˜Eθ,τ (T )
of the labor supply response to τ . Recall from Lemma 8 that this component decreases in θ for
any progressive reform (with constant labor supply elasticities). Hence, by weak bias, it induces
equalizing technical change. The term TEθ,τ (T ) must therefore decrease in θ. Intuitively, it
captures the successive rounds of general equilibrium feedback from directed technical change to
labor supply and back to technical change. The direct response of labor supply to a progressive
reform τ induces equalizing technical change (see above). This equalizing technical change further
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reduces relative skill supply, which then again induces equalizing technical change, and so on. We
thus obtain a sum of equalizing technical changes, which must be equalizing itself (i.e., decreasing
in θ).
Finally, the slope of the term SEθ,τ (T ) cannot be signed without further restrictions. The
reason is that this term includes within-technology substitution eects. To sign within-technology
substitution eects, however, we have imposed too little structure on the aggregate production
function F so far.
3.5.4 CES Case
The CES case provides the additional structure needed to sign not only the slope of the term
SEθ,τ (T ) but also, more importantly, the total directed technical change eect of a progressive tax
reform. In particular, when aggregate production takes the CES form and labor supply elasticities
are constant across workers, any progressive tax reform induces equalizing technical change.
Corollary 9. Fix an initial tax T and assume that F and Φ are CES as introduced in Section 3.3.4.
Moreover, let the elasticities wθ and 
R
θ be constant in θ, that is, 
w
θ = 
w and Rθ = 
R for all θ ∈ Θ.
Then the relative wage eect of the technical change induced by tax reform τ satises
1
wθ
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = ρCES(−R) τ
′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
− ρCES
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R) τ
′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ (3.29)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where
R :=
R
1− (γCES + ρCES)w .
Hence, any progressive tax reform induces technical change that reduces all skill premia.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.
Inversely, regressive reforms induce skill-biased technical change under the conditions of
Corollary 9.
The nding that progressive (regressive) tax reforms induce equalizing (skill-biased technical
change) has several consequences. First, it is empirically relevant. The US tax and transfer system,
for example, underwent regressive reforms since the 1980s (Piketty and Saez, 2007) while US wage
inequality surged, a development often contributed in parts to skill-biased technical change. My
results suggest that skill-biased technical change may be a consequence of the contemporaneous
regressive tax reforms, which I examine quantitatively in Section 3.7.
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Second, directed technical change eects have implications for the welfare assessment of
progressive and regressive tax reforms. I investigate these implications in Appendix B.3.2.
Third, the insight that progressive tax reforms reduce the skill-bias of technology suggests that
a more progressive tax system is optimal when accounting for directed technical change eects.
This is what I turn to next.
3.6 Optimal Taxes
To characterize optimal taxes, it is convenient to use the following notation. For a function
x : (θ, z) 7→ xθ(z) (e.g., wages or labor inputs) that depends on θ and potentially further variables
z, I denote the derivative of x with respect to θ by
x′θ(z) :=
dxθ(z)
dθ
and the corresponding semi-elasticity by
x̂θ(z) :=
x′θ(z)
xθ(z)
.
Moreover, without loss of generality, let worker types be ordered according to their wages under
the optimum tax schedule, that is, under the optimal tax wθ ≤ wθ˜ if θ ≤ θ˜.
3.6.1 Welfare
Welfare is measured by a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function V : {uθ}θ∈Θ 7→ V ({uθ}θ∈Θ) that
is strictly increasing in all arguments. The marginal welfare weight of an individual worker of
type θ is obtained as
gθ ({uθ}θ∈Θ) = 1
hθ
DuθV ({uθ}θ∈Θ) ,
where the derivative Duθ is dened analogously to the denition of Dlθ in Section 3.3.2. Let the
average marginal welfare weight of all workers above a given type θ be denoted by
g˜θ :=
1
1−Hθ
∫ θ
θ
g
θ˜
h
θ˜
dθ˜ .
I assume that V is scaled such that the average welfare weight across all workers equals one
at the optimal tax and impose that g is continuous in θ whenever u is continuous. In addition
and more substantially, the welfare function is supposed to value equity across workers in the
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following sense.
Assumption 5. For any utility prole {uθ}θ∈Θ such that uθ increases in θ, the marginal welfare
weights gθ ({uθ}θ∈Θ) decrease in θ.
Assumption 5 ensures that redistributing consumption from workers with high utility to workers
with low utility improves welfare.
3.6.2 Optimal Tax Formula
To derive optimal tax rates, I follow the mechanism design approach to optimal taxation.24 For
that, write welfare as a function of consumption and labor allocations instead of utility levels:
W (c, l) := V ({uθ(cθ, lθ)}θ∈Θ}) .
The goal is to nd the consumption-labor allocation that maximizes welfare W (c, l) subject to
the aggregate resource constraint and to incentive compatibility constraints across worker types.
The optimal tax schedule is then obtained as the tax that implements the welfare-maximizing
allocation.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
∫ θ
θ
cθhθ dθ = F (l, φ
∗(l)) . (3.30)
Incentive compatibility requires
uθ = max
θ˜∈Θ
{
c
θ˜
− v
(
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
wθ
)}
∀ θ .
I restrict attention to instances of the model where the labor input under the optimal tax is
continuously dierentiable in θ. Moreover, I assume that this property of labor inputs extends to
wages as follows.
Assumption 6. If l is continuously dierentiable in θ, thenDlθF (l, φ) is continuously dierentiable
in θ for all φ ∈ Φ.
Moreover, the worker density h is continuously dierentiable in θ.25
24The alternative approach would be to use the formulas for the welfare eects of tax reforms from Appendix B.3.2
and impose that these eects are zero for all reforms at the optimum. The two approaches yield the same results.
25The worker density being C1 ensures that the rst part of Assumption 6 is satised in the CES case.
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Under this restriction and with the wage function wθ increasing in θ at the optimum, the
incentive compatibility constraint is equivalent to the following conditions:
c′θ = v
′(lθ)(w′θlθ + wθl
′
θ)
1
wθ
for almost every θ, (3.31)
y′θ ≥ 0 for almost every θ . (3.32)
As is usual in the literature, I drop the monotonicity requirement (3.32) and study the relaxed
problem of maximizing welfare subject to (3.30) and (3.31).26
From the incentive compatibility and resource constraints, consumption levels can be derived as
a function of labor inputs. I substitute this function into the welfare functionW and compute rst-
order conditions with respect to labor inputs. Using workers’ rst-order conditions to reintroduce
marginal tax rates then yields the following expression for optimal marginal tax rates.
Proposition 4. Suppose the labor input l under the optimal tax is continuously dierentiable in θ.
Then, at every type θ, optimal marginal tax rates satisfy the following conditions.
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) = PE
∗
θ + TE
∗
θ + SE
∗
θ ,
where
PE∗θ =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Nwθ
nwθwθ
(1− g˜θ)
TE∗θ = lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
SE∗θ = lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ ,
all variables are evaluated at equilibrium under the optimal tax T , andN and n denote the cumulative
distribution and the density function of wages at the optimum.
Moreover, if lim supθ→θ l
′
θ < ∞ and lim infθ→θ l′θ > −∞ under the optimal tax,27 then the
following holds:
1. TE∗θ ≤ 0 and, if there is strong bias (see Section 3.4.2), TE∗θ + SE∗θ ≤ 0.
26In all simulations of optimal taxes, I verify that the monotonicity condition (3.32) holds at the optimum.
27This assumption guarantees that the distribution of labor inputs is well behaved at the top and at the bottom, in
the sense that its density is continuous and strictly positive on some neighborhood of the top or the bottom type,
respectively. This in turn allows to evaluate the eects of the labor input perturbations l˜∆,θ and l˜∆,θ on relative
labor inputs and invoke the directed technical change results of Section 3.4.
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2. TE∗
θ
≥ 0 and, if there is strong bias, TE∗
θ
+ SE∗
θ
≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.4.
Proposition 4 provides an expression that decomposes the optimal marginal tax rates into three
terms. The rst term PE∗θ is the standard expression from a setting with exogenous wages. It is
zero at the bottom and the top income level, reecting the well-known result that the optimal
marginal tax rate is zero for the highest and the lowest income earner when wages are exogenous.
The second term, TE∗θ , captures the impact of directed technical change eects on the optimal
tax. It is negative at the bottom and positive at the top income. Intuitively, by reducing marginal
tax rates at the bottom and increasing them at the top, the optimal tax schedule stimulates the
relative labor supply of less skilled workers, thus inducing rms to use technologies with a higher
relative productivity for low-skilled workers. This raises low-skilled workers’ wages relative to
those of high-skilled workers. In the mechanism design problem, the ensuing compression in the
pre-tax wage distribution slackens high-skilled workers’ incentive compatibility constraints and
widens the scope for redistribution.
The third term, SE∗θ , stems from within-technology substitution eects. To sign this term,
further structure on aggregate production is required.
Yet, whenever directed technical change dominates within-technology substitution eects (i.e.,
there is strong bias), the sum of the terms SE∗θ and TE∗θ has the same sign as TE∗θ itself. Hence,
with strong bias, the optimal marginal tax is positive at the top and negative at the bottom. This
reverses the result from Stiglitz (1982) by which the optimal marginal tax at the top is negative
with a general production structure that features complementarity between worker types.
The results for the marginal top tax rate extend as follows to the asymptotic marginal tax rate
that is obtained when the upper tail of the income distribution has a Pareto shape.
Corollary 10. Let the conditions of Proposition 4 be satised and suppose that the disutility of labor
is isoelastic with eθ = e for all θ. Moreover, suppose that the wage distribution satises
lim
θ→θ
1−Nwθ
nwθwθ
=
1
a
,
the terms TE∗θ and SE
∗
θ satisfy
lim
θ→θ
TE∗θ = TE and lim
θ→θ
SE∗θ = SE ,
and welfare weights satisfy
lim
θ→θ
gθ = g
top
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at the optimal tax.28
Then, the optimal tax T satises
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
e
)
1
a
(1− gtop) + TE + SE ,
where TE ≥ 0 and, if there is strong bias, TE + SE ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.4.
Hence, directed technical change eects provide a force for higher marginal tax rates in the
upper Pareto tail of the income distribution (TE ≥ 0). Moreover, under strong bias, they lead to
an upwards adjustment of marginal tax rates even relative to the formula obtained in a setting
with exogenous wages (e.g. Diamond, 1998).
3.6.3 CES Case
In the CES case, the optimal tax formula takes the following, particularly transparent form.29
Proposition 5. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 are satised and F and Φ take the CES form
introduced in Section 3.3.4. Then, at every type θ, optimal marginal tax rates satisfy the following
conditions:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) , (3.33)
where all variables are evaluated at equilibrium under the optimal tax T , the function β : θ 7→ βθ is
given by
βθ := κ
1+γCES+ρCES
θ h
γCES+ρCES
θ ∀ θ ,
while B and b are the cumulative distribution and the density function of β.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.4.
Here, the optimal marginal tax at the top is
(1− gθ)(γCES + ρCES) ,
28To guarantee existence of these limits under the optimal tax, additional structure on aggregate production is needed.
The CES structure imposed by Corollary 11 below is sucient, but clearly not necessary.
29See Appendix B.1.4 for the CES versions of the terms TE∗θ and SE∗θ .
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which is positive whenever there is strong bias (γCES + ρCES ≥ 0). Without strong bias, the
optimal marginal top tax is negative, following the logic of Stiglitz (1982).
The optimal marginal tax at the bottom is given by
(1− gθ)(γCES + ρCES) .
Since gθ ≥ 1, this is negative if there is strong bias and positive otherwise.
The optimal marginal tax in the Pareto tail of incomes takes the following form in the CES case.
Corollary 11. Let the conditions of Proposition 4 be satised and F and Φ take the CES form
introduced in Section 3.3.4. Suppose at a tax T , with T ′(y) = τ top for all y ≥ y˜ and some threshold
y˜, the income distribution satises
lim
θ→θ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
=
1
a
for some a > 1. Moreover, let the disutility of labor be isoelastic with eθ = e for all θ, and welfare
weights satisfy
lim
θ→θ
gθ = g
top
at the optimal tax.
Then, the optimal tax T satises
lim
θ→θ
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
1− gtop
ae
+
a− 1
a
γCES(1− gtop) + a− 1
a
ρCES(1− gtop) . (3.34)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.4.
As predicted by Corollary 10, directed technical change eects, captured here by the technical
change elasticity ρCES , increase the optimal asymptotic tax in the Pareto tail. Under strong bias
(γCES + ρCES ≥ 0), this even exceeds the optimal asymptotic tax from a corresponding setting
with exogenous wages.
Remarkably, Proposition 5 and Corollary 11 provide expressions for optimal marginal tax rates
that have closed form up to welfare weights. This enables a precise analysis of the impact of
directed technical change on the optimal tax.
3.6.4 Comparison to Exogenous Technology Planner
To cleanly identify the role of directed technical change, I compare the optimal tax to the one
perceived as optimal by an exogenous technology planner. The exogenous technology planner
observes the economy under some initial tax T , correctly infers all parameters of the economy, but
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mistakenly believes that technology remains xed at its current state φ∗(T ), irrespectively of the
tax schedule. Formally, the exogenous technology planner bases his computation of optimal taxes
on the equilibrium conditions (3.2), (3.1), (3.7), and (3.9), but replaces the equilibrium technology
condition (3.8) by the “wrong” equation
φ∗(l) = φ∗(l(T )) = argmax
φ∈Φ
F (l(T ), φ) ∀l .30
Proposition 12 in Appendix B.1.4 shows that the tax T ex
T
perceived as optimal by the exogenous
technology planner satises the following condition:31
T ex′
T
(yθ)
1− T ex′
T
(yθ)
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) , (3.35)
where the function β : θ 7→ βθ is given by
βθ := κ
1+γCES
θ h
γCES
θ
(
φ∗(T )
)1+γCES ∀ θ ,
while B and b are the cumulative distribution and the density function of β.
Comparing the exogenous technology planner’s tax rates (3.35) with the optimal tax in equation
(3.33), there are two dierences. First, optimal taxes account for the directed technical change
adjustment
ρCES(1− gθ) .
This term is increasing in θ (as welfare weights are decreasing in θ at the optimum) and in this
sense necessitates a progressive adjustment of the tax schedule. The intuition for this adjustment
is the same as for the top and bottom tax rate adjustments discussed above: lowering marginal
tax rates at the bottom and raising them at the top induces technical change that compresses the
wage distribution and hence improves equity.
The second dierence is that the optimal tax formula features the hazard ratio of β whereas the
exogenous technology planner uses that of β. The function β can be interpreted as the degree
of exogenous inequality in the model: if labor supply were identical across all workers, wages
would be proportional to β. The function β instead is the exogenous technology planner’s wrong
30Note that the set of optimal taxes computed by the exogenous technology planner for arbitrary initial taxes T strictly
includes the self-conrming policy equilibrium of Rothschild and Scheuer (2013). Specically, when setting T
to the tax in the self-conrming policy equilibrium, the exogenous technology planner’s preferred tax is exactly
the self-conrming policy equilibrium tax. Hence, comparing optimal taxes to those computed by the exogenous
technology planner for arbitrary initial taxes includes the comparison to the self-conrming policy equilibrium.
31I restrict attention to the CES case here, as this allows for sharp analytical conclusions.
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inference about the degree of exogenous inequality. The exogenous technology planner believes
that, if all workers’ labor supply were identical, wages would be proportional to β instead of β.
It can be shown that the exogenous technology planner’s measure of exogenous inequality is
larger than the true one (see Appendix B.1.4):
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
>
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
∀ θ . (3.36)
This raises the exogenous technology planner’s tax rates at all income levels relative to the
optimum. The second adjustment due to directed technical change therefore reduces marginal tax
rates everywhere.
Intuitively, the exogenous technology planner overestimates the degree of exogenous inequality
in the economy because he mistakenly believes that the skill bias of the equilibrium technology
under the initial tax T is exogenous. Since more exogenous inequality calls for higher marginal
tax rates, the exogenous technology planner chooses elevated marginal tax rates everywhere.32
At the bottom of the income distribution, the two adjustments point in the same direction.
Hence, if we assume exogenous welfare weights, directed technical change calls for unambiguously
lower marginal tax rates at the lowest income and, by continuity, in some neighborhood thereof.
At the top of the income distribution, the eects move in opposite directions. Yet, at the highest
income, the ABC term in equations (3.33) and (3.35) vanishes, such that the only remaining
dierence is the (positive) term ρCES(1 − gθ). Hence, with exogenous welfare weights, the
optimal marginal tax at the top is unambiguously higher when accounting for directed technical
change.
Moreover, when the upper tail of the income distribution has a Pareto shape, the exogenous
technology planner computes optimal marginal tax rates according to (see Corollary 13 in Appendix
B.1.4)
lim
θ→θ
T ex′
T
(yθ)
1− T ex′
T
(yθ)
=
1− gtop
ae
+
a− 1
a
γCES(1− gtop) ,
where a is the Pareto tail parameter of the income distribution and gtop the asymptotic welfare
weight. This expression is strictly smaller than the optimal marginal tax in Corollary 11. Hence,
conditional on the limit gtop, directed technical change unambiguously raises the optimal marginal
tax in the Pareto tail.
32An intuition for the positive impact of exogenous inequality on marginal tax rates is that a higher degree of
exogenous inequality implies that the pre-tax income distribution will respond less strongly to rising tax rates,
such that redistribution can be achieved at a lower eciency loss. See also Proposition 15 in Appendix B.3.3 and
the subsequent discussion.
85
3 Redistributive Income Taxation with Directed Technical Change
To summarize, accounting for directed technical change eects leads to lower marginal tax
rates at the bottom of the income distribution and to higher marginal tax rates both at the very
top and in the Pareto tail of the income distribution.
3.7 antitative Analysis
To assess the quantitative relevance of directed technical change eects, I calibrate the CES version
of the model to estimates from the empirical literature on directed technical change. I use the
calibration to simulate the eects of tax reforms and to compute optimal taxes.
3.7.1 Calibration
The calibration proceeds as follows. First, I set the wage elasticity parameters γCES and ρCES
(equivalently, σ and δ), the labor supply elasticity e (assuming isoelastic disutility of labor), and the
initial tax function T (approximating the US income tax system in 2005) on the basis of existing
empirical estimates. In the second step, I infer the exogenous technology parameter κ from the
US earnings distribution in 2005.
Within-Technology Substitution Eects The within-technology substitution elasticity γCES
and the technical change elasticity ρCES govern the response of relative wages to changes in
relative labor inputs. Directed technical change eects are likely to arise with considerable delay,
implying that to measure ρCES , one has to track relative wages over a long period of time after an
exogenous change in labor inputs occurred. Within-technology substitution, in contrast, does not
require rms to change their production technology, so its eects are likely to occur over a much
shorter period of time. The timing of the eects therefore provides an opportunity to identify
γCES and ρCES separately.
The empirical literature that aims to identify an elasticity of substitution between dierentially
skilled worker groups without explicit reference to directed technical change typically focuses on
comparably short time periods of about one year or slightly more. I take these estimates to set
γCES .
Besides the timing of the eects, an important property in which many empirical studies dier
is the denition of the skill groups between which an elasticity of substitution is measured. Many
studies focus on college graduates versus those without a college degree. Others consider high
school graduates versus high school dropouts. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) stand out
in that they estimate substitution elasticities between workers located at 20 dierent points in
the wage distribution. They test for heterogeneity in these elasticities but nd no evidence for
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it. In light of this result, the CES assumption, which imposes a single elasticity of substitution
between any two disjoint groups of workers, seems an acceptable simplication. It implies that all
estimates, irrespective of the denition of skill groups, are equally relevant for the calibration of
γCES .
Acemoglu (2002) summarizes the consensus of the literature at that time as σ being somewhere
between 1.4 and 2, which implies that γCES falls between−0.5 and−0.7. The results of Carneiro
et al. (2019) imply a short-run elasticity, measured within two years after the skill supply shock,
of −0.5 (for a detailed description of Carneiro et al. 2019 see below). This value falls within the
consensus range observed by Acemoglu (2002). Moreover, Carneiro et al. (2019) is the only study
that estimates wage responses at dierent points in time. Thereby, it provides estimates of γCES
and ρCES obtained consistently within a single framework. For these reasons, I set γCES = −0.5,
the estimate implied by Carneiro et al. (2019). The implied elasticity of substitution is σ = 2.
Directed Technical Change Eects A few studies measure the response of wages to skill
supply shocks over substantially longer periods of time (about 10 years or more). Most of them
explicitly reference directed technical change and provide evidence for technology adjustments
being an important driver of the long-run wage responses. Since this applies only to a handful of
papers, I give a brief overview over each of them in Appendix B.2.1.
Table 3.1 shows the results of these papers. The short-run estimates are −0.55 and −0.53,
which (further) motivates my choice of γCES . Estimates over a period of about 10 years are
consistently close to zero, ranging from −0.1 to 0. Finally, the estimate from Carneiro et al. (2019)
for an adjustment period of 17 years shows an eect of 0.5. These long-run eects are total eects,
in the sense that they include both within-technology and between-technology (directed technical
change) substitution. Hence, they map into the sum of γCES and ρCES .
Based on Table 3.1, I consider two cases. The rst case, derived from the 10 year estimates,
sets γCES + ρCES to −0.1, which, given γCES = −0.5, implies ρCES = 0.4. In this case,
within-technology substitution and directed technical change eects are of a similar magnitude
and almost oset each other (given that they work in opposite directions). Hence, accounting for
directed technical change reduces the analysis approximately to the case with exogenous wages
studied extensively in the literature on optimal taxation. In the second case, based on the 17 year
estimate of Carneiro et al. (2019), I set γCES + ρCES to 0.5, such that ρCES = 1. In this case,
directed technical change dominates within-technology substitution, that is, there is strong bias
(see Section 3.4). I therefore call this the strong bias case.
The conservative case is supported by all four studies in Table 3.1. Moreover, there are at least
two further papers that, for dierent reasons, do not provide estimates that could be used to infer
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Study Skill Groups Time Horizon Geographical Level Cross-wage Eect
Carneiro et al. (2019) College vs. non-
college
2 years Norwegian munici-
palities
−0.55
Carneiro et al. (2019) College vs. non-
college
11 years Norwegian munici-
palities
0
Carneiro et al. (2019) College vs. non-
college
17 years Norwegian munici-
palities
0.5
Lewis (2011) High school vs.
high-school dropout
10 years US metro areas −0.14
Dustmann and Glitz
(2015)
Postsecondary
vocational degree
or apprenticeship
versus no postsec-
ondary education
10 years German local labor
markets (aggregates
of German counties)
−0.09
Morrow and Treer
(2017)
Some tertiary ver-
sus no tertiary edu-
cation
Short (see descrip-
tion in Appendix
B.2.1)
38 countries −0.53
Morrow and Treer
(2017)
Some tertiary ver-
sus no tertiary edu-
cation
Long (see descrip-
tion in Appendix
B.2.1)
38 countries −0.11
Table 3.1. The table shows estimates of the eect of relative skill supply changes on relative wages
from a set of empirical studies. A brief outline of each study with an explanation of how the numbers
in the last column are derived from the respective study’s results is provided in Appendix B.2.1.
γCES and ρCES , but nevertheless support the view of the conservative case that the long-run
wage eects of skill supply shocks are close to zero. First, Blundell, Green and Jin (2018) document
that a large and sudden increase in the share of individuals holding a college degree in the 1990s
in the UK left the wage premium associated with college education basically unchanged. They
provide empirical results suggesting that rms responded to the hike in the relative supply of
college graduates by adopting production forms that granted higher degrees of autonomy and
responsibility to their workers, which likely beneted highly qualied workers’ productivity.
They argue that these endogenous technology adjustments oset the negative within-technology
substitution eect on the college premium. Second, Clemens et al. (2018) study the eect of the
exclusion of half a million Mexican farm workers (braceros) from the US in 1965 on US farm
workers’ wages and nd no evidence for dierential wage changes following the event in states
heavily exposed to the bracero exclusion relative to less exposed states. They provide striking
evidence for rapid adoption of labor-replacing technologies on farms in heavily exposed states
after the exclusion.
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The strong bias case is supported directly only by Carneiro et al. (2019). Nevertheless, I believe
that the case for strong bias is stronger than it might appear from this. The studies in Table 3.1
analyze the dierential evolution of wages between often quite narrowly dened geographical
areas, which were hit dierentially by plausibly exogenous skill supply shocks. By construction,
such estimates miss all directed technical change eects that appear on a higher geographical
level. Since the relevant markets for innovative technologies are plausibly much larger than
most of the geographical units listed in Table 3.1, the estimates are likely to capture mostly the
eects of investments into adoption of already existing technologies, rather than the eects of
re-directed inventive activity.33 The model developed in Section 3.3.1 implies that endogenous
adoption and innovation work in the same direction, cumulating in the total directed technical
change eect that is represented by ρCES . Hence, the estimates of Table 3.1 likely miss part of
ρCES and therefore underestimate it.34
Another piece of evidence in favor of strong bias is provided by Fadinger and Mayr (2014). They
show that in a cross section of countries, relative skill supply measures are negatively correlated
with relative unemployment rates of more versus less skilled workers and with relative emigration
rates of skilled workers. In a directed technical change model with frictional labor markets and
endogenous migration, they show that both correlations can be interpreted as signs of strong
relative bias of technology.35
Labor Supply Elasticity I assume an isoelastic disutility of labor as introduced in Section
3.3.4. This necessitates calibration of the hypothetical labor supply elasticity along the linearized
budget set represented by the parameter e. I choose e such that the elasticity of taxable income
with respect to changes in the marginal retention rate implied by the model matches empirical
estimates of this elasticity. Starting from e, the elasticity of taxable income has to account for
33See, for example, Dechezlepretre, Hemous, Olsen and Zanella (2019) and San (2019) for patent-based evidence that
inventions respond to the structure of labor supply.
34A potential source of upwards bias in directed technical change eects obtained by comparing small geographical
units are Rybczynski eects: a rise in relative skill supply in one region increases the region’s exports of skill-
intensive goods, which raises skilled workers’ wages. This wage increase may be mistakenly attributed to directed
technical change. All the studies listed in Table 3.1, however, provide dierent forms of evidence suggesting that
adjustments in the output mix of their observation units are not driving their results. See the respective papers for
details.
35Note at this point that there are at least two empirical studies that are in more or less open contradiction to the
predictions of directed technical change theory. First, Blum (2010) nds that in a panel of countries, increases in the
relative supply of skilled workers reduce their relative wages by more in the long-run than in the short-run. Second,
Ciccone and Peri (2005) report long-run estimates for the elasticity of substitution between college graduates
and non-college workers of about 1.5, which maps into a total wage elasticity γCES + ρCES of −0.7. With
γCES = −0.5, this implies a negative ρCES , inconsistent with theory. These results should serve as a word of
caution regarding the simulation results below. Yet, I do not respect them directly in the simulations. After all,
calibrating a model to empirical results that contradict the qualitative predictions of the model makes no sense.
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potential non-linearities in the tax scheme and for the equilibrium response of wages to changes
in the aggregate labor supply of workers of a given type. The rst adjustment is accommodated
by the elasticity R, as explained in Section 3.3.2. The second adjustment leads to the following
expression for the model-implied elasticity of taxable income (see Appendix B.3.1 for a more
detailed explanation of this elasticity):
Rθ
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
=
e
1 + ePT (yθ)− (γCES + ρCES)(1− PT (yθ))e
.
The wage response to a change in a type’s labor supply is again likely to dier between the short
and the long run. The above expression incorporates the long-run response, as evidenced by its
use of γCES +ρCES . Most reliable estimates of the elasticity of taxable income, however, measure
income responses over rather short periods of time (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). Hence, a
more appropriate theoretical counterpart of these estimates is given by the expression
˜Rθ :=
e
1 + ePT (yθ)− γCES(1− PT (yθ))e
,
which only includes the wage eects of within-technology factor substitution. I use this expression
to calibrate e given estimates of ˜Rθ . In doing so, I set PT to 0, as empirical tax systems are piece-
wise linear.
Saez et al. (2012) propose a value of 0.25 for ˜Rθ , while Gruber and Saez (2002) nd a value of
0.57. These estimates map into values for e of 0.27 and 0.64. This range includes many other
estimates from the extensive literature on labor supply elasticities (e.g. Meghir and Phillips, 2010;
Chetty, 2012). I choose an intermediate value of 0.5 for my baseline calibration. The main insights
are robust to other values in this range.
Initial Tax System I set the initial tax system, denoted by T , as an approximation to the US
income tax in 2005. I follow Heathcote et al. (2017), who show that a constant-rate-of-progressivity
schedule as introduced in Section 3.3.4 provides a good approximation. Heathcote et al. (2017)
estimate the parameters of such a tax function on 2000 to 2005 income and tax data for the US
and obtain values of p = 0.181 and λ = 5.568. I use these values in all simulations.
Exogenous Technology With the parameters γCES , ρCES , e, and T calibrated, the exogenous
technology parameter κ is identied by the earnings distribution under the initial tax system
T . I approximate the earnings distribution by smoothly combining a lognormal distribution for
incomes below $200k and a Pareto distribution with tail parameter 1.5 above $200k (Diamond and
Saez, 2011). Moreover, I assume that the type distribution h is standard uniform on [θ, θ] = [0, 1].
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In the CES case, this assumption is insubstantial, because the cross-wage elasticity between any
two distinct types of workers is independent of the types’ locations in the type space. Given an
estimate of the income distribution, it is straightforward to compute the function κ from workers’
rst-order condition (3.2) and the wage equation (3.14). The procedure is described in more detail
in Appendix B.2.2.
Welfare Function Finally, I use a welfare function of the type
V ({uθ}θ∈Θ) =
(∫ θ
θ
u1−rθ hθ dθ
) 1
1−r
,
where the relative inequality aversion parameter r allows to vary the strength of the preference
for equity in a exible way (Atkinson, 1970).
For the baseline calibration, I set r = 1, such that the (income-weighted) average of optimal
marginal tax rates in the conservative case (i.e., ρCES = 0.4) is the same as in the US 2005 tax
and transfer system.36
3.7.2 Simulation
Given the calibrated CES version of the model, I simulate the eect of tax reforms on wages and
compute optimal taxes on the basis of the analytical results of Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
Tax Reforms I study a hypothetical tax reform that reverses the cumulative impact on tax
progressivity of US income tax reforms from 1970 to 2005. As documented by Piketty and Saez
(2007), the US income tax system underwent a series of regressive reforms in this period. Heathcote
et al. (2017) estimate the decline in tax progressivity between 1970 and 2005 to be 0.034 when
measured by the progressivity parameter of a constant-rate-of-progressivity tax schedule. Taking
as a starting value the progressivity estimate of p = 0.181, I hence ask what are the eects of
raising the progressivity of a constant-rate-of-progressivity tax from 0.181 (its 2005 US value) to
0.215 (its 1970 US value) on the wage distribution.37
I compute the wage eects of the described reform using the expressions provided by Corollaries
9 and 12. For the exogenous technology planner, who ignores directed technical change, the
eects are given by the expression in Corollary 12 alone.38
36I report results for r = 50 (close to Rawlsian) in Appendix B.3.5.
37I choose the post-reform value for the parameter λ (the second parameter of a constant-rate-of-progressivity
tax function) such that, in the conservative case described above (ρCES = 0.4), the reform leaves tax revenue
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Figure 3.1. The gure displays the total wage changes in log points induced by the progressive
tax reform described in the text. Wage changes are shown for workers at each percentile of the
wage distribution. The red dashed line and the blue line are for the strong bias and, respectively,
the conservative case of the baseline calibration described in the text. The black line indicates wage
changes as predicted by the exogenous technology planner.
The results are displayed in Figure 3.1. In the conservative case, the reform has almost no
eect on wages. This was expected, because directed technical change and within-technology
substitution eects approximately oset each other in this case. When ignoring directed technical
change, the model predicts moderate wage decreases for low-skilled workers and even smaller
gains for the high-skilled. In the strong bias case, wages for low-skilled workers rise by up to 3%
while wages for high-skilled workers decrease by up to 1.5%.
To put the results into perspective, I compute the eect on the 90-10-percentile ratio of the wage
distribution. In the conservative case, this ratio increases by 0.3%, whereas in the strong bias case
the ratio falls by 2%. This reduction is almost exclusively driven by an increase in the wage at the
10th percentile of about 1.9%, while the wage at the 90th percentile is basically unchanged. With
a labor supply elasticity of e = 0.64 (at the high end of the range discussed in Section 3.7.1), the
reduction in the 90-10-percentile ratio becomes 2.6%.
unchanged.
38Corollaries 9 and 12 provide a local approximation of the wage eects of tax reforms. I also compute the exact
changes in wages due to the reform and nd that the dierence to the local approximation is negligible.
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These eects can be compared to the actually observed changes in the US wage distribution
between 1970 and 2005. In this period, the 90-10-percentile ratio rose by about 30% (e.g. Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011). My results then suggest that regressive tax reforms, in conjunction with directed
technical change, can explain up to 2.6% of this total of 30%, that is, 9% of the total increase in
relative terms.
Note at this point that the model likely underestimates the directed technical change eects
of regressive reforms by omitting potentially relevant adjustment margins. In particular, one
might imagine that, in the long run, individuals’ education and occupation choices respond to less
progressivity in the tax schedule in a way that reinforces the labor supply responses analyzed
here. Quantifying these eects in a richer model is an interesting next step but outside the scope
of the present paper, which focuses on the implications of directed technical change for the
(non-parametric) design of optimal taxes.
Optimal Taxes I compute optimal marginal tax rates according to Proposition 5 and, for
comparison, the marginal tax rates preferred by the exogenous technology planner as given by
Proposition 12. As a further benchmark, I include the marginal tax rates that are preferred when
the entire wage distribution is perceived as exogenous and xed at its state under the US 2005 tax
system.
Figure 3.2 shows that, as predicted by theory, directed technical change eects reduce optimal
marginal tax rates in the lower part of the income distribution and increase them in the upper part.
The point where directed technical change eects reverse their sign is close to the US median
earnings level in 2005, indicated by the vertical line. Below the median income, optimal marginal
tax rates are reduced by up to 18 percentage points relative to the exogenous technology planner’s
tax rates. Above the median, the increase in optimal marginal tax rates due to directed technical
change becomes as large as 10 percentage points.
These changes occur over the bulk of the income distribution. At the 10th percentile, the optimal
marginal tax falls by 17 percentage points (5 percentage points) in the strong bias (conservative)
case relative to the exogenous technology planner’s tax. At the 90th percentile, the increase in the
optimal marginal tax is 8 percentage points (3 percentage points) in the strong bias (conservative)
case. For strong bias, this leads marginal tax rates to increase monotonically with income over
large parts of the income distribution,whereas they follow a pronounced U-shape when ignoring
directed technical change.39
39At the very bottom of the income distribution (below the 10th percentile), optimal marginal tax rates are high in
all cases. This is because, for comparability with other quantitative optimal tax studies (e.g. Mankiw, Weinzierl
and Yagan, 2009; Brewer, Saez and Shepard, 2010), I assume that the income distribution has a mass point at zero.
Consequently, the negative marginal tax results obtained from Proposition 5, which require strictly positive incomes
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Figure 3.2. The gure displays optimal marginal tax rates by income level. The red dashed line and
the blue line are for the strong bias and, respectively, the conservative case of the baseline calibration
described in the text. The black lines are for the exogenous technology planner and for the case with a
fully exogenous wage distribution. The vertical line indicates the US median earnings level in 2005 of
about $52k.
Compared to the exogenous wage benchmark studied extensively in the existing literature,
optimal marginal tax rates can be more or less progressive, depending on whether there is strong
bias. In the conservative case, directed technical change and within-technology substitution eects
almost exactly oset each other, such that the optimal tax is very close to that obtained with
exogenous wages. In the strong bias case, directed technical change dominates and the optimal
tax is substantially more progressive.
The welfare gains from implementing the optimal tax relative to the exogenous technology
planner’s preferred tax can be sizable. In the strong bias case, they are equivalent to an increase
in the lump-sum payment of $430 annually, corresponding to 1.5% of the lump-sum payment or
0.6% of average income under the exogenous technology planner’s tax. In the conservative case,
the gains are much smaller, amounting to $35 annually. On the other end of the spectrum, they
become as large as $850 annually under strong bias and with Rawlsian welfare (see Appendix
B.3.5).
for the least skilled workers, do not apply.
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Interestingly, in the strong bias case, the welfare level achieved by the actual US 2005 tax and
transfer scheme is between the optimum and the level achieved by the exogenous technology
planner’s tax. Hence, for reasonable parameter values, ignoring directed technical change can lead
to tax reform proposals that deteriorate welfare in the present environment. This is due to the
fact that, under strong bias, the optimal tax with monotonically increasing marginal tax rates is
much closer in shape to the actual tax schedule than to the U-shaped tax preferred when ignoring
directed technical change.
3.8 Conclusion
I develop a model with directed technical change and endogenous labor supply, in which the
structure of labor supply determines the direction of technical change. Tax reforms aect the
direction of technical change by altering the structure of labor supply.
Under certain conditions, any progressive income tax reform induces technical change that
compresses the pre-tax wage distribution. As a consequence, when directed technical change is
taken into account – as opposed to treating technology as exogenous – optimal marginal tax rates
are higher in the upper tail and lower in the lower tail of the income distribution.
Simulating the cumulative (regressive) reforms of the US tax and transfer system between 1970
and 2005, the resulting wage eects, accounting for the induced technical change, are rather
modest. In the calibration most favorable to directed technical change eects, the regressive tax
reforms explain about 9% of the total contemporaneous increase in US wage inequality when
measured by the 90-10-percentile ratio of the wage distribution. The impact of directed technical
change on optimal marginal tax rates, however, is substantial. Optimal marginal tax rates for
workers who earn about half of the 2005 US median income are reduced by more than 10 percentage
points relative to the benchmark where technology is treated as exogenous.
Future work may elaborate on the empirical content of the theory. For a more complete
understanding of the contribution of past tax reforms to changes in wage inequality, a richer
model would be useful, including adjustments in occupational choices and, potentially, education
decisions to taxes.
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4 Ineiciency and Regulation of Credence
Goods Markets with Altruistic Experts
Authors: Razi Farukh, Anna Kerkhof, and Jonas Löbbing
4.1 Introduction
Market regulation is a pervasive feature of the economy in virtually all countries. In general, it
appears to be more prevalent in developing countries and has consequently been associated with
poor economic performance (e.g. Djankov, La Porta, de Silanes and Shleifer, 2002).
Yet, even in highly developed countries, a certain set of service sector industries exhibits a
particularly high degree of regulation. In these industries, often highly qualied experts provide
specialized services to consumers, who are unable to reliably assess the quality of the service
provided. In its purest form, the resulting information asymmetry requires that the consumer
trusts the expert to provide an appropriate service. Hence, such services have been termed
credence goods (e.g. Darby and Karni, 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). Existing regulation
of credence goods markets often entails a combination of price controls and entry restrictions.1
Given their potentially detrimental eect on eciency, it is important to understand whether
such regulations can be justied by the specic features of credence goods markets.2
Addressing this issue, we provide a novel rationale for price and entry regulation on markets
for credence goods, based on considerations of economic eciency.
In particular, we consider a setting where consumers demand a good of variable quality and
cannot write contracts contingent on quality or on a signal thereof. Producers (experts, henceforth)
1The European Economic and Social Committee (2014) provides a comprehensive description of the various types of
regulations imposed on credence goods markets in the European Union. For a detailed overview of the regulation
of health care markets (arguably one of the most important credence goods markets) in OECD countries, see Paris,
Devaux and Wei (2010).
2The professions related to credence goods markets, such as physicians or lawyers, consistently rank among the
top-earning occupations in most advanced economies. Arguably, their high incomes partly reect the regulations
imposed on their markets. See, for example, Kleiner and Krueger (2013) for evidence supporting that occupational-
level entry restrictions substantially increase earnings of incumbent workers. The question for justication of these
regulations is therefore also relevant from a distributional perspective.
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are altruistic in the sense that they value both their own monetary income and their consumers’
well-being.
We impose two key assumptions. First, experts’ preferences are convex in a way that makes
their marginal rate of substitution between income and consumer utility decline in income. Put
dierently, experts’ valuation of additional money relative to their consumers’ utility decreases
in the amount of income already earned. Second, there is a common agency structure, whereby
many consumers (the principals) are served by a single expert (the agent).
In combination, these two assumptions give rise to an externality across consumers: the payment
of a given consumer raises the expert’s income, which in turn increases the relative importance of
the other-regarding part of the expert’s preferences. This improves the service quality received by
all consumers served by the expert.
We study the implications of this externality in the setting that allows to expose our main results
in the most transparent way. In particular, we assume that consumers are matched randomly to
experts (in a many-to-one fashion) and make a take-it-or-leave-it price oer to the matched expert.
Experts then decide whether to accept the oers and, in case of acceptance, covertly choose the
quality of the good supplied to the respective consumer.3
Our rst set of results shows that consumers’ equilibrium price oers are ineciently low.
When making oers, consumers do not internalize the positive eect of their payment on the
quality received by other consumers. Consequently, raising prices above the (unregulated) equi-
librium level can make all consumers better o. Since experts are trivially better o when prices
increase, introducing a xed price or a price oor above the equilibrium price can achieve a Pareto
improvement. We also show that there is no need to consider policies other than the regulation of
prices in our baseline setting. Price regulation can implement all allocations that are constrained
ecient in an appropriate sense.
Next, we endogenize the entry decisions of experts. We introduce a xed cost of entry and
decreasing returns in experts’ technology, such that entry costs are nanced out of inframarginal
rents. The unregulated equilibrium is still (constrained) inecient. With endogenous entry,
however, price regulation alone does not suce to overcome this ineciency. Indeed, price
regulation alone can lead to a Pareto deterioration: Elevated prices draw additional experts into
the market until prots (net of the cost of entry) are close to zero again. Thus, the desirable
eect of a price oor on prots, and thereby on experts’ social behavior, vanishes. This leaves
the increase in price and a congruent increase in total entry costs as the only essential allocation
changes. Yet, when price regulation is combined with entry restrictions, its eciency-enhancing
3In Appendix C.2, we show that our main results are unchanged in a setting where experts post prices and consumers
subsequently choose between experts.
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eect is re-established. A cap on the number of active experts prevents the dilution of prots
through entry after prices have been raised, such that prots and the extent of experts’ prosociality
increase as desired.
Key to our results is the assumption that experts’ preferences give rise to income eects on
social behavior. We discuss evidence for this assumption in Section 4.8 at length. In a nutshell, we
describe three types of evidence from existing work that support our assumption. First, results
from numerous dictator games show that the level of giving strongly increases in the overall
amount of money to be distributed (e.g. Engel, 2011). Second, Bartling, Valero and Weber (2019)
present results from a more focused experiment, showing that increases in (experimental) income
raise participants’ willingness to forgo additional income to the benet of others. Finally, various
forms of correlational evidence on real-world giving behavior support the notion that giving
increases with income (e.g. List, 2011).
We contribute to the existing literature by providing a novel rationale for price and entry
regulation in credence goods markets. This complements Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) who
provide an alternative argument for price (but not entry) regulation in markets for credence goods.
Other theoretical analyses of quality-related entry or price regulation, such as Atkeson, Hellwig
and Ordonez (2015), deviate more strongly from the pure credence goods case and thus have
dierent applications. Existing studies of credence goods markets with socially motivated experts
(e.g. Kerschbamer, Sutter and Dulleck, 2017) and, more generally, in behavioral contract theory
have not discovered the cross-consumer externality central to our results, because they either
lack the common agency structure or the non-linear structure of (social) preferences.
The relation of our work to the existing literature is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Section 4.3 introduces our model. In Section 4.4, we discuss a benchmark without common agency
to clearly lay out the key mechanism in the model. Section 4.5 analyzes a market setting with
common agency and Section 4.6 analyzes regulatory intervention. In Section 4.7, we extend the
analysis to include endogenous market entry of experts and, correspondingly, study the eects
of entry regulation. In Section 4.8, we describe evidence from existing work that supports our
assumption that social behavior depends on income. Finally, Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
In studying the regulation of credence goods markets, our work is closely related to Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003). They also provide a rationale for the introduction of price oors on credence
goods markets. Their argument is based on a setting where consumers can consult multiple
experts sequentially to learn about the service most appropriate to their needs. In this setting,
99
4 Ineciency and Regulation of Credence Goods Markets with Altruistic Experts
an externality arises from experts’ eorts to identify the need of a consumer: if other experts
identify the consumer’s need with high probability, the consumer can verify any given expert’s
recommendation with high precision by consulting a second expert. Price competition then
leads any given expert to reduce price and eort, which erodes eort incentives for all other
experts. A price oor stops this process and sustains high diagnostic eort by all. Our rationale for
regulation is dierent, building on experts’ social preferences. It is complementary to Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (2003) in the sense that, incorporating non-linear social preferences into their setup
would give rise to the same considerations as in our analysis. In particular, this would arguably
strengthen the case for a price oor and introduce benets from entry restrictions.4
Other theoretical work on market regulation with the goal to promote quality deviates more
strongly from the pure credence goods case analyzed here. Atkeson et al. (2015), for example,
assume that consumers receive an imperfect signal of quality after their purchase, which allows
for reputation building by suppliers. They also nd a rationale for joint entry and price regulation,
as this incentivizes sellers to undertake ex-ante investments into their quality. But again, if experts
had social preferences as in our analysis, the cross-consumer externality from our setting would
also arise in theirs and our implications for regulation would complement their results.
More generally, whenever the monitoring of quality is imperfect and experts have non-linear
social preferences, our reasoning applies and creates a rationale for regulation. Yet, it is arguably
most relevant in the pure credence goods case, where social behavior of suppliers becomes crucial
because other mechanisms, such as reputation building or explicit monetary incentives, are not
available.5
The theoretical literature on credence goods mainly focuses on relaxing the informational
restrictions of the pure credence goods case in various ways and studies how this aects the ability
of private contracts to overcome the remaining informational problems. Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006) provide a useful taxonomy of informational assumptions and the associated results, giving
a comprehensive overview of the corresponding studies.6 With the exception of Pesendorfer
4Note that the reason for price regulation identied by Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) critically depends on
consumers being able to consult multiple experts. This excludes a variety of settings, in which our analysis remains
applicable. These are (i) settings with a need for immediate service delivery, such as medical emergencies; (ii)
situations where recommendation and execution of the service cannot be well separated; and (iii) situations where
separation is feasible but the execution cannot be monitored.
5It is, however, important for our results that consumers have a restricted set of contracts at their disposal. Prescott
and Townsend (1984) show that unrestricted private contracts achieve a constrained ecient outcome in a wide
range of moral hazard settings. Their results do not apply in our case because we do not allow consumers to propose
contracts contingent on experts’ interaction with other consumers. For example, consumers might overcome the
ineciency in our setting by oering prices conditional on experts not accepting lower prices by other consumers.
We consider this less realistic than the analyzed regulatory interventions. See Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1994)
for a similar view.
6For examples, see Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1993), and Emons (1997). An important more recent
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and Wolinsky (2003) (see above), these studies do not analyze the scope for public regulation. In
contrast, Mimra, Rasch and Waibel (2016) study the eects of price regulation on quality in an
experiment on credence goods provision. They nd that xed prices lead to higher quality than
price competition, but do not oer a theoretical explanation for their results.
Kerschbamer et al. (2017) propose social preferences as an explanation for deviations from
theoretical predictions identied in experimental work by Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2011).
Yet, neither these authors nor subsequent work studies (non-linear) social preferences in a market
setting with common agency. Hence, they do not discover the externality that is at the core of our
results.
The same holds, more generally, for the entire literature on behavioral contract theory (see
Kőszegi (2014) for a survey). Englmaier and Wambach (2010), for example, study moral hazard
with inequity-averse agents, but they do not embed their analysis in a common agency framework.
Therefore, they do not obtain externalities across principals.
Studies of common agency, in contrast, have identied externalities across principals in various
settings (e.g. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997). Yet, these papers do not consider non-linear
social preferences. Hence, their externalities are dierent from the one in our analysis.
4.3 Setup
We set up a model with many consumers who need a service and many experts who can provide
this service. Experts covertly choose the quality of the service, which creates moral hazard.
Moreover, consumer utility is not contractible, which makes the service a credence good (e.g.,
Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006).
4.3.1 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers (or, buyers) indexed by b ∈ B. The mass of consumers |B| is
denoted M . Consumer b’s utility is
ub = v(ab)− pb (4.1)
if the consumer receives a service of quality ab and pays pb in return. If the consumer receives no
service, he gets outside utility v.7
contribution to this line of research is Bester and Dahm (2018).
7We use ‘he’ when we speak of a consumer and ‘she’ when we speak of an expert.
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We assume that v is C2, with v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 everywhere. For interior solutions, let
v′(a)→ 0 as a→∞.
4.3.2 Experts
There is a nite set of experts indexed by e ∈ E := {1, 2, ..., N}. To reduce notation, let the
number of experts equal the mass of consumers, N = M . Expert e earns an income of
ye =
∫
Be
[pb − c(ab)] db ,
where Be ⊂ B is the set of consumers served by expert e and c(ab) denotes the cost of providing
a service of quality ab. The cost function is C2 with c > 0, c′ > 0, and c′′ > 0 everywhere. We
restrict the quality variable to take positive values, such that 0 is the minimum quality an expert
can provide.8
Note that we do not explicitly model the expert’s opportunity cost of service provision. Hence,
the cost function c is best thought of as including this opportunity cost. Income is then measured
net of opportunity costs. If ye = 0, the expert does therefore not literally earn nothing, but she
earns the same amount she could earn from alternative uses of her time.
Expert e’s utility is given by
ue = W (ye) +
∫
Be
[v(ab)− pb] db . (4.2)
Hence, experts care about their material payo ye but also about the utility of their clients. The
function W is C2 with W ′ > 1. This ensures that the expert always values her own income more
than her clients’ incomes at the margin. Crucially, we also assume that the marginal utility from
income is decreasing, that is, W ′′ < 0 everywhere. This makes the expert’s degree of selshness
contingent on her income level. If the expert earns little, she will focus on increasing her income
with little regard to consumers’ utility. If in contrast the expert is nancially well situated, she
will pay more attention to her clients’ needs.
We impose two further sensible assumptions on preferences to simplify the analysis. Our main
results do not depend on these assumptions. First, we transform consumers’ utility function such
that v(0)−c(0) = 0. This implies that experts do not derive moral satisfaction (i.e., utility through
the non-selsh part of their preferences) by serving consumers the minimum quality 0 at the price
8We interpret 0 as a quality threshold such that consumers can observe whether the quality they receive exceeds
0 or not. Consumers can then condition payments on this, making experts always provide at least 0 quality.
Alternatively, take 0 as a minimum service that is costless to the expert, such that she is always willing to provide
this minimum.
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of its cost. Second, let consumers’ outside utility be small, v ≤ 0. This excludes uninteresting
cases where consumers refuse to participate in the market.
4.3.3 Information
We assume throughout the paper that only experts themselves observe the quality of their services.
Thus, consumers cannot enforce contracts that make payments contingent on quality. Moreover,
we assume that consumer utility is not contractible either.9 This precludes standard approaches
to moral hazard problems.
With purely selsh preferences, these assumptions would make the case for consumers hopeless.
Experts would never have an incentive to provide more than the minimum level of quality. Non-
selsh experts, however, may provide higher quality services because they care for their clients.
This makes our setup well-suited to study the impact of non-selsh preferences on credence goods
provision in isolation from other considerations.
Note at this point that, in contrast to standard moral hazard and credence goods problems, our
setting does not include a stochastic, potentially unobservable state. We can easily incorporate
such a state in the analysis, but this does not add any relevant insights.
4.4 Bilateral Trade
To prepare the analysis of trading mechanisms for many consumers and many experts, consider
rst a bilateral setting with a single expert e and a single consumer b. The consumer is as described
above. The expert, however, does not perceive the consumer as atomistic, because he is her only
client. Hence the expert’s utility is
u˜e = W (pb − c(ab)) + v(ab)− pb
if she provides her service to the consumer, and W (0) otherwise. In relation to the common
agency setting studied in the remainder of the paper, this may best be thought of as a situation
where all consumers perfectly cooperate and are replaced by a representative consumer who
follows their jointly optimal strategy.
Suppose now the consumer oers a payment pb to the expert, who can then accept or reject the
oer. If the expert accepts the oer, she chooses the quality ab and provides the service.
If the expert accepts an oer pb, she will choose the quality ab of her service to maximize
9In the jargon of the credence goods literature, we consider a setting without veriability (of treatments) and liability
(e.g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006).
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utility. Expert utility is strictly concave in ab and ab must be non-negative by assumption, so the
following Kuhn-Tucker conditions uniquely determine the optimal quality a˜IC(pb):[
W ′(pb − c(a˜ICb ))c′(a˜ICb )− v′(a˜ICb )
]
a˜ICb = 0
W ′(pb − c(a˜ICb ))c′(a˜ICb )− v′(a˜ICb ) ≥ 0
a˜ICb ≥ 0 .
(4.3)
For concreteness, assume now that
W ′(0)c′(0) ≥ v′(0) . (4.4)
This implies that the expert chooses the minimum quality of 0 if her income is zero. In particular,
she will not incur monetary losses (relative to her outside option) to provide a quality higher than
necessary.
Consider now the expert’s acceptance decision. Suppose the oer is pb = c(0). If accepting this
oer, the expert will choose a quality of 0 and obtain utility W (0), equal to her outside option.
For simplicity we assume throughout the paper that, when indierent between two actions one of
which leads to the outside option, all individuals decide against the outside option. Hence, the
expert accepts the payment c(0). Moreover, her utility strictly increases in pb (recall that W ′ > 1),
so she accepts all oers above c(0) and rejects all oers below.
Anticipating these decisions of the expert, the consumer chooses his payment oer. In particular,
he takes into account the eect of his payment on service quality. By condition (4.3), this eect
is positive: a higher payment raises the expert’s income, which reduces the marginal utility of
income and makes the expert pay more attention to consumer utility. Thus, the consumer’s oer
choice is non-trivial; he may well choose a payment above c(0) to receive a service of higher
quality.
Let p∗ denote the optimal oer for the consumer, that is,
p∗ ∈ argmax
pb≥c(0)
{
v
(
a˜ICb (pb)
)− pb} . (4.5)
To focus on the most interesting case, we assume henceforth that v, W , and c indeed leave some
scope for mutually benecial exchange above the minimum quality 0. Formally, the minimum
oer c(0) (and the resulting minimum quality service) shall not maximize consumer utility:
c(0) /∈ argmax
pb≥c(0)
{
v
(
a˜ICb (pb)
)− pb} . (4.6)
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Figure 4.1. The gure displays indierence curves of the expert, Ie, and of the consumer, Ib, together
with the graph of expert’s quality choices a˜ICb . The point (p∗, a˜ICb (p∗)) maximizes consumer utility
on the curve a˜ICb .
In Appendix C.1.1, we provide an exact condition showing that assumption (4.6) holds if the
expert’s marginal cost does not increase too quickly in quality at ab = 0.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the results of the bilateral setting. The curve a˜ICb marks the set of feasible
allocations from the consumer’s perspective. The consumer chooses the point
(
p∗, a˜ICb (p
∗)
)
on
the curve, where his indierence curve Ib is tangent to the graph of a˜ICb . The expert’s indierence
curves Ie are such that expert utility is maximized at a˜ICb (pb) for any pb. Hence they have slope
innity at any point
(
pb, a˜
IC
b
)
.
4.5 Market Trade
Consider now again the setup with a nite number of experts and a continuum of consumers.
As in the bilateral setting we study a trading mechanism in which consumers oer payments in
exchange for the expert service and experts accept or reject.
In Appendix C.2 we analyze a mechanism where experts oer prices and consumers decide
which oer to accept. This mechanism yields essentially the same outcome as the consumer-
proposing mechanism studied here. The only dierence is that the expert-proposing mechanism
gives rise to additional equilibria (with dierent outcomes), which heavily rely on coordination
across consumers. We argue in the appendix that these equilibria are not very plausible and
provide two selection criteria, restricting consumers’ ability to coordinate. Both criteria leave
only the equilibrium that replicates the outcome of the consumer-proposing mechanism. To avoid
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these complications here, we focus directly on the consumer-proposing mechanism.
In particular, consider the following mechanism.
Stage 1 Each consumer b is matched randomly to an expert e and oers a payment pb to the
expert.10
Stage 2 Experts accept or reject the payments oered to them. If a consumer b’s oer is rejected,
he obtains outside utility v. If b’s oer is accepted, the accepting expert chooses a quality
level ab, and consumer b receives utility (4.1). Each expert e receives utility (4.2), where Be
is the set of consumers whose oers the expert accepted.11
Stages 1 and 2 describe a sequential game with complete information. We study its subgame
perfect equilibria by backward induction. For that, suppose payments {pb}b∈B and acceptance
sets Be are given. Then, experts choose quality levels ab to maximize utility subject to the non-
negativity constraint ab ≥ 0 for all b. Let aICb denote the optimal quality choice of expert e for
consumer b ∈ Be. As in the bilateral setting, this quality is uniquely determined by the following
Kuhn-Tucker conditions:12 [
W ′(ye)c′(aICb )− v′(aICb )
]
aICb = 0
W ′(ye)c′(aICb )− v′(aICb ) ≥ 0
aICb ≥ 0 .
(4.7)
Before choosing quality, experts decide which oers to accept. Formally, each expert e assesses
for each of her oers the marginal utility of adding the oer to her acceptance set Be. The set Be
must therefore satisfy the following conditions:
W ′(ye)
(
pb − c(aICb )
)
+ v
(
aICb
)− pb
≥ 0 ∀ b ∈ Be< 0 for all b whose oer e rejects. (4.8)
Using experts’ quality choices, these conditions lead to a simple characterization of acceptance
decisions contingent on an expert’s income.
10We assume that for each consumer the matching probability is uniform across experts. Thus, each expert will be
matched to a mass M/N of consumers.
11Note that consumers cannot condition their payments on the service quality they receive. This follows from our
assumption that quality is hidden to consumers and nal outcomes are not contractible.
12Expert utility is strictly concave in {ab}b∈Be , such that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions identify a unique maximizer.
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Lemma 9. Given payment oers {pb}b∈B , any expert e’s acceptance set Be and income ye must
satisfy, for any b matched to e on stage 1,
b ∈ Be ⇔ pb ≥
c(0) if ye ≤ 0p˜(ye) if ye > 0
with p˜ : ye 7→ p˜(ye) decreasing in ye and p˜(ye) ≤ c(0) for all ye > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.2.
Lemma 9 provides an acceptance threshold for consumers’ oers. Anticipating this threshold
and experts’ subsequent quality choices, consumers decide about their oers.
Importantly, here the quality provided by expert e does not depend on any individual payment
pb. In particular, by condition (4.7) the quality an expert provides is fully determined by her
income. But since consumers are atomistic, they perceive their contribution to the expert’s income
as negligible. Hence, in contrast to the bilateral setting, consumers have no incentive to raise their
payment above the acceptance threshold. The following proposition shows that the relevant piece
of the threshold then becomes c(0).
Proposition 6. Consider the game described by stages 1 and 2. In any subgame perfect equilibrium
all consumers oer c(0) and receive the minimum quality, that is, pb = c(0) and ab = 0 for all
b ∈ B.13,14
Proof. See Appendix C.1.3.
Proposition 6 stands in stark contrast to the result from the bilateral setting. Intuitively, this
discrepancy stems from an externality across buyers. If other buyers raised their payments,
experts’ incomes would increase and so would the service quality that any given buyer receives.
Note that the key assumption for this result is that experts’ preferences over income and
consumer utility are convex in a way that makes the marginal rate of substitution between the
two goods decreases in income. This induces experts to care more for their consumers and provide
higher quality services when their income is high.
13Our propositions focus on equilibrium outcomes instead of on the equilibria themselves, because there may be
multiplicity in the latter. This multiplicity, however, purely arises from o-equilibrium actions.
14A formal complication arises from the assumption of a consumer continuum: If experts change their actions towards
a measure zero of consumers, this does not aect experts’ utilities. We ignore this uninteresting issue throughout
the paper. Specically, we dismiss any equilibrium in which some expert chooses a special action for a measure
zero subset of consumers.
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4.6 Regulation and Eiciency
The cross-buyer externality suggests to study regulation policy. We study price regulation that
xes consumers’ payments at a prescribed level.15
In particular, consider the game described by stages 1 and 2 but with buyers’ oers pb xed at
the level p. Since buyers then have no decisions left, the game collapses to experts’ acceptance
and quality decisions. These must again satisfy conditions (4.7) and (4.8).
From Lemma 9 we already know that experts accept all oers if the regulation p is greater or
equal to c(0). Otherwise, they reject all oers. We can therefore implement an allocation {pb}b∈B ,
{Be}e∈E , {ab}b∈∪e∈EBe via price regulation if and only if it satises the following conditions.16
(i) Payments are uniform across buyers, pb = pb′ for all b, b′ ∈ B, and pb ≥ c(0) for all b ∈ B.
(ii) The sets Be have equal size, |Be| = 1 for all e ∈ E, and they are disjoint, Be ∩Be′ = ∅ for
all e 6= e′.
(iii) Service quality is uniform across buyers, ab = ab′ for all b, b′ ∈ B, and satises the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7).
We call such allocations implementable. In an implementable allocation, consumer utility is
given by
v
(
aIC(p)
)− p ,
where the quality level aIC(p) follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7). Using the symmetry
of implementable allocations implied by (i) and (ii), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions simplify to
[
W ′
(
p− c(aIC)) c′(aIC)− v′(aIC)] aIC = 0
W ′
(
p− c(aIC)) c′(aIC)− v′(aIC) ≥ 0
aIC ≥ 0 .
The thus dened quality aIC is identical to the quality a˜IC from the bilateral setting. Hence,
consumer utility as a function of the regulated price p is identical to consumer utility as a function
of the consumer’s payment oer in the bilateral setting. This identity implies that the price p∗ (as
dened by equation (4.5)) maximizes consumer utility among all implementable allocations.
15If payments were restricted by a lower bound instead of xed, consumers would set their oers at the lower bound
as long as the lower bound does not fall short of the competitive level c(0). Hence, a price oor yields essentially
the same results as a xed price.
16Via p < c(0) we can also implement the trivial allocation where Be = ∅ for all e ∈ E. We ignore this allocation
here.
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Turning to experts’ utility under regulation p, we obtain
max
a≥0
{W (p− c(a)) + v(a)− p} .
This is strictly increasing in p. Since p∗ > c(0) by assumption (4.6), experts prefer the regulation
p∗ to the competitive equilibrium outcome (described in Proposition 6).17 We have therefore
established that price regulation at p∗ Pareto-improves upon the competitive outcome.18
Proposition 7. The allocation implemented by price regulation p∗ (dened in equation (4.5)) Pareto-
dominates the competitive equilibrium outcome described in Proposition 6.
Intuitively, price regulation forces consumers to raise their payments as if internalizing the
externality they impose on other consumers. This counteracts the ineciency that arises in the
competitive equilibrium.
Note at this point that a subsidy could not achieve such eciency gains. A subsidy would lower
experts’ acceptance thresholds. Anticipating this, consumers would reduce their oers, leaving
producer prices at c(0). The incidence of the subsidy therefore falls completely on consumers. It
thereby fails to raise experts’ prots such that service quality remains unchanged.
To understand the potential of price regulation more completely, consider the set of constrained
ecient allocations. This is the set of implementable allocations that are not Pareto-dominated by
any other implementable allocation.
Since the regulation p∗ maximizes consumer utility, the allocation induced by p∗ is constrained
ecient. When raising the price above p∗, experts gain and consumers lose. Hence, regulation
levels p > p∗ are constrained ecient as well. Any allocation implemented by p < p∗ in contrast
is not constrained ecient, as both consumers and experts prefer the allocation under p∗. The set
of contrained ecient allocations is therefore the set of allocations implementable by a xed price
p ≥ p∗.19
Compare now the set of constrained ecient allocations to the set of fully ecient allocations.
An allocation is fully ecient if and only if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other allocation.
In the proof of Proposition 8 below, we show that an allocation is fully ecient if and only if
17We use the term competitive (equilibrium) outcome for the allocation described in Proposition 6, because it is
identical to the outcome obtained under (perfect) price competition between experts in Appendix C.2.
18We say that an allocation Pareto-dominates another allocation, if no agent is worse o and a non-zero measure of
agents is strictly better o in the rst allocation.
19By the way we set up the analysis of price regulation, we ignore participation constraints of consumers. If we were
to include such constraints, they would imply an upper bound on the regulation p, beyond which consumers no
longer participate. Otherwise, the results would remain unchanged.
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ab = a
∗∗ for all consumers b, where the (fully) ecient quality a∗∗ is given by
v′(a∗∗) = c′(a∗∗) .
Intuitively, fully ecient allocations maximize surplus, dened as
∫
B (v(ab)− c(ab)) db. Starting
from an allocation that does not maximize surplus, we can move to a surplus-maximizing allocation
and redistribute the gains over experts and consumers to make everyone better o.
Inspecting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for experts’ quality choices, we nd that expert e
chooses the fully ecient quality a∗∗ if and only ifW ′(ye) = 1. In words, to provide fully ecient
quality, experts must be indierent regarding marginal redistribution of money between them
and their consumers. Since we excluded this by assumption (W ′ > 1), we can never achieve fully
ecient service quality without interfering with experts’ quality choices directly. So, the sets of
constrained ecient and fully ecient allocations are disjoint; price regulation never achieves
full eciency.
We summarize our ndings on the structure of ecient allocations as follows.
Proposition 8. The set of constrained ecient allocations equals the set of allocations implementable
by price regulation p ≥ p∗, where p∗ is given by equation (4.5).
The regulation p∗ maximizes consumer utility. Expert utility increases strictly in the regulation p.
Moreover, the sets of constrained ecient and fully ecient allocations are disjoint.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 8 is illustrated by Figure 4.2. The gure focuses on symmetric allocations, repre-
sented by a common payment p and a common quality level a across consumers.
The curve aIC marks all allocations implementable via price regulation. Of these, all allocations
on the red (dashed) part of the curve are constrained ecient, as they have p ≥ p∗. There is no
intersection with the set of fully ecient symmetric allocations marked by the blue (dotted) line.
The competitive outcome CE at (0, c(0)) is neither constrained nor fully ecient.
In short, raising prices up to p∗ is Pareto-improving. Raising prices further benets experts and
hurts consumers.
4.7 Endogenous Entry
When price regulation raises experts’ prots it may incentivize new experts to enter the market.
This may dilute prots and thereby undermine the desired consequences of regulation. To address
this concern we extend the analysis to a setting with endogenous entry.
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Figure 4.2. The gure displays indierence curves of experts, Ie, and of consumers, Ib, among
symmetric allocations represented by a common payment p and a common service quality a. The
function aIC returns experts’ optimal quality choice given a common payment oer p. The point CE
marks the competitive equilibrium outcome from Proposition 6, the red dashed segment of aIC is the
set of symmetric constrained ecient allocations, and the blue dotted line is the set of symmetric fully
ecient allocations.
In particular, suppose now that there is a (countably) innite set of experts who initially decide
whether to enter the market at a xed cost F > 0 or not. To nance the entry cost even in a
situation where prices equal marginal cost, suppose that experts operate decreasing returns to
scale technologies. Formally, let the income of an expert e who entered the market be
yˆe =
∫
Be
[pb − c(ab)] db− k(|Be|)− F , (4.9)
where all recurrent variables have the same meaning as before. The new cost function k is C2
and satises k(0) = 0, k′ > 0, and k′′ > 0. Without loss of generality we can now impose the
normalization c(0) = 0. The function k then measures a xed cost per consumer served that is
independent of service quality. It is convex in the mass of consumers served to capture decreasing
returns to scale.20
Expert e’s utility becomes
uˆe = W (yˆe) +
∫
Be
(
v(ab)− pb − v(0) + k′(|Be|)
)
db . (4.10)
20Decreasing returns to scale may for example stem from increasing diculties to coordinate appointments with
consumers, frictional interaction with a growing number of employees, or disproportional wear and tear of
equipment.
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Compared to the previous sections we adjust the other-regarding part of experts’ utility by
|Be| (−v(0) + k′(|Be|)). This adjustment ensures that experts do not derive immaterial benets
or losses from serving a consumer the minimal quality at marginal cost. It mirrors our assumption
of v(0)− c(0) = 0 from the previous sections. As in the previous sections, the assumption serves
to simplify the analysis without substantively changing the results.
Consumers are modeled exactly as before (see section 4.3), except for that we replace the
assumption v ≤ 0 by
v ≤ v(0)− k′(M) .
This again ensures that consumers’ outside utility is small enough to exclude uninteresting cases
where consumers refuse to participate in the market.
4.7.1 Market Trade with Endogenous Entry
We consider now the following timing of events.
Stage 1’ Experts decide whether to enter the market or not. If they do not enter, they receive
utility W (0).
Stage 2’ Denote by E = {1, 2, ..., N} the set of experts who enter the market. Each consumer
b ∈ B is matched randomly to an expert e ∈ E and oers a payment pb to the expert.21
Stage 3’ Experts accept or reject oers. If an oer pb is rejected, consumer b receives the outside
option v. If pb is accepted, the corresponding expert chooses ab and the consumer receives
utility (4.1). Finally, each expert e ∈ E receives utility according to (4.10), where Be is the
set of consumers whose oers e accepts.
This denes a sequential game with complete information and we again study its subgame
perfect equilibria by backward induction.
Given a set of active experts E, payment oers {pb}b∈B and a matching {Be}e∈E , experts’
quality choices aˆICb are determined by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) as in Section 4.5. The
only dierence is that income ye is replaced by yˆe as given by equation (4.9).
Moving backwards, the acceptance decisions of each expert e ∈ E must satisfy
W ′(yˆe)
(
pb − c(aˆICb )− k′(|Be|)
)
+v(aˆICb )−pb−v(0)+k′(|Be|)
≥ 0 ∀ b ∈ Be< 0 for all b whose oer e rejects.
21Let the matching probability again be uniform, such that each expert is matched to mass M/N of consumers.
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The condition computes the marginal benet from expanding the set Be by consumer b. If this
marginal benet is positive, the expert accepts b’s oer, otherwise not. The condition leads to the
following intermediate result.
Lemma 10. Given payment oers {pb}b∈B , each active expert e’s acceptance decisions Be and
income yˆe must satisfy, for any consumer b matched to e on stage 2’,
b ∈ Be ⇔ pb ≥
k′(|Be|) if yˆe ≤ 0pˆ(ye, Be) if yˆe > 0
with pˆ : (yˆe, Be) 7→ pˆ(yˆe, Be) decreasing in yˆe and pˆ(yˆe, Be) ≤ k′(|Be|) for all yˆe > 0 and all Be.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Lemma 10 provides an acceptance threshold, which consumers anticipate when making their
oers on stage 2’. Determining equilibrium oers is now complicated by inframarginal rents,
which may induce positive prots. We therefore proceed with a case distinction.
Lemma 11. Take a non-empty set of active experts E and consider the subgame after E described
by stages 2’ and 3’. Distinguish the following cases.
1. If
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F > 0 ,
payment oers and expert utilities must satisfy
pb ≤ k′
(
M
N
)
and uˆe > W (0)
for all b ∈ B and e ∈ E.
2. If
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F = 0 ,
payment oers and expert utilities must satisfy
pb = k
′
(
M
N
)
and uˆe = W (0)
for all b ∈ B and e ∈ E.
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3. If
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F < 0 ,
payment oers and expert utilities must satisfy
pb = k
′
(
M
N
)
and uˆe < W (0)
for all b ∈ B and e ∈ E.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Case 3 is not compatible with entry decisions on stage 1’, as experts’ utility falls short of their
outside option. Hence, the equilibrium number of experts Nˆ must satisfy the conditions of cases 1
or 2. At Nˆ + 1, however, we need case 3, such that expert Nˆ + 1 nds it unprotable to enter:
M
Nˆ
k′
(
M
Nˆ
)
− k
(
M
Nˆ
)
− F ≥ 0 (4.11)
M
Nˆ + 1
k′
(
M
Nˆ + 1
)
− k
(
M
Nˆ + 1
)
− F < 0 . (4.12)
To resolve the cumbersome case distinction, suppose now that the mass of consumers is large,
M →∞. Then, conditions (4.11) and (4.12) imply M/Nˆ → m, where m satises
mk′(m)− k(m)− F = 0 . (4.13)
Hence,
M
Nˆ
k′
(
M
Nˆ
)
− k
(
M
Nˆ
)
− F → 0
as M → 0. In words, when we get rid of the integer problem with nite N , we approach case 2 of
Lemma 11, where experts make zero prots and payments equal marginal cost.
Proposition 9. Consider the game described by stages 1’ to 3’. Suppose M → ∞. Then, in any
subgame perfect equilibrium consumers’ oers approach marginal cost and quality levels approach
zero, that is, pb → k′(m) and ab → 0 for all b ∈ B, wherem is dened by equation (4.13).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 9 shows that for large M the equilibrium allocation with market entry approaches
the competitive outcome of minimal quality and marginal cost pricing familiar from Section 4.5.
The only dierence is that here marginal cost is given by k′(m) instead of c(0).
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4.7.2 Regulation with Endogenous Entry
We consider now a joint regulation of prices and entry, represented by the tuple (p,N). Such
a regulation induces a game described by stages 1’ to 3’ with two modications. First, only a
number of N experts decides whether to enter the market on stage 1’. This caps the number of
active experts at N . Second, as in Section 4.6 price regulation xes buyers’ oers at p.
Hence under regulation (p,N), experts decide whether to enter the market, whether to accept
the xed payment oers, and which quality to provide. Consumers have no choices. In the
following we construct a regulation that Pareto-improves upon the competitive outcome of
Proposition 9.
Note rst that for a given number of active experts N˜ , experts accept all oers if p ≥ k′(M/N˜).
In such a situation, condition (4.7) for experts’ quality choices simplies to[
W ′
(
M
N˜
p− M
N˜
c(aˆ
IC
)− k
(
M
N˜
)
− F
)
c′(aˆIC)− v′(aˆIC)
]
aˆ
IC
= 0
W ′
(
M
N˜
p− M
N˜
c(aˆ
IC
)− k
(
M
N˜
)
− F
)
c′(aˆIC)− v′(aˆIC) ≥ 0
aˆ
IC ≥ 0 .
This denes the quality aˆIC(M/N˜, p) as a function of the consumer to expert ratio M/N˜ and
the price level p. Consumer utility then also becomes a function of M/N˜ and p. We denote the
price that maximizes consumer utility at a given consumer to expert ratio by pˆ∗(M/N˜):
pˆ∗
(
M
N˜
)
∈ max
p≥k′
(
M
N˜
)
{
v
(
aˆ
IC
(
M
N˜
, p
))
− p
}
. (4.14)
Assume now that for large M and at the unregulated expert number Nˆ (as given by conditions
(4.11) and (4.12)), there is scope for trade above the minimum quality level of zero. Formally, if
the expert to consumer ratio approaches its limit value m from the unregulated case (as given by
equation (4.13)), marginal cost pricing is not collectively optimal for consumers:
k′(m) /∈ max
p≥k′(m)
{
v
(
aˆ
IC
(m, p)
)
− p
}
. (4.15)
This assumption is analogous to assumption (4.6) in the setting without entry.
As a consequence of assumption (4.15), if we can regulate entry such that the number of active
experts remains the same as in the unregulated equilibrium, we can Pareto-improve upon the
unregulated outcome by raising prices to pˆ∗(m) when M is large. Proposition 10 shows that
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capping entry at the number of experts from the unregulated outcome, N = Nˆ , yields the desired
result.22 In addition, Proposition 10 shows that the entry-related component of the regulation is
important.
Proposition 10. Consider the regulation (pˆ∗(m), Nˆ), where pˆ∗ is the consumer-optimal price given
by equation (4.14) and Nˆ is the number of active experts in the unregulated equilibrium given
by conditions (4.11) and (4.12). There exists a value M such that for all M > M , the allocation
implemented by the described regulation Pareto-dominates the unregulated equilibrium outcome
described in Proposition 9.
Consider in contrast the pure price regulation (pˆ∗(m),∞). There exists a valueM ′ such that for
allM > M ′, the allocation implemented by the pure price regulation is Pareto-dominated by the
allocation implemented by the joint price and entry regulation described above.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 10 shows that price regulation should be accompanied by entry regulation when
entry is endogenous. Adding the entry regulation Nˆ to the pure price regulation (pˆ∗(m),∞)
yields a Pareto-improvement.
To understand this result, note that the purpose of price regulation is to make experts behave
less selshly by raising their prots. But with endogenous entry, any attempt to raise prots via
price regulation attracts new entrants, which counteracts the increase in prots. The desired eect
on service quality is therefore mitigated. Entry regulation solves this problem by capping the
number of active experts. Those who are still allowed to enter benet from the increased prices
and decide, non-selshly, to provide higher quality services. Thus, entry regulation restores the
eectiveness of price regulation.
Whether the price regulation alone already achieves a Pareto-improvement over the competitive
outcome is unclear. For large M , experts’ utility is approximately unaected by pure price
regulation, because entry drives down experts’ utility to their outside option. For consumers the
eect is ambiguous. On the one hand, increased prices reduce utility. On the other hand, although
mitigated by entry, the pure price regulation can still have a positive eect on service quality. This
is because the regulation raises prices above marginal cost, which has a negative eect on experts’
utility through the non-selsh part of their preferences: experts feel bad because consumers pay
“too much” for what they receive. This immaterial utility loss must be compensated by material
gains to make experts enter the market. Hence, entry stops before the income level drops to zero.
Since income is positive, service quality can be positive as well.
22Intuitively, raising prices above the marginal cost k′(m) makes entry more attractive, such that the cap at Nˆ is
binding and therefore equal to the actual number of active experts.
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4.8 Does Social Behavior Depend on Income?
Our theory builds on the assumption that there are positive income eects on social behavior.
In the experimental and empirical literature, there are three types of evidence supporting this
assumption.
First, experimental evidence from dictator games consistently shows that individuals give more
to others when their endowment increases.23 Hence, as individuals’ income in the experiment
goes up, so does their willingness to forgo additional income to the benet of others. This exactly
replicates the crucial behavioral property implied by our assumption on experts’ preferences.
The nding that the absolute level of giving in dictator games increases in the endowment is
uncontroversial in the experimental literature and therefore typically receives little attention. We
view this as an indication that, at least qualitatively, our preference assumption is quite modest.
Bartling et al. (2019) question the informativeness of dictator games for whether social behavior
is income-dependent or not, based on the assertion that there are strong social norms regarding
the share of income to be kept in the dictator game.24 They propose an alternative experiment,
mimicking a market situation where participants decide between buying a good that inicts
externalities on others and one that does not. They nd that the premium individuals are willing
to pay for the externality-free good increases in their experimental income, in line with our
preference assumption.
Finally, there is correlational evidence from the eld. Many studies nd that charitable giving
signicantly increases in household income (e.g. Smith, Kehoe and Cremer, 1995; List, 2011).
Wiepking and Bekkers (2012) review over 50 studies showing that income and wealth have a
positive eect on the level of philantrophic donations.25 Moreover, Andreoni, Nikiforakis and
Stoop (2017) demonstrate that rich households are more likely to return misdelivered envelopes
with money than poor households.
Particularly insightful in our context is a study by Rasch and Waibel (2018). Using data on car
repairs – i.e., expert services – in Germany, they nd that a critical nancial situation of a car
garage is associated with a higher amount of overcharging incidences.
23See, for example, Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks (2005), Chowdhury and Jeon (2014), Korenok, Millner and Razzolini
(2012), and the comprehensive meta study on dictator games by Engel (2011).
24They argue that many individuals adhere to the norm that the money should be divided equally between dictator
and recipient. Indeed, many individuals seem to follow this norm.
25Conducting dictator games with millionaires, Smeets, Bauer and Gneezy (2015) nd that the level of giving by
millionaires is “much higher than in other experiments we are aware of” (p. 10641).
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4.9 Conclusion
We propose that income-dependence of social behavior creates an externality across principals in
a common agency framework. This externality is most relevant in environments where the scope
for monetary incentives is limited and social behavior plays a critical role. The propotypical case
of such an environment is a market for credence goods.
We show that the externality creates a rationale for regulatory intervention in credence goods
markets. Regulation that raises producer prices above their competitive level can achieve Pareto
improvements. Examples are price oors and xed prices. When market entry of experts is
endogenous, price regulation must be accompanied by entry restrictions to seize Pareto gains.
Regarding their practical implications, our results provide a novel perspective on discussions
about the dismissal of existing regulations in markets for expert services. While we believe that
decisions about such deregulation must be made on a case-by-case basis, accounting for the
idiosyncrasies of each market, our results should be considered as an input into these decisions.
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This thesis provides three main conclusions. First, weak relative bias of technology – the result
according to which a relative increase in the supply of a certain group of workers induces technical
change that raises this group’s relative wage – is a robust feature of neoclassical economic theory.
The result is driven by the simple and powerful logic of complementarity: an increase in the
relative supply of a certain input factor raises the returns to relatively complementary factors;
since complementarity is, under mild conditions, a symmetric relation, the ensuing increase in the
use of complementary factors in turn raises the relative return to the input that initially became
more abundant.
Second, directed technical change has important implications for the design of redistributive
labor income taxes. In particular, if the objective is to redistribute income from high- to low-income
earners, the presence of directed technical change calls for a more progressive tax system. This
insight is driven by a pre-distributive eect of directed technical change: a more progressive tax
induces technical change that reduces pre-tax wage inequality. This reduction in pre-tax wage
inequality makes more progressive taxes attractive for any social objective with a desire for equity.
Finally, regulation of prices and entry on credence goods markets can serve the public interest if
suppliers’ social behavior is income-dependent. At the heart of this result is an externality across
consumers: one consumer’s payment raises the supplier’s income, which makes the supplier
behave less selshly and thereby improves service quality for all consumers. On a credence goods
market, where informational restrictions preclude the use of explicit incentive schemes for quality
provision, this externality is an important lever for regulation policy. By xing prices above their
competitive level and restricting entry, regulation can ensure high incomes for suppliers and
thereby raise service quality.
Future work on technical change and inequality should focus on the following issues. First it
should elaborate on the possibilities for policy to target technology more directly than via the
income tax. While direct taxes on technology use have been investigated and found to be rather
ineective, it would be interesting to explore whether corporate taxes can be re-designed for this
purpose. What, for example, would be the eects of a prot tax based on labor’s share of rm
revenue or on the spread of incomes paid by the rm?
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Second, the theory of capital taxation must be revisited. With the share of income accruing to
capital growing over the past 50 years, this is clearly an important topic. At the same time, there is
a discrepancy between public opinion and economic theory: while public opinion often considers
high capital taxes as fair, at least implicitly arguing that capital income is more indicative of luck
than of strain, the arguments of economic theory for positive taxes on capital (e.g., systematic
heterogeneity in time preference, or arguments based on the inverse Euler equation) are remarkably
detached from such plain ideas. This discrepancy may well be indicative of a blind spot in current
theory.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Omied Proofs and Derivations
A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof replicates the proof of Proposition 1 with the tools of dierential
calculus.
Since θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero, we can restrict attention to a local increase in relative
skill supply in direction of the isoquant ofF (L, θ∗(L)), that is, to dL such thatw1(L, θ∗(L)) dL1+
w2(L, θ
∗(L)) dL2 = 0 and dL1 < 0. Let d θ∗ := ∇Lθ∗(L) dL be the direction of the response
of θ∗(L) to the change dL. The marginal output eect of a technical change in direction d θ∗ at
θ∗(L) must increase with the local labor supply change dL:
∇L [∇θF (L, θ∗(L)) d θ∗] dL ≥ 0. (A.1)
But now suppose that d θ∗ has a negative eect on the skill premium:
∇θw2(L, θ
∗(L))
w1(L, θ∗(L))
d θ∗ < 0.
This implies:
0 > ∇θw2(L, θ∗(L)) d θ∗ −∇θw1(L, θ∗(L)) d θ∗w2(L, θ
∗(L))
w1(L, θ∗(L))
= −w2(L, θ
∗(L))
w1(L, θ∗(L))
∇L1 [∇θF (L, θ∗(L))] d θ∗ +∇L2 [∇θF (L, θ∗(L))] d θ∗
= ∇L [∇θF (L, θ∗(L))] dL,
where the second line changes the order of dierentiation and the last line uses that the vector
(−w2(L, θ∗(L))/w1(L, θ∗(L)), 1) is proportional to dL. Strict negativity of the last line gives a
contradiction to equation (A.1) above.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 treats a special case of Theorem 3. I nevertheless present a
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separate proof here, as it is simpler and may, as an intermediate step, facilitate reading the more
general proof below.
Part 1. (⇒) I rst show that, if there are L s L′ such that w(L, θ∗(L)) ≺p w(L′, θ∗(L′)),
then F cannot be quasiconcave. Let H(L) = {l | ∇LF (L, θ∗(L))(l − L) = 0} be the line
tangent to the isoquant of F at L, holding θ xed at θ∗(L). Since the endogenous technology
wages w(L, θ∗(L)) are homogeneous of degree zero in L, we can restrict attention to cases where
L′ ∈ H(L). Let l(τ) parameterize the line H(L) such that l(0) = L and l(1) = L′.
Now suppose thatF is quasiconcave. Then,H(L) must be tangent to the (convex) upper contour
set of F at L. Hence, the restriction of F to H(L) must attain its maximum at L. Quasiconcavity
then requires that F (l(τ)) decreases in τ . But by hypothesis, we have
w2(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
w1(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))
+
d l1(1)/d τ
d l2(1)/d τ
>
w2(l(0), θ
∗(l(0)))
w1(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
+
d l1(1)/d τ
d l2(1)/d τ
= 0,
where the equality follows from the construction of l(τ). Rearranging yields
∇LF (l(1), θ∗(l(1)))d l(1)
d τ
> 0,
so there exists τ ′ > 1 such thatF (l(τ ′), θ∗(l(1))) > F (l(1), θ∗(l(1))). Finally, becauseF (l(τ), θ∗(l(1)))
is a lower bound ofF (l(τ)) and both are equal at τ = 1, we must also have thatF (l(τ ′)) > F (l(1)),
contradicting quasiconcavity.
(⇐) If F is not quasiconcave, it has an upper contour set that is not convex. Hence, there exists
a line parameterized by l(τ) such that
F (l(0)) = F (l(1)) > F (l(τ))
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose now without loss of generality that relative skill supply increases
in direction of τ , and apply the envelope theorem in Corollary 4 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) to
obtain:
F (l(τ))− F (l(0)) =
∫ τ
0
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ < 0
F (l(1))− F (l(τ)) =
∫ 1
τ
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ > 0.
It follows that there exist τ1 < τ2 such that
∇LF (l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))d l(τ1)
d τ
< 0 < ∇LF (l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))d l(τ2)
d τ
.
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But since d l(τ1)/d τ is proportional to d l(τ2)/ d τ (because l(τ) is a line), and because d l2(τ)/ d τ >
0 (since relative skill supply increases in direction of τ ), the inequalities can be rearranged to yield
w2(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
w1(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))
<
w2(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
w1(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
,
which establishes the rst part of the theorem.
Part 2. (⇒) I rst show that, if any increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium, F
must be quasiconvex. The proof is by contradiction and proceeds symmetrically to the proof of
(⇐) above.
Suppose that F is not quasiconvex. Then it has a lower contour set that is not convex. Hence,
there exists a line parameterized by l(τ) such that
F (l(0)) = F (l(1)) < F (l(τ))
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose without loss of generality that relative skill supply increases in
direction of τ , and apply the envelope theorem in Corollary 4 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) to
obtain:
F (l(τ))− F (l(0)) =
∫ τ
0
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ > 0
F (l(1))− F (l(τ)) =
∫ 1
τ
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ < 0.
It follows that there exist τ1 < τ2 such that
∇LF (l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))d l(τ2)
d τ
< 0 < ∇LF (l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))d l(τ1)
d τ
.
But since d l(τ1)/d τ is proportional to d l(τ2)/ d τ (because l(τ) is a line), and because d l2(τ)/ d τ >
0 (since relative skill supply increases in direction of τ ), the inequalities can be rearranged to yield
w2(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
w1(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
<
w2(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
w1(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))
,
which contradicts the hypothesis that any increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium.
(⇐) The proof is again by contradiction and proceeds symmetrically to the proof of (⇒) in part
1 above.
Suppose that there are L s L′ such that w(L′, θ∗(L′)) ≺p w(L, θ∗(L)). Let H(L) = {l |
∇LF (L, θ∗(L))(l − L) = 0} be the line tangent to the isoquant of F at L, holding θ xed at
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θ∗(L). Since the endogenous technology wages w(L, θ∗(L)) are homogeneous of degree zero in
L, we can restrict attention to cases where L′ ∈ H(L). Let l(τ) parameterize the line H(L) such
that l(0) = L and l(1) = L′.
Now, since F is quasiconvex, H(L) must be tangent to the (convex) lower contour set of F
at L. Hence, the restriction of F to H(L) must attain its minimum at L. Quasiconvexity then
requires that F (l(τ)) increases in τ . But by hypothesis, we have
w2(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
w1(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))
+
d l1(1)/d τ
d l2(1)/d τ
<
w2(l(0), θ
∗(l(0)))
w1(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
+
d l1(1)/d τ
d l2(1)/d τ
= 0,
where the equality follows from the construction of l(τ). Rearranging yields
∇LF (l(1), θ∗(l(1)))d l(1)
d τ
< 0,
so there exists τ ′ < 1 such thatF (l(τ ′), θ∗(l(1))) > F (l(1), θ∗(l(1))). Finally, becauseF (l(τ), θ∗(l(1)))
is a lower bound ofF (l(τ)) and both are equal at τ = 1, we must also have thatF (l(τ ′)) > F (l(1)),
contradicting quasiconvexity.
Proof of Theorem 1. The structure of the proof is the same as in the two skills case. First, since
θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree zero in L, we can restrict attention to labor supply changes along
the exogenous technology isoquant of F (L, θ∗(L)), that is, to changes from L to L′ such that
F (L, θ∗(L)) = F (L′, θ∗(L)). This allows to construct a monotonic and dierentiable path l(τ)
from L to L′ such that l(0) = L, l(1) = L′, and F (l(τ), θ∗(L)) = F (L, θ∗(L)) for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
(Monotonicity here means that each component ls(τ) is monotonic in τ .)
Moreover, we can restrict attention to cases with θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′), because otherwise the
statement of the theorem is trivially satised. In these cases, we have
F (l(0), θ∗(L′)) ≤ F (l(0), θ∗(L)) = F (l(1), θ∗(L)) ≤ F (l(1), θ∗(L′)), (A.2)
with at least one of the inequalities being strict because we select the supremum of the maximizer
set in equation (2.2). (If both inequalities were equalities, we would either select θ∗(L) at both
l(0) and l(1), or θ∗(L′).)
Using the mean value theorem, equation (A.2) implies that there is a τ ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))d l(τ
′)
d τ
> 0. (A.3)
Let s˜ denote a skill level such that d ls(τ ′)/ d τ ≥ 0 for all s > s˜ and d ls(τ ′)/d τ ≤ 0 for all
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s ≤ s˜. Such a skill level exists because ls(τ) is monotonic for each s and L′ has greater relative
skill supply than L. Recalling that
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L))d l(τ
′)
d τ
= 0,
we can extend equation (A.3) to[
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))− ws˜(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
ws˜(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
]
d l(τ ′)
d τ
> 0. (A.4)
The left-hand-side of this inequality is the product of two vectors with entries indexed by s.
The second vector, d l(τ ′)/d τ , has weakly negative entries below and weakly positive entries
above s˜. If θ∗(L′) were less skill-biased than θ∗(L), the opposite would hold for the rst vector,
that is, its entries are weakly positive below and weakly negative above s˜, since
ws(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′)
ws(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
R ws˜(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′)
ws˜(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
if s Q s˜. (A.5)
But this implies that the product of the two vectors is weakly negative, in contradiction to
inequality (A.4). Finally, since by hypothesis we can order θ∗(L) and θ∗(L′) according to their
skill bias, we must have θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′).
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is in large parts analogous to the proof of Theorem 1. We can again
focus on L′ such that F (L, θ∗(L)) = F (L′, θ∗(L)), and we can again construct a path l(τ) from
L to L′, as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Now suppose, to derive a contradiction, that θ∗(L′) ≺b′ θ∗(L). This implies that there must
exist a τ˜ such that
F (l(τ˜), θ∗(L′)) = F (l(τ˜), θ∗(L)) = F (l(τ), θ∗(L)) < F (l(τ), θ∗(L′))
for all τ ∈ (τ˜ , 1].
The mean value theorem then implies existence of a τ ′ ∈ (τ˜ , 1) such that
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))d l(τ
′)
d τ
> 0, (A.6)
analogous to inequality (A.3) above. From here on, the proof follows exactly the proof of Theorem 1,
starting at inequality (A.3). Note that inequality (A.5) holds here, because the choice of τ˜ guarantees
that F (l(τ ′), θ∗(L)) ≤ F (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′)). This, in combination with the initial supposition that
θ∗(L′) ≺b′ θ∗(L), then implies inequality (A.5) and thus leads to a contradiction to the initial
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supposition.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3. The structure of the proof is the same as in the two skills case and
hence follows closely Part 1 in the proof of Proposition 2.
Part 1. I rst show that, if there are L s L′ such that w(L, θ∗(L)) ≺p w(L′, θ∗(L′)), then F
cannot be quasiconcave.
Let H(L) = {l | ∇LF (L, θ∗(L))(l − L) = 0} be the hyperplane tangent to the isoquant
of F at L, holding θ xed at θ∗(L). Since the endogenous technology wages w(L, θ∗(L)) are
homogeneous of degree zero in L, we can restrict attention to cases where L′ ∈ H(L). Let l(τ)
parameterize the line through L and L′, such that l(0) = L and l(1) = L′.
Now suppose thatF is quasiconcave. Then,H(L) must be tangent to the (convex) upper contour
set of F at L. Hence, the restriction of F to H(L) must attain its maximum at L. Quasiconcavity
then requires that F (l(τ)) decreases in τ . Let s˜ ∈ (0, 1) be the skill such that d ls(1)/ d τ > 0
for all s > s˜ and d l(1)/ d τ ≤ 0 for s ≤ s˜. Such an s˜ exists because L′ has greater relative skill
supply than L, both are on l(τ), which is tangent to the isoquant at L, and they must dier at a
subset of skills of measure greater than zero because otherwise w(L, θ∗(L)) and w(L′, θ∗(L′))
would be equal. Note that there must also exist an s˜′ ∈ (0, 1) such that d ls(1)/d τ < 0 if s < s˜′.
Moreover, by hypothesis, we have
ws(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
R ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
if s R s˜,
with strict inequality for a strictly positive measure of skills.1
Combining the information aboutw(l(1), θ∗(l(1))),w(l(0), θ∗(l(0))) and d l(1)/ d τ , we obtain[
w(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))− ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
w(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
]
d l(1)
d τ
> 0,
because the left-hand side is the inner product of two vectors with positive (negative) entries for
s above (below) s˜, and these vectors are simultaneously dierent from zero at a subset of skills of
strictly positive measure. It follows that
w(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))
d l(1)
d τ
>
ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
w(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
d l(1)
d τ
= 0, (A.7)
where the equality follows from the construction of l(τ). Using that wages are identical to the
1Note that with a continuum of skills, the wage function w(L, θ) : S → R is determined uniquely up to a set of skills
of measure zero by the Gateaux derivative of F (L, θ). Hence it is reasonable to treat wage functions that dier on
a skill set of measure zero as equivalent. The notation w(L, θ∗(L)) ≺p w(L′, θ∗(L′)) is thus reserved for wage
functions that dier on a strictly positive measure of skills.
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L-derivative of F , inequality (A.7) yields
∇LF (l(1), θ∗(l(1)))d l(1)
d τ
> 0.
So, there exists τ ′ > 1 such that F (l(τ ′), θ∗(l(1))) > F (l(1), θ∗(l(1))).
Finally, because F (l(τ), θ∗(l(1))) is a lower bound of F (l(τ)) and both are equal at τ = 1, we
must also have that F (l(τ ′)) > F (l(1)), contradicting quasiconcavity.
Part 2. Parameterize the line along which F fails to be quasiconcave by l(τ), such that
F (l(0)) = F (l(1)) > F (l(τ))
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose now without loss of generality that relative skill supply increases
in direction of τ , and apply the envelope theorem in Corollary 4 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) to
obtain:
F (l(τ))− F (l(0)) =
∫ τ
0
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ < 0
F (l(1))− F (l(τ)) =
∫ 1
τ
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ > 0.
It follows that there exist τ1 < τ2 such that
∇LF (l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))d l(τ1)
d τ
< 0 < c∇LF (l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))d l(τ2)
d τ
,
with c > 0 some real number. Since l(τ) is a line, d l(τ1)/ d τ and d l(τ2)/d τ are proportional.
Thus, the two inequalities imply
[w(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))− cw(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))] d l(τ1)
d τ
< 0.
As in part 1 above, let s˜ denote the skill such that d ls(τ1)/ d τ is greater (smaller) zero if s is
greater (smaller) s˜. Then replace the constant c to obtain[
w(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))− ws˜(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
ws˜(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
w(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
]
d l(τ1)
d τ
< 0. (A.8)
Now suppose, to derive a contradiction, that w(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2))) p w(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1))). This
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directly implies
ws(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
ws(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
R ws˜(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
ws˜(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
if s R s˜.
It follows that the rst vector in the inner product on the left-hand side of inequality (A.8) has
positive (negative) entries for s above (below) s˜. But by construction of s˜, the same holds for the
second vector. Their product must hence be positive, in contradiction to inequality (A.8).
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 3. This is the many skills analogue to Part 2 of the proof of Proposition
2.
Part 1. I rst show that, if any increase in relative skill supply raises the skill premium, F must
be quasiconvex along all lines in direction of s. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose that F is not quasiconvex along some line in direction of s. Let l(τ) parameterize
this line such that
F (l(0)) = F (l(1)) < F (l(τ))
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose now without loss of generality that relative skill supply increases
in direction of τ , and apply the envelope theorem in Corollary 4 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) to
obtain:
F (l(τ))− F (l(0)) =
∫ τ
0
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ > 0
F (l(1))− F (l(τ)) =
∫ 1
τ
∇LF (l(τ), θ∗(l(τ))d l(τ)
d τ
d τ < 0.
It follows that there exist τ1 < τ2 such that
∇LF (l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))d l(τ1)
d τ
> 0 > c∇LF (l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))d l(τ2)
d τ
,
with c > 0 some real number. Since l(τ) is a line, d l(τ1)/ d τ and d l(τ2)/d τ are proportional.
Thus, the two inequalities imply
[w(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))− cw(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))] d l(τ1)
d τ
> 0.
As in the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3 above, let s˜ denote the skill such that d ls(τ1)/ d τ is greater
(smaller) zero if s is greater (smaller) s˜. Then replace the constant c to obtain[
w(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))− ws˜(l(τ1), θ
∗(l(τ1)))
ws˜(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2)))
w(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
]
d l(τ1)
d τ
> 0. (A.9)
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Now, by hypothesis, we have w(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1))) p w(l(τ2), θ∗(l(τ2))). This directly implies
ws(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
ws(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))
R ws˜(l(τ2), θ
∗(l(τ2)))
ws˜(l(τ1), θ∗(l(τ1)))
if s R s˜.
It follows that the rst vector in the inner product on the left-hand side of inequality (A.9) has
negative (positive) entries for s above (below) s˜. But by construction of s˜, the opposite holds for
the second vector, that is, it has positive (negative) entries for s above (below) s˜. Their product
must hence be negative, in contradiction to inequality (A.9). It follows that the initial assumption
is false and F must be quasiconvex along all lines in direction of s.
Part 2. The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose that F is quasiconvex, and that there are
L s L′ such that w(L′, θ∗(L′)) ≺p w(L, θ∗(L)).
Let H(L) = {l | ∇LF (L, θ∗(L))(l − L) = 0} be the hyperplane tangent to the isoquant
of F at L, holding θ xed at θ∗(L). Since the endogenous technology wages w(L, θ∗(L)) are
homogeneous of degree zero in L, we can restrict attention to cases where L′ ∈ H(L). Let l(τ)
parameterize the line through L and L′, such that l(0) = L and l(1) = L′.
Now, since F is quasiconvex, H(L) must be tangent to the (convex) lower contour set of F at L.
Hence, the restriction of F to H(L) must attain its minimum at L. Quasiconvexity then requires
that F (l(τ)) increases in τ . As in the rst part of the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3, let s˜ ∈ (0, 1)
be the skill such that d ls(1)/ d τ > 0 for all s > s˜ and d l(1)/ d τ ≤ 0 for s ≤ s˜. Note that there
must also exist an s˜′ ∈ (0, 1) such that d ls(1)/d τ < 0 if s < s˜′. Moreover, by hypothesis, we
have
ws(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
R ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
if s Q s˜,
with strict inequality for a strictly positive measure of skills (see footnote 1).
Combining the information aboutw(l(1), θ∗(l(1))),w(l(0), θ∗(l(0))) and d l(1)/ d τ , we obtain[
w(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))− ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
w(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
]
d l(1)
d τ
< 0,
because the left-hand side is the inner product of two vectors, one with positive (negative) entries
for s above (below) s˜, the other with negative (positive) entries for s above (below) s˜. The
inequality is strict because the vectors are simultaneously dierent from zero at a subset of skills
of strictly positive measure. It follows that
w(l(1), θ∗(l(1)))
d l(1)
d τ
<
ws˜(l(1), θ
∗(l(1)))
ws˜(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
w(l(0), θ∗(l(0)))
d l(1)
d τ
= 0, (A.10)
where the equality follows from the construction of l(τ). Using that wages are identical to the
129
A Appendix to Chapter 2
L-derivative of F , inequality (A.10) yields
∇LF (l(1), θ∗(l(1)))d l(1)
d τ
< 0.
So, there exists τ ′ < 1 such that F (l(τ ′), θ∗(l(1))) > F (l(1), θ∗(l(1))).
Finally, because F (l(τ), θ∗(l(1))) is a lower bound of F (l(τ)) and both are equal at τ = 1, we
must also have that F (l(τ ′)) > F (l(1)), contradicting quasiconvexity.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider L and L′ as in the theorem. Since θ∗(L) is homogeneous of degree
zero in L, we can restrict attention to cases where L′ is on the exogenous technology isoquant
of F (L, θ∗(L)), that is, F (L′, θ∗(L)) = F (L, θ∗(L)). Let l(τ) parameterize a dierentiable and
monotonic path from L to L′ such that l(0) = L, l(1) = L′, and F (l(τ), θ∗(L)) = F (L, θ∗(L))
for all τ ∈ [0, 1]. By construction, l1(τ) and l3(τ) are increasing, l2(τ) is decreasing in τ .
Now suppose, to derive a contradiction, that θ∗(L′) is strictly less polarizing then θ∗(L). We
then have
F (l(0), θ∗(L′)) ≤ F (l(0), θ∗(L)) = F (l(1), θ∗(L)) < F (l(1), θ∗(L′)), (A.11)
where the last inequality is strict because we select θ∗ as the supremum of the maximizer set in
equation (2.2) (here this means that we select the most polarizing technology from the maximizer
set).
Using the mean value theorem, equation (A.11) implies that there is a τ ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∇LF (l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))d l(τ
′)
d τ
> 0.
Replacing the derivative with wages and using that l(τ) is in the isoquant of F (L, θ∗(L)), we
obtain
w(l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))
d l(τ ′)
d τ
> cw(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
d l(τ ′)
d τ
= 0,
for any constant c > 0. Rearranging yields
[
w(l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))− cw(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))] d l(τ ′)
d τ
> 0. (A.12)
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But now set c equal to w2(l(τ ′), θ∗(L′))/w2(l(τ ′), θ∗(L)). Inequality (A.12) then reduces to[
w1(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))− w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
w2(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
w1(l(τ
′), θ∗(L))
]
d l1(τ
′)
d τ
+
[
w3(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))− w2(l(τ
′), θ∗(L′))
w2(l(τ ′), θ∗(L))
w3(l(τ
′), θ∗(L))
]
d l3(τ
′)
d τ
> 0.
But under the initial assumption that θ∗(L′) is less polarizing than θ∗(L), both expressions in
brackets are negative while the derivatives of l1(τ) and l3(τ) are both positive. Hence the total
expression on the left-hand side must be negative, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, suppose there exist x < x′ such that Ls,x > 0 andKx′ > 0. This requires
that the cost per eciency unit of capital is greater (smaller) than that of labor type s in task x
(x′), that is,
ws
γ(s, x)
≤ r
α(x)
and ws
γ(s, x′)
≥ r
α(x′)
.
But this implies
γ(s, x′)
γ(s, x)
≤ α(x
′)
α(x)
,
which contradicts the assumed pattern of comparative advantage between labor and capital.
Therefore, there exists x˜ ∈ X such that (i)Kx > 0 only if x ≤ x˜ and (ii) Ls,x > 0 only if x ≥ x˜ for
all s. Moreover, it is obvious that Kx > 0 for all x < x˜, as otherwise a task would not be produced
at all, increasing its relative price arbitrarily and hence violating task rms’ prot maximization
conditions.
Second, conditional on x˜, the assignment of labor to tasks in [x˜, x] is the same as in a model
without capital and with a task set of [x˜, x]. Such a model is analyzed by Costinot and Vogel (2010),
whose Lemma 1 establishes existence of a continuous and strictly increasing matching function
m as proposed in the lemma.
It remains to argue why the threshold task x˜ is performed by labor and not by capital. But this
question turns out to be irrelevant, as we have dened an equilibrium of the model in terms of
distributions of labor and capital over tasks, and a density corresponding to a distribution is only
unique up to a set of measure zero. This means that whether we let x˜ be performed by labor or by
capital, the distributions of labor and capital over tasks, and hence the equilibrium itself, do not
change. So, we can always represent the equilibrium distributions by capital and labor densities
such that Kx˜ = 0 and Ls,x˜ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider rst existence and uniqueness of the exogenous technology equilib-
rium. For any x˜ ∈ (x, x), the assignment of labor to the task set [x˜, x] is equivalent to the labor
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assignment in Costinot and Vogel (2010), whose Lemma 1 establishes existence of a unique assign-
ment function m as required by the equilibrium denition. Moreover, given m, the assignment
of capital to [x, x˜) is clearly uniquely determined by the requirement that all marginal products
α(x)∂Y/∂Yx must equal r. Then, capital and labor assignment together uniquely determine task
quantities, task prices, and wages via conditions (E1), (E2), and (E4).
Consider now the three properties of the exogenous technology equilibrium proposed by the
lemma.
1. Consider L′ = λL. Let Kx denote the equilibrium capital density under L, let K ′x = λKx,
and analogously for Y ′x = λYx. It is then easy to check that K ′x and Y ′x, with all other
equilibrium objects unchanged, form an equilibrium under the new labor supply L′. This
is because nal good and task production are linear homogeneous, such that scaling all
inputs by a common factor does not change prices. Linear homogeneity in production also
implies that nal good production Y changes by the factor λ in the new equilibrium. Since
aggregate capital K changes by λ as well, this must also hold for aggregate net production
Y − rK .
2. Since all markets are competitive, the equality of wages and marginal products of labor
follows from standard Walrasian equilibrium arguments.
3. According to equation (2.8), relative wages are fully determined by the matching function.
Since the matching function is determined equivalently as in Costinot and Vogel (2010), an
increase in x˜ here has the same eects on relative wages as in increase in the lower bound
of the task set in Costinot and Vogel (2010). Their Lemma 5 says that such an increase raises
all skill premia.
Finally, consider the endogenous technology equilibrium. Again since all markets are competi-
tive, standard reasoning along the lines of the rst welfare theorem implies that the automation
threshold x˜∗ satises
x˜∗(L) ∈ argmax
x˜∈X
F (L, x˜)
in any endogenous technology equilibrium (otherwise task producers could choose a dierent x˜
and earn positive prots thereby). Moreover, any such x˜ must satisfy condition (E6) and hence
forms an endogenous technology equilibrium (when combined with the corresponding exogenous
technology equilibrium). Existence then follows from the fact that F (L, x˜) is continuous in x˜ and
X is compact.2
2To see that F (L, x˜) is continuous in x˜, note that (E1) and the nal good production function (equation (2.7))
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For uniqueness, suppose that there are two equilibrium technologies x˜∗1 < x˜∗2 at some labor
supply L. Then, using the assumption about comparative advantage between capital and labor
(Assumption 3), (E6) implies that the least-skilled worker earns less under x˜∗1 than under x˜∗2, that
is,
ws(L, x˜
∗
1) < ws(L, x˜
∗
2). (A.13)
On the other hand, we know from point 3 of Lemma 2 that skill premia must also be smaller
under x˜∗1, that is, w(L, x˜∗1) p w(L, x˜∗2). Finally, since F (L, x˜∗1) = F (L, x˜∗2) and F is linear
homogeneous in L, we have ∫
S
ws(L, x˜
∗
1) d s =
∫
S
ws(L, x˜
∗
2) d s.
In combination with the fact that skill premia are greater under x˜∗2, this requires that the least-
skilled worker earns less under x˜∗2, a contradiction to inequality (A.13).
Proof of Lemma 3. I show that for any upper contour set of F there exists a supporting hyperplane
through any point on the boundary of the upper contour set. This implies convexity of the upper
contour sets and hence quasiconcavity of F .
Take any L and let w∗ and p∗x denote equilibrium wages and task prices at L. Consider the
hyperplane given by {l | lw∗ = Lw∗}. Now suppose, to derive a contradiction, that there exists
an L′ such that L′w∗ = Lw∗ (L′ is on the mentioned hyperplane) and F (L′) > F (L) (L′ is in the
interior of the upper contour set bounded by L). Let Y ∗∗x and m∗∗ be task quantities and matching
function in equilibrium at L′. We must have that∫
X
Y ∗∗x p
∗
x dx >
∫
X
Y ∗x p
∗
x dx, (A.14)
as otherwise nal good producers would choose Y ∗∗x instead of Y ∗x in equilibrium at L (because
F (L′) > F (L)). But then, task producers could choose m∗∗ and labor input L′ to produce Y ∗∗x
at labor cost L′w∗ = Lw∗, which yields greater prots than producing Y ∗x with m∗ and L (in
the light of (A.14)). So, Y ∗x could not be equilibrium quantities at L. Hence, the constructed
hyperplane is tangent to the upper contour set of F bounded by L. Since we can construct a
supporting hyperplane in this way for any L, the proof is completed.
Proof of Lemma 4. We can establish existence and uniqueness of the exogenous technology equi-
imply existence of an aggregate production function F ′ (L,m, {Kx}x, x˜) that is continuous in x˜. Since in the
exogenous technology equilibrium {Kx}x and m are such that they maximize aggregate production, the reduced
form production function F (L, x˜) is the upper envelope of {F ′(L,m, {Kx}x, x˜)}m,Kx . As the upper envelope of
a family of continuous (in x˜) functions, F is itself continuous.
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librium analogously to existence and uniqueness of the endogenous technology equilibrium in
Lemma 2. First, note that the exogenous technology equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium
of an otherwise identical model where the intermediate goods qα and qβ are produced at marginal
costs ηα/κ and ηβ/κ and supplied under perfect competition. Call the equilibrium of this perfectly
competitive model the “auxiliary equilibrium”. We prove existence and uniqueness of the auxiliary
equilibrium.
Suppose at rst that x˜ is xed and consider conditions (E1)’ to (E6)’, (E8)’, and (E9)’. By the
same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2, the matching function m is uniquely determined
by the equilibrium conditions and x˜. Similarly, the relative assignment of capital over tasks
[x, x˜) is uniquely determined by the requirement that px is constant over these tasks (E6)’. The
intermediate quantity qβ is determined by (E3)’ conditional on task quantities Yx. Solving equation
(2.11) for qβ and substituting the resulting expression into nal good production leads to a nal
good production function of the same form as in equation (2.7) in the setting without technology-
embodying intermediate goods. Analogously, solving equation (2.10) for qα and plugging the
result into task production (E1)’ yields a reduced form task production function that, for x < x˜,
only depends on capital. We can then use the derived nal good production function and the
reduced form task production function to uniquely determine the scale of {Kx}x∈[x,x˜) (note that
the relative assignment of capital to tasks was already determined before, via condition E6’). Via
the capital assignment, qα and qβ are then determined uniquely via (E3)’ and (E8)’.
Considering the determination of x˜, the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2 imply that
x˜ must maximize net aggregate production in the auxiliary equilibrium, and that there is exactly
one x˜ consistent with the equilibrium conditions. This establishes existence and uniqueness of the
auxiliary equilibrium and, by equivalence between these equilibria, of the exogenous technology
equilibrium.
Consider now the properties of the modied aggregate production function F (L,α, β) and
wages w(L,α, β) proposed in the lemma.
1. For linear homogeneity of F , suppose L is scaled by λ > 0. It is then easily veried
that, when scaling Kx, qα, and qβ by λ, while keeping all prices, x˜, and the matching
function unchanged, all equilibrium conditions are still satised. In this new equilibrium,
all quantities are scaled by λ, so the value of F will also be scaled by λ, establishing linear
homogeneity of F in L.
2. For equality of wages and the marginal product of labor in F , note that F (L,α, β) measures
aggregate production in the auxiliary equilibrium. Since the auxiliary equilibrium is perfectly
competitive, standard Walrasian equilibrium arguments imply equality of wages and the
134
A.1 Omitted Proofs and Derivations
marginal product of labor. Then, equivalence between auxiliary and exogenous technology
equilibrium allows to transfer this result to the exogenous technology equilibrium.
3. Consider (α, β), (α′, β′) ∈ D (where D is the innovation possibilities frontier as given in
Lemma 4) with α ≤ α′, and suppose that there exists L such that F (L,α, β) ≤ F (L,α′, β′)
and w(L,α, β) p w(L,α′, β′). According to point 3 in Lemma 2, the proof of which holds
in the present context, w(L,α, β) p w(L,α′, β′) requires x˜(L,α′, β′) < x˜(L,α, β). This
in turn, via condition (E7)’, implies
ws(L,α, β)
ws(L,α′, β′)
=
α′
α
γ(s, x˜(L,α, β))
γ(s, x˜(L,α′, β′))
> 1. (A.15)
But at the same time, the fact that F (L,α, β) ≤ F (L,α′, β′) and that F is linear homoge-
neous in L implies that ∫
S
ws(L,α, β) d s ≤
∫
S
ws(L,α
′, β′) d s.
Finally, the initial assumption that x˜(L,α′, β′) < x˜(L,α, β) implies, by the arguments in
the proof of point 3 of Lemma 2, that w(L,α′, β′) p w(L,α, β). Now, greater skill premia
and a lower total wage bill under (α, β) require that the least skilled worker’s wage is lower
under (α, β) than under (α′, β′), in contradiction to equation (A.15).
Consider now the endogenous technology equilibrium, where α and β are determined via (E10)’.
Take any
(α∗(L), β∗(L)) ∈ argmax
(α,β)∈D
F (L,α, β),
and recall that
F (L,α, β) = Y − rK − ηα
κ
qα − ηβ
κ
,
where the quantities Y , K , qα, and qβ take their exogenous technology equilibrium values.
Moreover, let
F ′(L, x˜, {Kx},m, qα, qβ, α, β) = Y ′ − rK − ηα
κ
qα − ηβ
κ
be net output at quantities (L, x˜, {Kx},m, qα, qβ, α, β), that is, Y ′ is gross output at these given
quantities as derived from equation (2.9) and condition (E1)’. Since the exogenous technology
values of (x˜, {Kx},m, qα, qβ) maximize F ′, F is the upper envelope of the functions F ′(L, ., α, β)
(where the dot shall signify that the upper envelope is taken with respect to the variables
(x˜, {Kx},m, qα, qβ)). Envelope arguments then imply that the technology pair (α∗(L), β∗(L))
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must satisfy the following Lagrange conditions:
∂F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L))
∂α
− λ
ρ
α
1−ρ
ρ =
∂F ′(L, x˜∗, {K∗x},m∗, q∗α, q∗β, α∗(L), β∗(L))
∂α
− λ
ρ
α
1−ρ
ρ
= q∗α
κ
∫ x˜∗
0
pxK
∗
x
1−κ dx− λ
ρ
α
1−ρ
ρ = 0
∂F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L))
∂β
− λ
ρ
β
1−ρ
ρ =
∂F ′(L, x˜∗, {K∗x},m∗, q∗α, q∗β, α∗(L), β∗(L))
∂β
− λ
ρ
β
1−ρ
ρ
= q∗β
κ
(∫
X
Y ∗x
−1
 dx
) (1−κ)
−1
− λ
ρ
β
1−ρ
ρ = 0,
where the (x˜∗, {K∗x},m∗, q∗α, q∗β) denote the exogenous technology equilibrium quantities of the
corresponding variables. Then comparison of the conditions reveals that, with pD = λκ, any
(α, β) that satises the Lagrange conditions also satises the equilibrium condition (E10)’ and
hence forms an endogenous technology equilibrium.
Finally, note that the Lagrange conditions require
∂F (L,α, β)/∂α
∂F (L,α, β)/∂β
=
(
α
β
) 1−ρ
ρ
.
When ρ→ 0, the right-hand side of the equation converges to a step function that is 0 for α/β < 1
and jumps to innity at α/β = 1. Thus, the equation will have a unique solution when ρ is
suciently small, as claimed in the main text below Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 5. I construct a line in direction of the relative skill supply order s along which
the endogenous technology function F fails to be quasiconcave. Starting from some labor supply
S, consider a line through L that is (i) tangent to the isoquant of F at L, and (ii) such that all
supply ratios within the skill sets [s, s˜] and (s˜, s] are xed. That is, we move along this line by
scaling up (or down) all supply levels above s˜ by a common factor, while scaling down (or up) all
supply levels below s˜ by another factor.
Holding technology xed at (α∗(L), β∗(L)), it is easy to see that F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) is linear
in L on this line. In particular, suppose we scale up labor supply above s˜ by the factor λ > 1
and scale down labor supply below s˜ accordingly. Assume now that the assignment of skills
above s˜ to tasks remains constant. Then, capital adjusts such that the quantities of all tasks
performed by capital and workers below s˜ scale up by the factor λ as well. This holds all task
prices constant, which, under the assumption of constant labor assignment, means that wages are
unchanged as well. Constancy of wages in turn conrms the initial assumption of an unchanged
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assignment of labor with skill above s˜. So, the new (exogenous technology) equilibrium features
unchanged wages compared to the initial situation. Since wages correspond to marginal products
in F , constancy of wages implies linearity of F in L on the constructed line. Moreover, since by
construction the line is tangent to the isoquant of F (and hence of F ), F is indeed constant in L
on the line.
Constancy of F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) on the constructed line now directly implies that the endoge-
nous technology function F (L) := F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) cannot be quasiconcave along this line.
This is because F (L,α∗(L), β∗(L)) is a lower bound for F (L) that is binding at L. Since α∗(L)
changes when relative skill supply changes (see equations (2.12) and (2.13)), the lower bound
does not bind at other points on the line, such that there are points L′ s L s L′′, all on the
constructed line, such that F (L′), F (L′′) > F (L), which completes the proof.
A.1.2 Complete Equilibrium Characterization for the Assignment Model with
International Trade
This section provides a rigorous denition and a detailed characterization of the trade equilibrium
in the two country assignment model of Section 2.5.4. The Northern economy has the same
structure as the closed economy of Section 2.5.3. In particular, the nal good is produced according
to
Y N =
∫ 1
0
(
βNi
1
κ qNNβ,i + β
S
i
1
κ qSNβ,i
)κ
d i
[∫ x
x
(
Y NNx + Y
SN
x
) −1
 dx
] (1−κ)
−1
,
where Y N denotes nal good production in the North, βNi and βSi are quality levels of the
technology-embodying intermediate good (β, i) in North and South, respectively, qNNβ,i is the
quantity of this intermediate good produced and utilized in the North, qSNβ,i is the quantity produced
in the South and utilized in the North, and analogously Y NNx (Y SNx ) is the quantity of task x
produced and utilized in the North (produced in the South and utilized in the North). Tasks are
produced according to
Y Nx =
∫ 1
0
(
αNi
1
κ qNNα,i + α
S
i
1
κ qSNα,i
)κ
d iKNx
1−κ
+ γN (mN
−1
(x), x)LN
mN−1(x)
dmN
−1
(x)
dx
.
Here, Y Nx denotes production of task x in the North,αNi andαSi are quality levels of the technology-
embodying intermediate good (α, i) in the North and South, respectively, qNNα,i (qSNα,i ) is the quantity
of this good produced and utilized in the North (produced in the South and utilized in the North),
KNx is the amount of capital employed in task x in the North, mN (x) is the skill level assigned to
task x in the North, and γN (s, x) is the Northern labor productivity schedule. Tasks, labor, and
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the nal good are supplied competitively. Tasks prices in the North are denoted by pNx , wages by
wNs , and the Northern nal good is the numéraire.
The technology-embodying intermediate goods are produced by monopolists at marginal cost
ηα and ηβ , respectively, from nal good. The total quantity of good (α, i) produced in the North
is denoted qNα,i, and analogously for (β, i). Prices are pNα,i and pNβ,i. The monopolists obtain quality
levels αNi or βNi at costs pDαNi
1
ρ or pDβNi
1
ρ , respectively, where pD denotes the price for R&D
resources. R&D resources are in xed supply D in the North.
The South is symmetric to the North, with two exceptions. First, there is no R&D sector in the
South. Instead, quality levels αSi and βSi are copied with some loss δ from Northern monopolists,
such that αSi = δαNi and βSi = δβNi for δ ∈ (0, κ). Second, since there are no xed R&D
expenditures required to produce them, the technology-embodying intermediates qSα,i and qSβ,i
are supplied competitively.
Final good market clearing now requires that Y N = Y NN + Y NS , where Y NN (Y NS) is the
amount of nal good produced and consumed in the North (produced in the North and consumed
in the South), and Y S = Y SS + Y SN , where Y SS and Y SN are the Southern analogues of Y NN
and Y NS . Task market clearing requires Y Nx = Y NNx +Y NSx and Y Sx = Y SSx +Y SNx for all x. The
markets for technology-embodying intermediates clear if qNα,i = qNNα,i + qNSα,i , qNβ,i = qNNβ,i + qNSβ,i ,
and analogously for Southern intermediate good production. Finally, trade between the two
countries is balanced if
Y NS +
∫ x
x
pNx Y
NS
x dx+
∫ 1
0
pNα,iq
NS
α,i d i+
∫ 1
0
pNβ,iq
NS
β,i d i
= Y SN +
∫ x
x
pSxY
SN
x dx+
∫ 1
0
pSα,iq
SN
α,i d i+
∫ 1
0
pSβ,iq
SN
β,i d i.
A trade equilibrium now consists of automation thresholds x˜N and x˜S , matching functions
mN (s) and mS(s), capital assignments {KNx }x∈X and {KSx }x∈X , task production {Y Nx }x∈X
and {Y Sx }x∈X , task utilization {Y NNx }x∈X , {Y NSx }x∈X , {Y SSx }x∈X , and {Y SNx }x∈X , technology
intermediate production qNα , qSα , qNβ , and qSβ , technology intermediate utilization qNNα , qNSα , qSSα ,
qSNα (and analogously for β), nal good quantities Y N and Y S , and nal good consumption Y NN ,
Y NS , Y SS , Y SN ; task prices {pNx }x∈X and {pSx}x∈X , wages {wNs }s∈S and {wSs }s∈S , capital
prices pNc and pSc , technology intermediate prices pNα , pSα, pNβ , and pSβ , a price for R&D resources
pD in the North, and a price for nal good in the South pS ; such that all rms maximize prots,
all markets clear, and trade is balanced. Note that the denition already uses symmetry across
technology intermediate producers within each country.
The remainder of the section provides a characterization of a trade equilibrium in terms of the
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equilibrium of an integrated economy with labor supply LN + ∆LS , where ∆ ∈ (0, 1] measures
the dierence in labor productivity between the two countries, that is, γS(s, x) = ∆γN (s, x).
We start from the observation that free trade in tasks and nal good implies that the correspond-
ing prices must be equal across countries, that is, pNx = pSx for all x and pS = 1 (the Northern nal
good is the numéraire). Since skills are assigned to those tasks in which their marginal product is
greatest, and because the labor productivity dierence ∆ does not depend on tasks, equality of
task prices implies equality of matching functions across countries. Denote the common matching
function by mT (x). It follows immediately that there is also a common automation threshold x˜T
for both countries. Moreover, wages correspond to marginal products of skills in their respective
tasks, so we must have wSs = ∆wNs for all skills. Finally, because nal good prices are equal and
the marginal cost of capital in terms of nal good is r in both countries, there will be a common
price of capital pTc = r.
Consider now the supply of technology-embodying intermediate goods for task production. If
only Northern monopolists supplied the goods, they would again face iso-elastic demand, such that
they would charge prices pNα = ηα/κ. This implies a price per eciency unit of ηα/(καN ). The
price at which Southern producers just break even is pSα = ηβ , which implies a price per eciency
unit of ηα/αS or, with αS = δαN , ηα/(δαN ). Since it is assumed that δ < κ, Southern producers
would incur losses when producing at Northern producers’ monopoly prices. Hence, in equilibrium
only Northern producers produce. Moreover, they charge monopoly prices pNα = ηα/κ. To obtain
a condition for the quantity of these goods, consider inverse demand in the North (using symmetry
across α-intermediates),
pNα = κα
NqNNα
κ−1
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
N
x
1−κ
dx,
and in the South,
pNα = κα
NqNSα
κ−1
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
S
x
1−κ
dx.
Now let qα := qNα + qSα = qNα denote world production, and let sα := qNNα /qα be the share of
world production utilized in the North. Then, linear homogeneity of task production in qNCα and
KCx (for both countries C = N,S) for all tasks x < x˜T implies that the marginal product of
capital in task x will be equal in both countries if and only if KNx = sαKx for all x < x˜T , where
Kx := K
N
x +K
S
x is the world capital stock. Note that marginal products of capital must be equal
because the price of capital is the same in both countries. With this result, we can rewrite the
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inverse demand for the α-intermediate in the North (or, equivalently, in the South) as
pNα = κα
Nsκ−1α q
κ−1
α
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
N
x
1−κ
dx
= καNqκ−1α
∫ x˜T
x
px
(
KNx
sα
)1−κ
dx
= καNqκ−1α
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
1−κ
x dx, (A.16)
which has the same form as the corresponding inverse demand in the closed economy (see equation
(2.10)). Prots of α-monopolists at a given α are then given by
piα,i(α
N
i ) = maxq
{
καNi q
κ
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
1−κ
x dx− ηαq − pDαNi
1/ρ
}
.
It follows that the rst order condition for a prot maximum in αNi also takes the same form as in
the closed economy (using symmetry to drop the i):
ρκqκα
∫ x˜T
x
pxK
1−κ
x dx = pDα
N
1−ρ
ρ . (A.17)
Next, consider the production of tasks. Let Yx := Y Nx + Y Sx denote world production of tasks.
The previous results now imply that
Yx = α
Nsαq
κ
αK
1−κ
x + α
N (1− sα)qκαK1−κx
= αNqκαK
1−κ
x
for all x < x˜T , and
Yx = γ
N (mT
−1
(x), x)LN
mT−1(x)
dmT
−1
(x)
dx
+ γS(mT
−1
(x), x)LS
mT−1(x)
dmT
−1
(x)
dx
= γN (mT
−1
(x), x)
(
LN
mT−1(x) + ∆L
S
mT−1(x)
) dmT−1(x)
dx
for x ≥ x˜T . Again, both equations, written in terms of world quantities, take the same form as in
the closed economy.
Considering the supply of intermediate goods for nal good production (β-intermediates),
for the same reason as in the case of α-intermediates only Northern monopolists will produce
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β-intermediates. They will therefore also face iso-elastic demand and charge constant markups,
pNβ,i = ηβ/κ. To derive an inverse demand equation in terms of world quantities, dene sβ :=
(Y NNx + Y
SN
x )/Yx as the share of world task output that is utilized in the North. Note that this
share is constant across tasks, since otherwise the marginal products of tasks, and hence task
prices, would dier across countries. Using sβ , inverse demand for β-intermediates in the North
can be written as:
pNβ,i = κβ
N
i q
NN
β,i
κ−1
[∫ x
x
(
Y NNx + Y
SN
x
) −1
 dx
] (1−κ)

= κβNi q
NN
β,i
κ−1
s1−κβ
[∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
] (1−κ)

,
and inverse demand in the South:
pNβ,i = κβ
N
i q
NS
β,i
κ−1
[∫ x
x
(
Y SSx + Y
NS
x
) −1
 dx
] (1−κ)

= κβNi q
NS
β,i
κ−1
(1− sβ)1−κ
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)

.
The two inverse demand equations imply that the share sβ also equals the share of world output
of β-intermediates that is utilized in the North: qNNβ,i = sβqβ,i, or, using symmetry across
intermediate varieties, qNNβ = sβqβ , where qβ,i and qβ denote world output. With this observation,
and again using symmetry across i, the inverse demand equations imply
pβ = κβ
Nqκ−1β
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)

, (A.18)
which is the desired inverse demand equation in terms of world quantities. Prots of β-monopolists
are then given by
piβ,i(β
N
i ) = maxq
κβNi qκ
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)

− ηβq
− pDβNi 1ρ ,
such that the rst order condition for a prot maximum in βNi becomes (using symmetry to drop
the i):
ρκqκβ
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)
−1
= pDβ
N
1−ρ
ρ . (A.19)
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Finally, let Y = Y N + Y S be world (gross) production of the nal good. Using the share sβ ,
we can write
Y = βN (sβqβ)
κ
(∫ x
x
(sβYx)
−1
 dx
) (1−κ)
−1
+ βN ((1− sβ)qβ)κ
(∫ x
x
((1− sβ)Yx)
−1
 dx
) (1−κ)
−1
= βNqκβ
(∫ x
x
Y
−1

x dx
) (1−κ)
−1
. (A.20)
This gives world nal good production in terms of world quantities of tasks and β-intermediates.
Collecting the derived equations yields equilibrium conditions for world quantities and prices
that are common across countries. These conditions exactly replicate the equilibrium conditions
for the closed economy in Section 2.5.3. In particular, in any trade equilibrium the common
matching function mT (x), the common automation threshold x˜T , world quantities {Kx}x∈X ,
{Yx}x∈X , qα, and qβ , and productivity levels αN and βN ; the common prices {px}x∈X , pTc , pNα ,
pNβ , the Northern R&D price pD , and Northern wages {wNs }s∈S satisfy the following conditions:
(E1)” Yx = αNqκαK1−κx if x < x˜T and Yx =
γN (mT
−1
(x), x)
(
LN
mT−1(x)
+ ∆LS
mT−1(x)
)
dmT
−1
(x)
dx if x ≥ x˜;
(E2)” px = ∂Y∂Yx for all x, where Y is given by (A.20);
(E3)” qβ satises equation (A.18);
(E4)” mT (s) ∈ argmaxx∈X γN (s, x)px for all s;
(E5)” wNs = γN (s,mT (s))pmT (s) for all s;
(E6)”
(
pNα
καN
)κ (
pTc
(1−κ)αN
)1−κ
= px for all x < x˜T and pTc = r;
(E7)” w
N
s
γN (s,x˜T )
=
(
pNα
καN
)κ (
r
(1−κ)α
)1−κ
;
(E8)” qα satises equation (A.16);
(E9)” pNα =
ηα
κ and p
N
β =
ηβ
κ ;
(E10)” αN , βN , and pD satisfy equations (A.17), (A.19), and αN
1
ρ + βN
1
ρ = D.
These conditions are identical to conditions (E1)’ to (E10)’ for the closed economy. Therefore, the
collection of world quantities and prices described in (E1)” to (E10)” is identical to the equilibrium
of a closed economy with labor supply LN + ∆LS and parameter values of the North. The
dierence between world quantities and prices under trade and the Northern autarky equilibrium
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is thus identical to the dierence in Northern autarky variables that arises from a hypothetical
change in labor supply from LN to LN + ∆LS . This veries the claim in Section 2.5.4 that the
eects of trade integration on technology αN and wages wN are the same as the eects of a
change in labor supply from LN to LN + ∆LS .
A.2 Supplementary Material
A.2.1 Further Models of Endogenous Technical Change
This section derives equations (2.1) and (2.2) as characterizations of wages and equilibrium
technologies in two specic models of endogenous technical change, complementing the baseline
model presented in the main text. The section also provides conditions for the existence of
symmetric exogenous and endogenous technology equilibria in each model.
Baseline Model First, consider existence of symmetric equilibria in the baseline model. Recall
that an exogenous technology equilibrium consists of wages and labor inputs for each rm such
that rms maximize their prots by choosing their labor inputs, taking wages and technologies
θi = θ as given, and the labor market clears. An endogenous technology equilibrium additionally
consists of technologies for each rm, and rms maximize their prots by choosing labor inputs
and technologies jointly, again taking wages as given.
Observation 1. In the baseline model, there exists a symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium
at any pair (L, θ) if and only if F (L, θ) is concave in L at any θ. If F (L, θ) is strictly concave in L,
the symmetric equilibrium is the unique exogenous technology equilibrium.
Moreover, there exists a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium at any L if and only if
the endogenous technology production function F (L) is concave. If F (L) is strictly concave and
argmaxθ∈Θ F (L, θ) is a singleton for all L, the symmetric equilibrium is the unique endogenous
technology equilibrium at any L.
Proof. For a given labor supplyL and technology θ, a symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium
exists if and only if we can nd wages w such that
F (L, θ)− wL
is maximized with respect to L at L. Let F ′θ(L) := F (L, θ) be the production function at xed
technology θ. Then, the problem is equivalent to nding a hyperplane that is tangent to the graph
of F ′θ at L and lies above F ′θ(L) at all L. Such hyperplanes exist for all L if and only if F ′θ(L) is
concave.
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If F (L, θ) is strictly concave in L, the prot maximization problem has a unique solution for
any wage vector for which a solution exists. Hence, all rms must have the same labor input, and
the symmetric equilibrium is the only one that can exist.
A symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium at a given labor supply L exists if and only if
we can nd wages w such that
F (L)− wL
is maximized with respect to L at L. This is because argmaxθ∈Θ F (L, θ) is always non-empty by
compactness of Θ and continuity of F (such that F (L) is well dened). The existence proof then
proceeds as for the exogenous technology equilibrium but with F in the place of F ′θ .
If F (L) is strictly concave and argmaxθ∈Θ F (L, θ) is a singleton, the prot maximization
problem of rms has a unique solution for any wage vector for which a solution exists. Hence, all
rms choose the same labor input and technology, and the symmetric equilibrium is the only one
that can exist.
The important insight is that a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium exists at all L
only if the endogenous technology production function F is concave. This prevents the analysis
of the phenomena discussed in Section 2.3.2 of the main text within the baseline model, at least if
the analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria. More precisely, whenever symmetric equilibria
exist everywhere in the baseline model, the induced technical change eect will never dominate
the direct eect of increases in relative skill supply on skill premia, because this would require that
F is not quasiconcave by Theorem 3. To analyze cases where skill premia increase in relative skill
supply in a symmetric equilibrium, we must therefore consider models with interdependences
across rms’ technology choices, as presented in the next sections.
Spillover Model The spillover model is identical to the baseline model except for that it includes
cross eects between rms’ technologies. In particular, the production function of rm i is now
given by F ′(Li, θi, θ), where θ is the average of all rms’ technology choices, θ =
∫ 1
0 θi d i. For
the average to be well dened, let Θ be a convex subset of RN . Instead of the average, we could
use any other function of all rms’ technologies that is insensitive to any single rm’s θj . Denote
by F (L, θ) := F ′(L, θ, θ) the symmetric technology production function, which gives output as
a function of labor input and a common technology for all rms.
The equilibrium denitions are as in the baseline model. At xed technology θi = θ for all i, an
exogenous technology equilibrium is given by wages and labor inputs for each rm, such that
rms choose their labor inputs to maximize prots given wages. As in the baseline model, it is
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clear that wages have to satisfy
w(L, θ) = ∇LF ′(L, θ, θ) = ∇LF (L, θ)
in any symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium. So, equation (2.1) holds.
An endogenous technology equilibrium is given by wages, labor inputs, and technologies for
all rms, such that rms choose their labor inputs and technologies to maximize prots, taking
wages and the technologies of other rms as given. Let
θ∗(L) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
F (L, θ)
be a common technology across rms that maximizes output at symmetric labor inputs. Moreover,
suppose that the spillovers across rms’ technologies are such that each rm benets from other
rms choosing similar technologies to its own.
Assumption 7. For each rm i and any labor input Li,
F ′(Li, θi, θi) ≥ F ′(Li, θi, θ)
for all feasible θ.
In words, for any individual technology θi rm i’s productivity is maximized when the other
rms choose θi as well on average. This captures the notion that part of the knowledge about
how to work with a given technology is non-excludable, such that rms’ productivity increases
when other rms operate the same technology and much useful knowledge spills over. A perhaps
more stringent formalization would have any rm’s productivity decrease in the average distance
between its own and other rms’ technologies. Such a modication is straightforward and thus
omitted.
Under Assumption (7) and appropriate conditions on F ′, any technology θ∗(L) as described
above forms a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium when combined with wages
w(L, θ∗(L)) = ∇LF (L, θ∗(L)) and symmetric labor inputs L for all rms. Thus, equation
(2.2) applies. More comprehensively, the following results hold.
Observation 2. In the spillover model, there exists a symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium
at any pair (L, θ) if and only if the symmetric technology function F (L, θ) is concave in L at any θ.
If F is strictly concave in L, the symmetric exogenous technology equilibrium is the unique exogenous
technology equilibrium. Wages in any symmetric technology equilibrium are given by equation (2.1).
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Moreover, suppose Assumption 7 holds and the endogenous technology function F ′(L, θ) :=
maxθi F
′(L, θi, θ) is concave in L. Then, for any labor supply L, any technology θ∗(L) as given by
equation (2.2) forms a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium in combination with wages
w(L, θ∗(L)) = ∇LF (L, θ∗(L)) and symmetric labor inputs L for each rm.
Proof. The exogenous technology equilibrium is equivalent to the exogenous technology equilib-
rium of the baseline model, so the rst part follows directly from Observation 1.
For the second part, we have to show that there are wages w such that the pair (L, θ∗(L))
maximizes rm prots
F ′(Li, θi, θ∗(L))− wLi
with respect to (Li, θi). First, for any θ′ ∈ Θ we have
F ′(L, θ∗(L), θ∗(L)) ≥ F ′(L, θ′, θ′) ≥ F ′(L, θ′, θ∗(L)).
It follows that F ′(L, θ∗(L)) = F ′(L, θ∗(L), θ∗(L)). Now let w∗ = ∇LF ′(L, θ∗(L), θ∗(L)) and
note that by the envelope theorem,
w∗ = ∇LF ′(L, θ∗(L)).
Concavity of F ′ in L then implies that prots are indeed maximized at (L, θ∗(L)) when wages
are given by w∗.
Uniqueness of the symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium can easily be ensured by
restricting spillovers to be suciently weak in an appropriate sense. The more interesting result,
however, is that existence of a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium as characterized by
equations (2.1) and (2.2) only requires concavity of F ′(L, θ) in L, and not in L and θ jointly. In
consequence, also the symmetric technology function F (L, θ) does not have to be jointly concave
in L and θ. The reason is that existence of a symmetric equilibrium only requires concavity in the
choice variables of an individual rm, whereas the function F (L, θ) combines an individual rm’s
technology and the average technology across rms in the variable θ (by restricting the two to be
the same). Therefore, in a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium of the spillover model,
skill premia may increase in relative skill supply as described in Proposition 2 and Theorem 3.
Monopolistic Competition Model The distinction between concavity of individual decision
problems and the aggregate production function becomes even more transparent in the monop-
olistic competition model. There are now two types of rms, a continuum of nal good rms
and a continuum of technology rms. Final good rms produce the single consumption good
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(the numéraire), using labor and technology-embodying intermediate goods as inputs. Their
production function is F ′(Li, Qi), where Li is rm i’s labor input and Qi = (Qi,k)k=1,2,...,K is a
vector of aggregates of technology-embodying intermediate goods. In particular, for each k,
Qi,k =
∫ 1
0
θk,xq
κ
i,k,x dx,
where (k, x) indexes technology rms, qi,k,x is the quantity of rm (k, x)’s intermediate good used
by nal good rm i, and θk,x is the intermediate’s quality. Technology rms are monopolistically
competitive with substitution parameter κ ∈ (0, 1). They produce their intermediate goods at
constant marginal cost ηk from nal good, facing inverse demand
pk,x =
∂F ′(Li, Qi)
∂Qi,k
κθk,xq
κ−1
i,k,x
from nal good rm i. Since inverse demand is iso-elastic, all technology rms charge a price of
pk,x = ηk/κ. The symmetric price is denoted by pk henceforth. Moreover, denote the total output
of rm (k, x) by qk,x. Then, prots of rm (k, x) are given by
pik,x(θk,x) = max
(qi)i∈[0,1]
{
κθk,x
∫ 1
0
∂F ′(Li, Qi)
∂Qi,k
qκi d i− ηk
∫ 1
0
qi d i− Ck(θk,x)
}
.
The rst order condition for the rm’s quality choice is
κ
∫ 1
0
∂F ′(Li, Qi)
∂Qi,k
qκi,k,x d i = −
dCk(θk,x)
d θk,x
.
It can be veried that the elasticity of the optimal qi,k,x in θk,x is 1/(1− κ). Then, assuming that
the elasticity of dCk/ d θ is always greater than κ/(1− κ), the rst order condition has a unique
solution, which is necessary and sucient for a maximum. In summary, technology rms’ problem
of choosing price and quality of their output has a unique solution which is necessarily symmetric
across rms. The symmetric quantities and qualities are denoted by qi,k and θ = (θk)k=1,2,...,K
henceforth.
Equilibrium conditions can now directly be stated in terms of the symmetric choices of tech-
nology rms. In particular, an exogenous technology equilibrium is a collection of labor inputs
Li, intermediate inputs qi,k, intermediate prices pk, and wages w, such that nal good rms
choose their labor and intermediate inputs to maximize prots taking prices and wages as given,
technology rms choose their prices to maximize prots taking inverse demand curves from
nal good rms and the quality levels of their output as given, and the labor market clears. An
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endogenous technology equilibrium additionally consists of quality levels θk for technology rms,
and requires technology rms to choose both their prices and quality levels to maximize prots,
taking inverse demand curves from nal good rms as given.
To characterize symmetric equilibria in the form of equations (2.1) and (2.2), dene the following
“modied production function” (see also Lemma 4):
F (Li, θ) := max
(qk)k=1,2,...,K
{
F ′(Li, (θkqκk )k=1,2,...,K)−
ηk
κ
qk
}
− 1
κ
K∑
k=1
Ck(θk).
Then, with technology rms’ decisions given by pk = ηk/κ and θ, nal good rms’ objective is
equivalent to maximizing
F (Li, θ)− wLi
with respect to Li.3 Therefore, by the same arguments as in the previous models, a symmetric
exogenous technology equilibrium exists at all L and θ if and only if F (Li, θ) is concave in Li at
all θ. Moreover, in such a symmetric equilibrium, wages are given by
w = ∇LF (L, θ),
that is, equation (2.1) holds. If F (Li, θ) is also strictly concave in Li at all θ, any exogenous
technology equilibrium will feature symmetric labor inputs and wages given by equation (2.1).
For a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium, take any technology
θ∗(L) ∈ argmax
θ∈RK+
F (L, θ).
Such a technology must satisfy the rst order conditions
∂F ′(L,Q∗(L))
∂Qk
κq∗k(L)
κ =
dCk(θ
∗(L)k)
d θk
for all k, where Q∗(L) = θ∗(L)q∗(L)κ and q∗(L) is a solution to
max
(qk)k=1,2,...,K
{
F ′(L, (θ∗k(L)q
κ
k )k=1,2,...,K)− ηk/κqk
}
.
Thereby, θ∗(L) and q∗k(L) jointly satisfy technology rms’ rst oder conditions and nal goods’
inverse demand for intermediates, when labor inputs are symmetric. For a symmetric endogenous
3Note that nal good rms take θ as given, such that the presence of the term
∑
Ck(θk) in F (Li, θ) does not change
the maximization problem.
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technology equilibrium, it remains to nd wages w such that symmetric labor inputs maximize
F (Li, θ
∗(L))− wL.
Such wages, again, exist at all L if and only if F is concave in Li at θ∗(L). Moreover, they will
clearly satisfy w = ∇LF (L, θ∗(L)). We have therefore established that a symmetric endogenous
technology equilibrium with equilibrium technology given by (2.2) and wages by (2.1) exists
whenever F is concave in Li.
Observation 3. In the monopolistic competition model, there exists a symmetric exogenous technol-
ogy equilibrium at any pair (L, θ) if and only if F (L, θ) is concave in L at any θ. If F is strictly
concave in L, labor inputs are symmetric in any exogenous technology equilibrium. Whenever labor
inputs are symmetric, wages are given by equation (2.1).
Moreover, if F (L, θ) is concave in L, there exists a symmetric endogenous technology equilibrium
with equilibrium technology satisfying equation (2.2) and wages given by (2.1).
Uniqueness of the endogenous technology equilibrium can be ensured by imposing that F is
strictly pseudoconcave in θ – such that a unique technology satises technology rms’ rst order
conditions at symmetric nal good rm choices – and F ′ is strictly concave in the qi,k,x – such
that all nal good rms indeed choose the same intermediate quantities. The more important
insight from Observation 3 is, however, that existence of symmetric endogenous and exogenous
technology equilibria can be guaranteed without any restriction on the curvature of F (L, θ) in L
and θ jointly. Only restrictions on the curvature of F in L (for existence) and in θ (for uniqueness)
individually are needed. In particular, the endogenous technology function F (L) = F (L, θ∗(L))
can be quasiconvex, as required for strong bias by Theorem 3.
Finally, note that the monopolistic competition model embeds static versions of well-known
models from previous work as special cases. First, when
F ′(L,Q) = QL1−κ,
with L denoting labor supply of a single skill level, we obtain a static version of the standard
monopolistic competition based growth models developed by Romer (1990) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992). Since this model neither features wage inequality nor biased technical change, its
static version is not very interesting. A more interesting case is obtained when
F ′(L,Q) =
[(
Q1L
1−κ
1
)ρ
+
(
Q2L
1−κ
2
)ρ](1/ρ)
.
This is a static version of the seminal directed technical change model by Acemoglu (1998).
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A.2.2 Generalization of the Weak Bias Theorem
This section presents a generalization of Theorem 1 on the induced technical change eect. The
generalization provides a partial converse to the statement of Theorem 1, giving precise limits to
the occurrence of the weak bias phenomenon.
First, note that the skill bias orderb on the set of feasible technologies Θ is actually a preorder.
That is, it is reexive, transitive, but not necessarily antisymmetric. There may, for example, be
two distinct technologies θ and θ′ that induce the same wage distribution at any labor input, such
that θ b θ′, θ′ b θ, and θ 6= θ′. Alternatively, θ and θ′ may induce the same set of relative
wages but at dierent wage levels. In both cases, θ and θ′ can be ordered by their skill bias in both
directions but they are not equal. Let ∼ denote the equivalence relation connecting technologies
with the same skill bias, that is,
θ ∼ θ′ ⇔ [θ b θ′ ∧ θ′ b θ].
Given the preorder b, we can dene what it means for the partially ordered set (Θ,b) to be
a prelattice.
Denition 7. The pair (Θ,b) is a prelattice if any two elements θ, θ′ ∈ Θ have a supremum
and an inmum in Θ.
Note that in a prelattice, in contrast to a lattice, supremum and inmum are not necessarily
unique for all pairs of elements. Moreover, whenever all elements in Θ can be ordered according
to their skill bias, as demanded by Theorem 1, then (Θ,b) will automatically be a prelattice.
Besides the prelattice structure of (Θ,b), the generalization of Theorem 1 requires F to be
prequasisupermodular in θ.
Denition 8. The function F (L, θ) is prequasisupermodular in θ if, for any L and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
F (L, θ) ≤ F (L, θ) for all θ ∈ inf(θ, θ′)⇒ F (L, θ′) ≤ F (L, θ) for some θ ∈ sup(θ, θ′),
where inf(θ, θ′) denotes the set of inma of θ and θ′, and sup(θ, θ′) denotes the set of suprema.
Prequasisupermodularity is therefore dened analogously to quasisupermodularity (see, for
example, (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994)), adapted to the preorder environment (quasisupermod-
ularity is dened on sets endowed with a usual, that is, antisymmetric, order relation). Again,
whenever all elements in Θ can be ordered according to their skill bias, the function F is prequa-
sisupermodular in θ without any further assumptions. This is because θ and θ′ are elements of
their inmum and supremum sets themselves, then.
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The generalization of Theorem 1 is now stated as follows.
Theorem 5. Suppose (Θ,b) is a prelattice and F is prequasisupermodular in θ. Then,
L s L′ ⇒ θ∗(L) b θ∗(L′)
if and only if θ∗(L) ∼ θ∗(λL) for all L and λ ∈ R++ (that is, the skill bias of the equilibrium
technology is scale invariant).
Proof. By zero homogeneity of the skill bias of θ∗, we can restrict attention to changes from L
to L′ such that F (L, θ∗(L′)) = F (L′, θ∗(L′)). Moreover, by denition of θ∗, it must hold that
F (L, θ) ≤ F (L, θ∗(L)) for all θ ∈ inf(θ∗(L), θ∗(L′)). Therefore, by prequasisupermodularity,
there must exist a θ ∈ sup(θ∗(L), θ∗(L′)) such that F (L, θ∗(L′)) ≤ F (L, θ). We can now assume
that θ b θ∗(L′), because otherwise the statement of the theorem is immediately satised. Under
this assumption, it must hold that
F (L, θ) ≥ F (L, θ∗(L′)) = F (L′, θ∗(L′)) > F (L′, θ),
where the last inequality is strict because θ∗ is selected as the supremum of the maximizer set in
equation (2.2). From here on, the proof proceeds analogously to the proof of Theorem 1 starting
from equation (A.2): θ here takes the role of θ∗(L′) in the proof of Theorem 1, and θ∗(L′) here
takes the role of θ∗(L) in the proof of Theorem 1. Moreover, the inequalities (A.3) and (A.4) are
reversed, and the contradiction at the end is obtained by observing that θ∗(L′) b θ implies that
the left-hand-side of inequality (A.4) must be positive (instead of strictly negative as implied by
the preceding arguments).
Theorem 5 generalizes Theorem 1 in two ways. First, it replaces the assumption that any two
technologies can be ordered according to their skill bias by imposing a prelattice structure on Θ
and prequasisupermodularity on F . The prelattice structure and prequasisupermodularity ensure
that the set of equilibrium technologies θ∗(L) will be totally ordered along any curve in the labor
supply space that is totally ordered itself under the relative skill supply (pre)order s. Second,
Theorem 5 replaces zero homogeneity of θ∗(L) with zero homogeneity of the skill bias of θ∗(L).
That is, those components of θ∗ that do not aect relative wages are allowed to change when
scaling labor supply up or down. Zero homogeneity of the skill bias of θ∗ is clearly necessary for
weak bias, as any violation would constitute a counterexample to the weak bias phenomenon.
This gives rise to the “only if” part in Theorem 5.
Finally, note that Theorem 5 is not a direct application of the main theorem of monotone
comparative statics (Theorem 4 in (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994)), although the two are closely
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related. The relevant part of Theorem 4 from Milgrom and Shannon (1994) says the following.
Theorem 6 (cf. Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Let (X,a) be a lattice and (P,b) a partially
ordered set. Consider a family of functions {f(·; p)}p∈P with f : X × P → R. Let f(x; p) be
quasisupermodular in x and have the single crossing property in (x; p). Then,
p b p′ ⇒ sup argmax
x∈X
f(x; p) a sup argmax
x∈X
f(x; p′).
It can be shown that the theorem still holds when a and b are preorders and F is prequa-
sisupermodular in x. The important dierence between Theorem 6 and Theorem 5 is that the
former imposes the single crossing property in (x; p) on F .4 The latter instead uses specically
dened (pre)order relations b and s. Indeed, these specic orderings already introduce a
complementarity between changes along s (increases in relative skill supply) and changes along
b (skill-biased technical change). Such a complementarity is assumed via the single crossing
property in Theorem 6. One can show, however, that the conditions of Theorem 5 do not imply
the single crossing property in (θ;L) for F . Therefore, given the specic environment introduced
in the main text (the preorder relations and the structure of the labor supply space), Theorem 5
cannot be obtained as a corollary to Theorem 6.
4The single crossing property in (x; p) means that F (x′, p)− F (x, p) ≥ (>)0 implies F (x′, p′)− F (x, p′) ≥ (>)0
for any x a x′ and p b p′.
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B.1 Proofs and Derivations
This appendix contains all proofs and derivations omitted from the main text.
B.1.1 Proofs and Derivations for the Setup
Here I provide proofs and derivations for Section 3.3.
Derivation of the labor demand equation (3.3)
I derive the labor demand equation (3.3) in detail to demonstrate that the functional derivative
Dlθ works as expected.
Final good rm prots are given by
G˜(L, φ, q)−
∫ θ
θ
wθLθ dθ −
J∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
pj,kqj,k dk.
Taking the derivative DLθ as dened in Section 3.3.2 and equating it with zero yields:
DLθG˜(L, φ, q) = DLθ
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
L
θ˜
dθ˜
The remaining task is to show that
DLθ
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
L
θ˜
dθ˜ = wθ.
I derive this equality for interior types θ ∈ (θ, θ) in detail to demonstrate the working of the
functional derivative DLθ . The derivations for the highest and lowest types θ and θ proceed
analogously and are therefore omitted.
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By denition:
DLθ
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
L
θ˜
dθ˜ = lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µL˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
Moreover, by denition of L˜∆,θ:
∫ θ
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µL˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ =
∫ θ
θ−∆
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µ
θ˜ − θ + ∆
∆
)∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
+
∫ θ+∆
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µ
θ − θ˜ + ∆
∆
)∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
Hence:∫ θ
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µL˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ =
∫ θ
θ−∆
w
θ˜
θ˜ − θ + ∆
∆
dθ˜ +
∫ θ+∆
θ
w
θ˜
θ − θ˜ + ∆
∆
dθ˜ .
Then, by L’Hôspital’s rule:
lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µL˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ = lim
∆→0
1
2∆
∫ θ
θ−∆
w
θ˜
dθ˜ + lim
∆→0
1
2∆
∫ θ+∆
θ
w
θ˜
dθ˜ .
Applying L’Hôspital’s rule again, we obtain:
lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
d
dµ
w
θ˜
(
L
θ˜
+ µL˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ = lim
∆→0
wθ−∆
2
+ lim
∆→0
wθ+∆
2
= wθ ,
where the last equality requires continuity of w in θ, which I assume is given in equilibrium.
Labor Supply Elasticities
This section derives expressions (3.10) and (3.11) for the labor supply elasticities with respect to
the marginal retention rate and the wage. The starting point is workers’ rst-order condition (3.2):
v′(lθ(T,wθ)) = R′T (wθlθ(T,wθ))wθ.
Taking the derivative Dτ˜ on both sides of the equation yields:
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))Dτ˜ lθ(T,wθ) = wθ
d
dµ
(
1− T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ)) + µ
)∣∣∣∣
µ=0
−T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))w2θDτ˜ lθ(T,wθ)
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and hence:
Dτ˜ lθ(T,wθ) =
wθ
v′′(lθ(T,wθ)) + T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))w2θ
.
By denition of Rθ we obtain
Rθ =
wθ(1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ)))
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))lθ(T,wθ)
1 + T
′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))wθlθ(T,wθ)
1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ))
(1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ)))wθ
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))lθ(T,wθ)
.
Again using the rst-order condition to replace (1− T ′(wl))w by v′(l), we obtain equation (3.10).
For equation (3.11) dierentiate the rst-order condition with respect to wθ on both sides,
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))
∂lθ(T,wθ)
∂wθ
= 1− T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ))
− T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))w2θ
∂lθ(T,wθ)
∂wθ
− T ′′(wθ, lθ(T,wθ))wθlθ(T,wθ),
and rearrange it to obtain
∂lθ(T,wθ)
∂wθ
=
1− T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ))− T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))
v′′(lθ(T,wθ)) + T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))w2θ
.
Then, use the denition of wθ to get
wθ =
(
1− T ′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))wθlθ(T,wθ)1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ))
)
(1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ)))wθ
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))lθ(T,wθ)
1 + T
′′(wθlθ(T,wθ))wθlθ(T,wθ)
1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ))
(1−T ′(wθlθ(T,wθ)))wθ
v′′(lθ(T,wθ))lθ(T,wθ)
.
Replacing (1− T ′(wl))w by v′(l) yields equation (3.11).
Note at this point that the second-order condition of workers’ utility maximization requires
v′′(lθ) + T ′(wθlθ)w2θ ≥ 0 .
At the utility maximum, this is equivalent to (using workers’ rst-order condition)
T ′′(wθlθ)wθlθ
1− T ′(wθlθ)
v′(lθ)
v′′(lθ)lθ
= PT (wθlθ)eθ(lθ) ≥ −1 .
Assumption 3 in the main text ensures that this inequality is satised strictly. Hence, workers’
second-order condition is satised strictly and the elasticities Rθ and wθ are well dened.
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Derivation of Aggregate Production, Feasible Technologies, Wages, and Wage
Elasticities in the CES Case
The CES case is obtained via the following assumptions on the fundamentals of the model presented
in the main text.
G˜(L, φ˜, q) =
∫ θ
θ
(
κ˜θL
1−α
θ
∫ 1
0
φ˜θ,kq
α
θ,k dk
) σ˜−1
σ˜
dθ
 σ˜σ˜−1
Cθ(φ˜θ,k) = φ˜
δ˜
θ,k .
The function κ˜ is an exogenous component of technology and assumed to be continuously
dierentiable; σ˜ > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between dierentially skilled workers
in the production of an individual nal good rm; and δ˜ determines the convexity of the research
cost function. The endogenous component of technology is φ˜.1
Aggregate Production To derive the aggregate production function F (l, φ) as given by equa-
tion (3.12), start from its denition:
F (l, φ) = max
{qθ}θ∈Θ
{
G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ˜, {qθ}θ∈Θ)−
∫ θ
θ
ηθqθ dθ
}
.
The rst-order conditions for the maximization with respect to q are:
G˜
1
σ˜
(
κ˜θφ˜θh
1−α
θ l
1−α
θ
) σ˜−1
σ˜
αq
ασ˜−α−σ˜
σ˜
θ = ηθ ∀θ ,
which can be rearranged to yield an explicit expression for the maximizer:
qθ =
(
α
ηθ
) σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜ (
κ˜θφ˜θh
1−α
θ l
1−α
θ
) σ˜−1
α+σ˜−ασ˜
G˜
1
α+σ˜−ασ˜ ∀θ . (B.1)
1Note that here the set of technology types is equated with the set of worker types, such that technology and research
costs are now indexed by θ. This reects the assumption that for every worker type θ there exists a type of
technology, embodied in the intermediate goods qθ,k , that raises the eciency of labor of type θ in the production
process. Moreover, the set of technology types is a continuum here, in contrast to the nite set {1, 2, ..., J} in the
general model above. As mentioned in footnote 7, the case with a continuum of technology types can be treated
analogously to the nite case presented above and is therefore omitted from the presentation of the general model.
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Denoting this maximizer by q∗ and inserting it into G˜ yields
G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ˜, q∗) =
∫ θ
θ
(
α
ηθ
) α(σ˜−1)
α+σ˜−ασ˜ (
κ˜θφ˜θh
1−α
θ l
1−α
θ
) σ˜−1
α+σ˜−ασ˜
G˜
α(σ˜−1)
(α+σ˜−ασ˜)σ˜ dθ
 σ˜σ˜−1 ,
which can be solved for G˜:
G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ˜, q∗) = α
α
1−α
∫ θ
θ
(
η
− α
1−α
θ κ˜
1
1−α
θ φ˜
1
1−α
θ hθlθ
) (1−α)σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜
σ˜−1
σ˜
dθ
α+σ˜−ασ˜(1−α)σ˜ σ˜σ˜−1 . (B.2)
This provides an expression for gross aggregate production. Using the maximizer q∗ from equation
(B.1) again, the part of gross output that goes into the production of intermediate goods becomes
∫ θ
θ
ηθq
∗
θ dθ =
∫ θ
θ
η
α−ασ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜
θ α
σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜
(
κ˜θφ˜θh
1−α
θ l
1−α
θ
) σ˜−1
α+σ˜−ασ˜
G˜
1
α+σ˜−ασ˜ dθ
= α
σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜ G˜
1
α+σ˜−ασ˜
∫ θ
θ
(
η
− α
1−α
θ κ˜
1
1−α
θ φ˜
1
1−α
θ hθlθ
) (1−α)σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜
σ˜−1
σ˜
dθ (B.3)
= αG˜ . (B.4)
Combining equations (B.2) and (B.3), we obtain net aggregate production F as follows:
F (l, φ) = (1− α)G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ˜, q∗)
=
∫ θ
θ
(
(1− α)α α1−α η−
α
1−α
θ κ˜
1
1−α
θ φ˜
1
1−α
θ hθlθ
) (1−α)σ˜
α+σ˜−ασ˜
σ˜−1
σ˜
dθ
α+σ˜−ασ˜(1−α)σ˜ σ˜σ˜−1 .
Dening
σ − 1
σ
:=
(1− α)σ˜
α+ σ˜ − ασ˜
σ˜ − 1
σ˜
κθ := (1− α)α
α
1−α η
− α
1−α
θ κ˜
1
1−α
θ ∀θ
φθ := φ˜
1
1−α
θ ∀θ ,
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net aggregate production becomes
F (l, φ) =
[∫ θ
θ
(κθφθlθhθ)
σ−1
σ dθ
] σ
σ−1
,
which is equation (3.12) from the main text.
Set of Feasible Technologies From the R&D resource constraint and the R&D cost function,
the set of feasible technologies φ˜ follows as{
φ˜ : θ 7→ φ˜θ ∈ R+ |
∫ θ
θ
φ˜δ˜ dθ ≤ C
}
.
Using the substitution
φθ := φ˜
1
1−α
θ ∀θ ,
the set of feasible φ becomes
Φ =
{
φ : θ 7→ φθ ∈ R+ |
∫ θ
θ
φδθ dθ ≤ C
}
,
where δ := (1− α)δ˜, as given in the main text.
Wages I derive expression (3.14) for interior types θ ∈ (θ, θ). For the boundary types θ and θ
the derivations proceed analogously and yield the same result.
Consider rst the derivative
DlθF (l, φ) = lim
∆→0
1
∆
dF (l + µl˜∆,θ, φ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
.
Using the denition of l˜∆,θ this derivative becomes
dF (l + µl˜∆,θ, φ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= F (l, φ)
1
σ
[∫ θ
θ−∆
(
κ
θ˜
φ
θ˜
h
θ˜
)σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ˜
θ˜ − θ + ∆
∆
dθ˜ +
∫ θ+∆
θ
(
κ
θ˜
φ
θ˜
h
θ˜
)σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ˜
θ − θ˜ + ∆
∆
dθ˜
]
.
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Taking limits and applying L’Hôspital’s rule yields:
lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ−∆
(
κ
θ˜
φ
θ˜
h
θ˜
)σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ˜
θ˜ − θ + ∆
∆
dθ˜ =
1
2
(κθφθhθ)
σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ
and
lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ+∆
θ
(
κ
θ˜
φ
θ˜
h
θ˜
)σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ˜
θ − θ˜ + ∆
∆
dθ˜ =
1
2
(κθφθhθ)
σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ ,
where I used continuity of κ, h, φ, and l in θ. The former two are continuous by assumption; φ is
continuous in equilibrium if l is continuous, as evident from equation (B.6) below; and continuity
of l is presumed in all equilibria under consideration.
Finally, combine the two previous expressions to obtain
DlθF (l, φ) = (κθφθhθ)
σ−1
σ l
− 1
σ
θ F (l, φ)
1
σ
and therewith
wθ(l, φ) = (κθφθ)
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ F (l, φ)
1
σ .
Wage Elasticities Again I focus on the derivations for interior types. Given expression (3.14),
the own-wage substitution elasticity is simply the elasticity of wθ with respect to lθ:
γθ,θ = − 1
σ
.
The cross-wage substitution elasticity γ
θ,θ˜
is
γ
θ,θ˜
=
l
θ˜
wθ
Dl
θ˜
(κθφθ)
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ F (l, φ)
1
σ
=
l
θ˜
wθ
(κθφθ)
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ
1
σ
F (l, φ)
1
σ
−1w
θ˜
h
θ˜
=
1
σ
w
θ˜
(l, φ)h
θ˜
l
θ˜
F (l, φ)
.
For the technical change elasticities, consider rst the determination of equilibrium technology
described by equation (3.8). First-order conditions for the maximization problem in equation (3.8)
are
δφ∗δ−1θ λ = (κθhθlθ)
σ−1
σ φ
∗− 1
σ
θ F (l, φ)
1
δ ∀θ , (B.5)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the R&D resource constraint. The conditions equate the
marginal R&D cost of raising φθ , converted into units of nal good via λ, with the marginal gain
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in production. The latter is given by the derivative DφθF , which is computed analogously to
DlθF above.
Solving the rst-order conditions for φθ yields
φ∗θ = (δλ)
−σ
(δ−1)σ+1 (κθhθlθ)
σ−1
(δ−1)σ+1 F (l, φ)
1
(δ−1)σ+1 ∀θ . (B.6)
Then, we can use the R&D resource constraint∫ θ
θ
φ∗δθ dθ = C
to solve for the Lagrange multiplier:
λ =
1
δ
C
− (δ−1)σ+1
δσ
[∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
] (δ−1)σ+1
σδ
F (l, φ)
1
σ .
Plugging this into equation (B.6), we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium technology
φ∗:
φ∗θ = C
1
δ (κθhθlθ)
σ−1
(δ−1)σ+1
[∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
]− 1
δ
. (B.7)
We can now use equation (B.7) to derive the technical change elasticities. The own-wage
technical change elasticity is simply derived from equations (3.14) and (B.7) as
ρθ,θ =
φ∗θ
wθ
∂wθ
∂φ∗θ
lθ
φ∗θ
∂φ∗θ
∂lθ
=
σ − 1
σ
σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1 .
For the cross-wage technical change elasticity, start from its denition:
ρ
θ,θ˜
=
l
θ˜
wθ
Dφ,l
θ˜
(κθφ
∗
θ(l))
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ F (l, φ∗(l))
1
σ
=
σ − 1
σ
l
θ˜
φ∗θ
Dφ,l
θ˜
φ∗θ(l) +
l
θ˜
wθ
(κθφ
∗
θ(l))
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ Dφ,l
θ˜
F (l, φ∗(l))
1
σ .
The second term of the sum in the second row is zero by the envelope theorem. So, we obtain
ρ
θ,θ˜
=
σ − 1
σ
l
θ˜
φ∗θ
Dφ,l
θ˜
φ∗θ(l) .
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Analogously to the computation of the derivative DlθF (l, φ) above, we can compute Dφ,lθ˜φ
∗
θ(l)
using equation (B.7):
Dφ,l
θ˜
φ∗θ(l) =−
σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1C
− 1
δ (κθhθlθ)
σ−1
(δ−1)σ+1
[∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
]− 1
δ
×
[∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
]−1 (
κ
θ˜
h
θ˜
l
θ˜
) (σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 l−1
θ˜
=− σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1
φ∗θ(l)
l
θ˜
φ∗
θ˜
(l)
C
.
Thereby,
ρ
θ,θ˜
= −σ − 1
σ
σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1
φ∗
θ˜
(l)
C
. (B.8)
To derive the expression from the main text, note that we can rewrite the rst-order condition
(B.5) as
δφ∗δ−1θ λ = wθhθlθφ
∗−1
θ ,
which implies
φ∗δθ =
1
λδ
wθhθlθ . (B.9)
We now integrate this over θ and use Euler’s homogeneous function theorem to obtain
C =
1
λδ
F .
Using this to eliminate λ in equation (B.9), we obtain
φ∗δθ = C
wθhθlθ
F
.
Finally, combining this with equation (B.8) yields
ρ
θ,θ˜
= −σ − 1
σ
σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1
w
θ˜
(l, φ)h
θ˜
l
θ˜
F (l, φ)
,
which is the expression given in the main text.
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Linear Homogeneity of Aggregate Production
In the main text I assume that nal good rms’ production function G˜ is linear homogeneous in
the rival inputs l and q. Here I show that the aggregate production function F and its equilibrium
version F ∗ (dened below) inherit this property.
Lemma 12. The aggregate production function F dened in (3.6) is linear homogeneous in l.
Proof. Aggregate production F (l, φ) for some labor input l and some technology φ is dened as
max
q
G˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ, q)−
J∑
j=1
ηjqj
 .
Let q∗(l, φ) denote a solution to this maximization problem.
Consider now the labor input λl for some λ > 0 and the intermediate input λq∗(l, φ). Since
G˜ is linear homogeneous in l and q, the rst-order conditions of the maximization problem are
satised at λl, λq∗(l, φ), and φ. Since G˜ is concave in l and q, rst-order conditions are sucient
for a maximum, and λq∗(l, φ) is a maximizer of G˜ at λl and φ. So, using linear homogeneity of G˜
again,
F (λl, φ) = G˜({λhθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ, λq∗(l, φ))−
J∑
j=1
ηjλq
∗
j (l, φ)
= λG˜({hθlθ}θ∈Θ, φ, q∗(l, φ))−
J∑
j=1
ηjq
∗
j (l, φ)
= F (l, φ) .
Consider next the equilibrium aggregate production function
F ∗(l) := F (l, φ∗(l)) . (B.10)
Lemma 13. The equilibrium aggregate production function F ∗ dened in (B.10) is linear homoge-
neous in l.
Proof. By the condition for equilibrium technology φ∗(l), the equilibrium aggregate production
function satises
F ∗(l) = max
φ∈Φ
F (l, φ) .
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Then, by linear homogeneity of F in l (see Lemma 12):
F ∗(λl) = max
φ∈Φ
F (λl, φ)
= max
φ∈Φ
λF (l, φ)
= λmax
φ∈Φ
F (l, φ)
= λF ∗(l)
for any λ > 0.
B.1.2 Proofs for Directed Technical Change
Lemma 6 is a local version of Theorem 5 in Loebbing (2018). Yet it is not strictly covered by the
theorem, because, as described in the main text and footnote 16, I use a slightly unusual denition
of quasisupermodularity, which allows me to dispense with the lattice structure of Φ. So, I provide
a proof for Lemma 6 here. The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 5 in Loebbing (2018).
Proof of Lemma 6. Take any two labor inputs l and l˜ such that l˜ has greater relative skill supply,
that is, l˜θ/l˜θ˜ ≥ lθ/lθ˜ . Since F is linear homogeneous in labor (Lemma 12), wages are independent
of the scale of the labor input. So, for the purpose of Lemma 6, we can always scale l up or
down such that F (l, φ∗(l˜)) = F (l˜, φ∗(l˜)). In words, we scale l such that it is contained in the
(exogenous technology) isoquant of F through (l˜, φ∗(l˜)).
Moreover, by denition of the equilibrium technology φ∗, we have F (l, φ∗(l)) ≥ F (l, φ) for
all φ sb φ∗(l), φ∗(l˜). Quasisupermodularity then implies that there is a φ sb φ∗(l), φ∗(l˜) such
that F (l, φ) ≥ F (l, φ∗(l˜)).
Now assume, to derive a contradiction, that φ∗(l˜) sb φ∗(l). Then, φ 6= φ∗(l˜) and, by unique-
ness of argmaxφ∈Φ F (l˜, φ) (Assumption 3), we must have F (l˜, φ∗(l˜)) > F (l˜, φ).
Combining the previous results, we obtain
F (l, φ) ≥ F (l, φ∗(l˜)) = F (l˜, φ∗(l˜)) > F (l˜, φ) (B.11)
for some φ sb φ∗(l), φ∗(l˜) and φ sb φ∗(l), φ∗(l˜). In words, increasing relative skill supply by
moving from l to l˜ leaves output unchanged at φ∗(l˜) but reduces output at φ. Intuitively, this is
incompatible with φ being more skill-complementary than φ∗(l˜), which is what we show formally
in the following.
To that end, consider a monotonic and dierentiable path l(τ) from l to l˜ such that l(0) = l,
163
B Appendix to Chapter 3
l(1) = l˜ and F (l(τ), φ∗(l˜)) = F (l, φ∗(l˜)) for all τ ∈ [0, 1]. Here I mean by monotonicity that
each entry lθ(τ) (in the vector l(τ)) is monotonic in τ . Applying the mean value theorem, the
inequalities in (B.11) imply that there is a τ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∫ θ
θ
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ)
dlθ(τ˜)
dτ
dθ < 0 . (B.12)
Moreover, let θ˜ denote a skill level such that lθ ≤ l˜θ for all θ ≤ θ˜ and lθ ≥ l˜θ for all θ > θ˜. Such a
skill level exists because l˜ has greater relative skill supply than l. Noting that
∫ θ
θ
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ
∗(l˜))
dlθ(τ˜)
dτ
dθ = 0 ,
we can now extend inequality (B.12) to
∫ θ
θ
(
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ)−
Dl
θ˜
F (l(τ˜), φ)
Dl
θ˜
F (l(τ˜), φ∗(l˜))
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ
∗(l˜))
)
dlθ(τ˜)
dτ
dθ < 0 . (B.13)
By denition of θ˜ and monotonicity of l(τ), we know that dlθ(τ˜)/dτ is positive for all θ > θ˜ and
negative for all θ ≤ θ˜. Moreover, since φ sb φ∗(l˜), the dierence
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ)−
Dl
θ˜
F (l(τ˜), φ)
Dl
θ˜
F (l(τ˜), φ∗(l˜))
DlθF (l(τ˜), φ
∗(l˜))
is also positive for θ > θ˜ and negative for θ ≤ θ˜. This implies that the right-hand side of (B.13)
must be (weakly) positive, a contradiction.
We have hence shown that φ∗(l˜) sb φ∗(l), that is, the equilibrium technology is more skill-
biased under l˜ than under l. So, the increase in relative skill supply induces skill-biased technical
change. The local implication of this global result is Lemma 6.
B.1.3 Proofs and Derivations for the Tax Reform Analysis
In this section I provide all proofs and omitted derivations for the tax reform analysis in Section
3.5. I start with the proof of Lemma 7, which provides alternative characterizations of progressive
tax reforms as dened by Denition 6.
Proof of Lemma 7. The strategy of the proof is to show that statement 1 implies statement 2,
statement 2 implies statement 3, and statement 3 implies statement 1.
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(1 ⇒ 2) Take a function r such that R
T˜
(y) = r(RT (y)) for all y. Dierentiating both sides
with respect to y yields
r′(RT (y))R′T (y) = R
′
T˜
(y) ∀y ,
and after taking logs and rearranging:
log r′(RT (y)) = logR′T˜ (y)− logR
′
T (y) ∀y .
Dierentiating again with respect to y and multiplying through by y gives
r′′(RT (y))
r′(RT (y))
R′T (y)y = −(PT˜ (y)− PT (y)) < 0 ∀y ,
where the inequality is Denition 6. The assumption that T ′(y) < 1 and T ′(y) + µτ ′(y) < 1 for
all y (see Assumption 3) implies that r′(RT (y)) > 0 and R′T (y) > 0, such that r′′(RT (y)) < 0
for all y, which is statement 2.
(2⇒ 3) Statement 2 implies
R′
T˜
(y)
R′
T˜
(y˜)
=
r′(RT (y))
r′(RT (y˜))
R′T (y)
R′T (y˜)
≤ R
′
T (y)
R′T (y˜)
∀y ≥ Y˜ ,
because r is concave and RT strictly increasing. Replacing R′T˜ (y) by R
′
T (y)− µτ ′(y) and rear-
ranging yields
R′T (y)− µτ ′(y)
R′T (y)
≤ R
′
T (y˜)− µτ ′(y˜)
R′T (y˜)
∀y ≥ y˜
and hence:
τ ′(y)
R′T (y)
≥ τ
′(y˜)
R′T (y˜)
∀y ≥ y˜ ,
which is statement 3.
(3⇒ 1) We can transform statement 3 into
R′T (y)− µτ ′(y)
R′T (y)
≤ R
′
T (y˜)− µτ ′(y˜)
R′T (y˜)
∀y ≥ y˜ .
Taking logs and rearranging yields
logR′
T˜
(y)− logR′
T˜
(y˜) ≤ logR′T (y)− logR′T (y˜) ∀y ≥ y˜ .
Setting y˜ = y − d, dividing both sides of the equation by d, and taking the limit as d → 0, we
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obtain
−1
y
P
T˜
(y) ≤ −1
y
PT (y) ∀y
and hence
P
T˜
(y) ≥ PT (y) ∀y .
Labor Input Eects
First, note that equation (3.22) is easily derived by applying the derivative Dτ to labor inputs. In
particular, accounting for the general equilibrium contingencies between labor supply and wages,
we can write labor supply as lθ(T,wθ) and wages as wθ(l(T,wθ), φ∗(l(T,wθ))). Then, using
derivatives and elasticities as dened in the main text, it is straightforward to derive equation
(3.22).
Starting from equation (3.22) I prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8. Step 1. It is easy to see that
l̂
(n)
θ,τ = T˜E
(n)
θ,τ + S˜E
(n)
θ,τ
for all n ≥ 1. Hence, the two expressions (3.25) and (3.26) are equal.
Step 2. Suppose for now that all the series in expressions (3.25) and (3.26) converge. Then, take
expression (3.25) and insert it into the xed point equation (3.22):
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n)
θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ ζθ,θ
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n)
θ,τ + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ζ
θ,θ˜
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n)
θ˜,τ
dθ˜
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∞∑
n=1
[
wθ ζθ,θ l̂
(n)
θ,τ + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ζ
θ,θ˜
l̂
(n)
θ˜,τ
dθ˜
]
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n+1)
θ,τ
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∞∑
n=2
l̂
(n)
θ,τ
=
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n)
θ,τ .
This proves that, conditional upon convergence of the series, expression (3.25) solves the xed
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point equation (3.22). Then, by Step 1, expression (3.26) also solves the xed point equation
conditional upon convergence.
Step 3. Regarding convergence, consider expression (3.25) rst. Start from the denition of l̂(n)θ,τ
and take the square of both sides of the equation:
(
l̂
(n)
θ,τ
)2
= (wθ ζθ,θ)
2
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
+(wθ )
2
(∫ θ
θ
ζ
θ,θ˜
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
dθ˜
)2
+2wθ ζθ,θ l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ζ
θ,θ˜
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
dθ˜ .
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
(
l̂
(n)
θ,τ
)2 ≤ (wθ ζθ,θ)2 (l̂(n−1)θ,τ )2 + (wθ )2 ∫ θ
θ
ζ2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜
+ 2wθ ζθ,θ l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ 
w
θ
√√√√∫ θ
θ
ζ2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜
√√√√∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜ ,
and after integrating over θ,
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n)
θ,τ
)2
dθ ≤
∫ θ
θ
(wθ ζθ,θ)
2
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
dθ +
∫ θ
θ
(wθ )
2
∫ θ
θ
ζ2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜ dθ
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜
+ 2
∫ θ
θ
wθ ζθ,θ l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ 
w
θ
√√√√∫ θ
θ
ζ2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜ dθ
√√√√∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜ .
Taking the supremum of wθ ζθ,θ in the rst term and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
again to the last term yields:
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n)
θ,τ
)2
dθ ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
[
(wθ ζθ,θ)
2
] ∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
dθ+
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
wθ ζθ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ dθ
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜
+ 2
√√√√∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
wθ ζθ,θ
w
θ ζθ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ dθ
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜,τ
)2
dθ˜ .
The coecients of
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
dθ on the right-hand side of the inequality amount to
sup
θ∈Θ
(wθ ζθ,θ)
2 +
∫ θ
θ
(wθ ζθ,θ˜)
2 dθ˜ dθ + 2
√√√√∫ θ
θ
(wθ ζθ,θ)
2(wθ ζθ,θ˜)
2 dθ˜ dθ ,
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which is strictly smaller than one by condition (3.24). Hence, the term
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
dθ is domi-
nated by a geometric sequence converging to zero.
Regarding l̂(n)θ,τ , the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies
l̂
(n)
θ,τ ≤ wθ ζθ,θ l̂(n−1)θ,τ + wθ,τ
√√√√∫ θ
θ
ζ2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜
√√√√∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜
)2
dθ˜ . (B.14)
Suppose now, to derive a contradiction, that l̂(n)θ,τ is not dominated by any geometric sequence that
converges to zero. Then, for any c ∈ (wθ ζθ,θ, 1) and for any N ∈ N, there must exist NN > N
such that
|l̂(NN )|θ,τ
|l̂(NN−1)θ,τ |
> c .
At the same time, since
∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ,τ
)2
dθ is dominated by a geometric sequence converging to
zero, we must have
|wθ,τ
√∫ θ
θ ζ
2
θ,θ˜
dθ˜
√∫ θ
θ
(
l̂
(n−1)
θ˜
)2
dθ˜|
l̂
(NN )
θ,τ
→ 0 as N →∞ .
But with equation (B.14) this implies, as N →∞,
|l̂(NN )θ,τ |
|l̂(NN−1)θ,τ |
→ |wθ ζθ,θ| < c ,
a contradiction.
So, l̂(n)θ,τ is dominated by a geometric sequence converging to zero and the series
∑∞
n=1 l̂
(n)
θ,τ
indeed exists.
Step 4. For convergence of the series T˜Eθ,τ and S˜Eθ,τ , consider T˜Eθ,τ rst. Replacing ζθ,θ˜ by
ρ
θ,θ˜
, the reasoning in step 3 implies that T˜Eθ,τ converges. Second, note that
S˜Eθ,τ =
∞∑
n=1
l̂
(n)
θ,τ − T˜Eθ,τ .
Since we have already shown that both series on the right-hand side converge, the same must
hold for S˜Eθ,τ .
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Step 5. The nal step is to prove that, if wθ is constant in θ and Rθ τ ′(yθ(T ))/(1− T ′(yθ(T )))
increases in θ, the component T˜Eθ,τ decreases in θ as well. The proof is by induction.
If Rθ τ ′(yθ(T ))/(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) increases in θ, then by Lemma 6 we have that the term
T˜E
(1)
θ,τ = 
w
θ ρθ,θ(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
is decreasing in θ.
Suppose now that T˜E
(n)
θ,τ decreases in θ. Then, again by Lemma 6,
ρθ,θT˜E
(n)
θ,τ +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
TE
(n)
θ,τ dθ˜
decreases in θ. If wθ is constant in θ, the same holds for
wθ ρθ,θT˜E
(n)
θ,τ + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
TE
(n)
θ,τ dθ˜ .
But this is equal to T˜E
(n+1)
θ,τ . Hence inductively, T˜E
(n)
θ,τ decreases in θ for all n ≥ 1. So the sum∑
n=1 T˜E
(n)
θ,τ decreases in θ as well, which yields the desired result.
The proof of Corollary 9 requires specic results for the labor response to tax reforms that hold
in the CES case. The following lemma provides these results.
Lemma 14. Fix an initial tax T and assume that F and Φ are CES as introduced in Section 3.3.4.
Moreover, let the elasticity wθ be constant in θ, that is, 
w
θ = 
w for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, the eect of tax
reform τ on labor inputs can be written as
l̂θ,τ (T ) = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
− (γCES + ρCES)w
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ , (B.15)
where
Rθ :=
Rθ
1− (γCES + ρCES)w .
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So, l̂θ,τ (T ) decreases in θ if and only if
R
θ˜
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
increases in θ.
If in addition Rθ is constant in θ, l̂θ,τ (T ) decreases in θ if and only if τ is progressive.
Proof. The fastest way to prove equation (B.15) is to check that it satises the xed point equation
(3.22). In the CES case and with wθ constant, this equation becomes
l̂θ,τ (T ) = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))+
w(γCES+ρCES)l̂θ,τ (T )−w(γCES+ρCES)
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
l̂
θ˜,τ
dθ˜ .
Inserting equation (B.15) yields:
l̂θ,τ (T ) =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w(γCES + ρCES)(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
− w(γCES + ρCES)(γCES + ρCES)w
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
− w(γCES + ρCES)
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ w(γCES + ρCES)×∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(γCES + ρCES)w
∫ θ
θ
w
θ̂
l
θ̂
h
θ̂
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ̂
)
τ ′(y
θ̂
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ̂
(T ))
dθ̂ dθ˜
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) − 
w(γCES + ρCES)
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
− (w)2(γCES + ρCES)2
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ (w)2(γCES + ρCES)2
∫ θ
θ
w
θ̂
l
θ̂
h
θ̂
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ̂
)
τ ′(y
θ̂
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ̂
(T ))
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
dθ˜ dθ̂
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) − 
w(γCES + ρCES)
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ ,
where the last equality follows from the fact that F is linear homogeneous in l (see Lemma 12)
and Euler’s homogeneous function theorem. So, equation (B.15) solves the xed point equation
(3.22).
The remainder of Lemma 14 then follows from the observation that the second term on the
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right-hand side of equation (B.15) is independent of θ and that, in the CES case, Rθ is constant in
θ if Rθ and wθ are constant in θ.
Directed Technical Change Eects
Using the labor input responses from Lemma 8, I prove the results from Section 3.5.3 on the
directed technical change eects of tax reforms.
First, I obtain equation (3.27) by applying the derivativeDφ,τ to wages. In particular, accounting
for the general equilibrium contingencies between wages and labor supply, we can write wages as
wθ(l(T,wθ), φ
∗(l(T,wθ))) and labor supply as lθ(T,wθ). Then, using derivatives and elasticities
as dened in the main text, it is straightforward to derive equation (3.27).
Combining equation (3.27) with Lemma 8, we can prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equation (3.28) is obtained immediately by inserting equation (3.26) from
Lemma 8 into (3.27).
To sign the slopes of DEθ,τ and TEθ,τ , note that by Lemma 6 the induced technical change
eect
ρθ,θ l̂θ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
l̂
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜
decreases in θ if l̂θ,τ (T ) decreases in θ. This immediately implies that DEθ,τ decreases in θ if
Rθ τ
′(yθ(T ))/(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) increases in θ. Moreover, Lemma 8 says that T˜Eθ,τ decreases in θ
if wθ is constant in θ and Rθ τ ′(yθ(T ))/(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) increases in θ. So, under these conditions
also TEθ,τ decreases in θ.
Corollary 9 gives the directed technical change eects of a reform τ in the CES case. I prove
this by applying Lemma 14.
Proof of Corollary 9. Since aggregate production F and the equilibrium aggregate production
function F ∗ are linear homogeneous in l (see Lemmas 12 and 13), the induced technical change
eects of a proportional change in all types’ labor inputs are zero:
ρθ,θ l̂θ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
l̂
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ = 0 for all θ
if l̂θ,τ (T ) is constant in θ. Hence, inserting equation (B.15) into equation (3.27), the second term
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of equation (B.15) vanishes. This leaves
1
wθ
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = ρCES(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
− ρCES
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ ,
which is equation (3.29).
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (3.29) is independent of θ. This immediately
implies that the relative wage change is decreasing in θ if Rθ τ ′(yθ(T ))/(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) increases
in θ.
Finally, if Rθ is constant in θ (in addition to wθ , which is required by Corollary 9 anyway), Rθ is
constant in θ as well, and the relative wage change decreases in θ for any progressive reform.
Within-Technology Substitution Eects
Proposition 3 provides a general formula for the directed technical change eects of tax reforms
on wages. Here, I state its counterpart for within-technology substitution eects. I use this when
computing the total wage eects of tax reforms in the quantitative analysis in Section 3.7.
Proposition 11. Fix an initial tax T and let conditions (3.23) and (3.24) be satised.
Then, the relative eect of the within-technology factor substitution induced by tax reform τ on
wages can be written as
1
wθ
Dτwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) =γθ,θ(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) +
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ γθ,θT˜Eθ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
TE
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜
+ γθ,θS˜Eθ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
SE
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ , (B.16)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where T˜Eθ,τ (T ) and S˜Eθ,τ (T ) are dened in Lemma 8.
Proof. Analogously to the induced technical change eects in equation (3.27), the substitution
eects of tax reform τ on wages can be written as
1
wθ
Dτwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = γθ,θ l̂θ,τ (T ) +
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
l̂
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ . (B.17)
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Replacing equation (3.27) by equation (B.17), the proof proceeds analogously to the proof of
equation (3.28) in Proposition 3 and is therefore omitted.
In the CES case, the within-technology substitution eects can be expressed as follows.
Corollary 12. Fix an initial tax T and assume that F and Φ are CES as introduced in Section 3.3.4.
Moreover, let the elasticity wθ be constant in θ, that is, 
w
θ = 
w for all θ ∈ Θ. Then the relative wage
eect of the within-technology factor substitution induced by tax reform τ satises
1
wθ
Dτwθ(T, φ
∗(T )) = γCES(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))
− γCES
∫ θ
θ
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
h
θ˜
F (l(T ), φ∗(T ))
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ (B.18)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where
Rθ :=
Rθ
1− (γCES + ρCES)w .
Proof. Again replacing equation (3.27) by equation (B.17), the proof of Corollary 12 is analogous
to the proof of its counterpart for induced technical change eects, Corollary 9.
B.1.4 Proofs and Derivations for Optimal Taxes
This section contains all proofs and omitted derivations for the analysis of optimal taxes in Section
3.6 of the main text.
General Case
In the general case, optimal taxes are obtained by maximizing wefareW (c, l) subject to the resource
constraint (3.30) and the incentive compatibility constraint (3.31). The derivation proceeds along
the following steps: rst eliminate consumption from the welfare maximization problem, then
derive rst-order conditions, use workers’ rst-order condition to reintroduce tax rates into the
equations, and nally prove the sign conditions for the term TE∗θ at the bottom and the top of the
type distribution using directed technical change theory.
In the rst step, the following lemma shows how to eliminate consumption from the welfare
maximization problem.
Lemma 15. The pair of consumption and labor inputs (c, l) satises the resource and incentive
compatibility constraints (3.30) and (3.31) if and only if c = c∗(l), where c∗(l) = {c∗θ(l)}θ∈Θ is
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determined by
c∗θ(l) = F (l, φ
∗(l))−
∫ θ
θ
v(l
θ˜
)h
θ˜
dθ˜ −
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
)ŵ
θ˜
dθ˜ +
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
ŵ
θ˜
dθ˜ + v(lθ)
(B.19)
for all θ.
Proof. (⇒) I rst show that constraints (3.30) and (3.31) imply equation (B.19). For that, write
consumption as
cθ = cθ +
∫ θ
θ
c′
θ˜
dθ˜ .
By the incentive compatibility constraint (3.31), this implies for all θ:
cθ = cθ +
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)(w′
θ˜
l
θ˜
+ w
θ˜
l′
θ˜
)
1
w
θ˜
dθ˜
= cθ +
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)ŵ
θ˜
l
θ˜
dθ˜ + v(lθ)− v(lθ) . (B.20)
Combining this with the resource constraint (3.30), we obtain the following expression for cθ:
cθ = F (l, φ
∗(l))−
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)ŵ
θ˜
l
θ˜
dθ˜ hθ dθ −
∫ θ
θ
v(lθ)hθ dθ + v(lθ) .
Using integration by parts to solve the double integral yields:
cθ = F (l, φ
∗(l))−
∫ θ
θ
v′(lθ)ŵθlθ(1−Hθ) dθ −
∫ θ
θ
v(lθ)hθ dθ + v(lθ) .
Inserting this back into equation (B.20), we obtain:
cθ = F (l, φ
∗(l))−
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)ŵ
θ˜
l
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
) dθ˜ −
∫ θ
θ
v(l
θ˜
)h
θ˜
dθ˜ +
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)ŵ
θ˜
l
θ˜
dθ˜ + v(lθ) ,
which is equation (B.19) dening the function c∗ above.
(⇐) Dierentiating c∗ with respect to θ shows immediately that equation (B.19) implies the
incentive compatibility constraint (3.31). Similarly, after multiplying c∗θ by hθ and integrating over
[θ, θ], standard computations show that
∫ θ
θ
c∗θ(l) dθ = F (l, φ
∗(l)) ,
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which proves that equation (B.19) also implies the resource constraint (3.30).
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemma 15 provides an equivalent representation of resource and incentive
compatibility constraints, which is explicitly solved for c. Hence, instead of maximizing welfare
subject to the two constraints, we can study the unconstrained maximization of
Ŵ (l) := W (c∗(l), l)
with l being the only choice variable. The rst part of the proof now uses the rst-order conditions
of this unconstrained problem to derive the condition for optimal marginal tax rates provided in
Proposition 4.
Part 1. The rst-order conditions are given by
DlθŴ (l) = 0 for all θ .
We hence study the derivative DlθŴ (l) rst. Using the notation for welfare weights introduced
in the main text, the derivative can be written as
DlθŴ (l) = wθhθ − v′(lθ)hθ
− (v′′(lθ)lθ + v′(lθ)) (1−Hθ)ŵθ + g˜θ(1−Hθ) (v′′(lθ)lθ + v′(lθ))
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
+ lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
g
θ˜
h
θ˜
∫ θ˜
θ
v′(l
θ̂
)l
θ̂
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ̂ dθ˜ (B.21)
for all θ, where the terms in the rst two lines were derived following the procedure detailed in
Sections B.1.1 and B.1.1, which uses continuity of l and ŵ in θ.2 Following the notation introduced
in Section 3.3.2, the expression dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)/dµ
∣∣∣
µ=0
denotes the total derivative of ŵ in the
direction of lθ , accounting both for the substitution and the induced technical change eects:
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
=
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
+
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
.
Using integration by parts to solve the double integral in equation (B.21), the derivative of the
2The wage growth function ŵ is continuous in θ because l is C1 by hypothesis of Proposition 4.
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welfare function becomes
DlθŴ (l) = wθhθ − v′(lθ)hθ − (1− g˜θ)
(
v′′(lθ)lθ + v′(lθ)
)
(1−Hθ)ŵθ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
+ lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
g˜
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
)v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
= wθhθ − v′(lθ)hθ − (1− g˜θ)
(
v′′(lθ)lθ + v′(lθ)
)
(1−Hθ)ŵθ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)v′(l
θ˜
)l
θ˜
(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ . (B.22)
We now use workers’ rst-order condition (3.2) to introduce marginal tax rates into the equation.
In particular condition (3.2) implies
v′(lθ)lθ = (1− T ′(yθ))yθ (B.23)
and
v′′(lθ)lθŵθ + v′(lθ)ŵθ =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− T ′(yθ))w′θ . (B.24)
Using equations (3.2), (B.23), and (B.24) in equation (B.22), we obtain
DlθŴ (l) = T
′(yθ)yθhθ − (1− T ′(yθ))
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− g˜θ)(1−Hθ)w′θlθ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))y
θ˜
(1− g˜
θ˜
)(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
Splitting up the total derivative dŵ∗
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ)/dµ
∣∣∣
µ=0
into its substitution and induced technical
change components, this becomes:
DlθŴ (l) = T
′(yθ)wθhθ − (1− T ′(yθ))
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− g˜θ)(1−Hθ)w′θ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))y
θ˜
(1− g˜
θ˜
)(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))y
θ˜
(1− g˜
θ˜
)(1−H
θ˜
)
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
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Equating the derivative to zero, dividing by 1− T ′(yθ), and rearranging yields:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− g˜θ)1−Hθ
hθ
ŵθ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
(B.25)
Finally, let nw andNw denote the density and cumulative distribution functions of the distribution
of wages and use the change-of-variable hθ = nwθw′θ to obtain the condition for marginal tax
rates from Proposition 4:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− g˜θ)1−Nwθ
nwθwθ
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜
− lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ .
Part 2. The second part of the proof is to show that TE∗θ ≤ 0 and TE∗θ ≥ 0. We only consider
TE∗
θ
because the proof for TE∗θ works analogously.
Consider rst the derivative dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))/dµ
∣∣∣
µ=0
. It measures the local induced
technical change eect of the labor input change l˜∆,θ (dened in Section 3.3.2) on relative wages.
For θ ≤ θ − ∆, the labor input change is zero by denition. On (θ −∆, θ] it varies in θ
according to
1
l˜∆,θ,θ
dl˜∆,θ,θ
dθ
=
2∆
2∆(θ − θ + ∆) =
1
θ − θ + ∆ ≥
1
∆
.
Hence, given the optimal labor input l, we can nd an  > 0 such that for all ∆ <  and for all
θ ∈ (θ −∆, θ):
1
l˜∆,θ,θ
dl˜∆,θ,θ
dθ
≥ 1
lθ
dlθ
dθ
.3
3Here we use that, by hypothesis, lim supθ→θ l
′
θ <∞.
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So, for ∆ < , the relative labor input change l˜∆,θ,θ/lθ increases in θ. Thus, by Lemma 6, we
obtain that
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
≥ 0
for all θ˜ if ∆ < . Hence, for ∆ < ,
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ ≥ 0
and therefore
TE∗
θ
= lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)y
θ˜
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ ≥ 0 .
Part 3. Finally, we show that, if there is strong bias, SE∗θ + TE∗θ ≤ 0 and SE∗θ + TE∗θ ≥ 0.
Again, the proof is analogous for both statements and we focus on the latter.
Note rst that SE∗
θ
+ TE∗
θ
can be written as
lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
1− T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−Hθ
hθwθ
(1− g˜θ)yθ
dŵ∗θ(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ .
We have already shown in part 2 that, for suciently small ∆, the relative labor input change
l˜∆,θ,θ/lθ increases in θ. By denition of strong relative bias of technology (see equation (3.20)),
this implies
dŵ∗θ(l + µl˜∆,θ)
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
≥ 0
for all θ. Analogously to part 2, it follows that SE∗
θ
+ TE∗
θ
≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 10. The limit expression for the optimal marginal tax rate follows immediately
from the convergence assumptions in the corollary. So, the only statements in need of a proof are
the sign restrictions on TE and TE + SE.
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Part 1. I start with the proof of TE ≥ 0. First, note that
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))h
θ˜
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
TE∗
θ˜
dθ˜
= lim
∆→0
1
∆
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ̂
))(1−H
θ̂
)(1− g˜
θ̂
)y
θ̂
∫ θ
θ
l
θ˜
dŵ
θ̂
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜
∆,θ˜
))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ˜ dθ̂
=
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ̂
))(1−H
θ̂
)(1− g˜
θ̂
)y
θ̂
dŵ
θ̂
(l, φ∗(l + µdl))
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
dθ̂ ,
where the labor input change dl is given by
dl
θ˜
=
0 if θ˜ < θl
θ˜
if θ ≤ θ˜ .
Since dl
θ˜
/l
θ˜
increases in θ˜, that is, dl is an increase in relative skill supply, we have by Lemma 6:
dŵ
θ̂
(l, φ∗(l + µdl))
dµ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
≥ 0
for all θ̂ and hence: ∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))h
θ˜
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
TE∗
θ˜
dθ˜ ≥ 0
for all θ. Therefore, we obtain the following result:
0 ≤ lim
θ→θ
∫ θ
θ (1− T ′(yθ˜))hθ˜wθ˜lθ˜TE∗θ˜ dθ˜∫ θ
θ (1− T ′(yθ˜))hθ˜wθ˜lθ˜ dθ˜
= lim
θ→θ
−(1− T ′(yθ))hθwθlθTE∗θ
−(1− T ′(yθ))hθwθlθ
= lim
θ→θ
TE∗θ ,
where the second line uses L’Hôspital’s rule.
Part 2. The proof that TE + SE ≥ 0 under strong bias proceeds along the same lines as part
1. In particular, we can show analogously to part 1 that, if there is strong bias,
∫ θ
θ
(1− T ′(y
θ˜
))h
θ˜
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
(
TE∗
θ˜
+ SE∗
θ˜
)
dθ˜ ≥ 0
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for all θ. It follows then as in part 1 that
lim
θ→θ
(TE∗θ + SE
∗
θ ) ≥ 0 .
CES Case
To derive expression (3.33) for optimal tax rates in Proposition 5, I start by specializing the terms
TE∗θ and SE∗θ to the CES case.
Lemma 16. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 are satised and F and Φ take the CES form
introduced in Section 3.3.4. Then, the terms TE∗θ and SE
∗
θ take the following form for every θ:
SE∗θ = (1− gθ)γCES −
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θγCES (B.26)
TE∗θ = (1− gθ)ρCES −
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES . (B.27)
Proof. I focus on the expression for TE∗θ , because the derivation of SE∗θ is analogous with γCES
in the place of ρCES .
The central step is to obtain an expression for the derivative of ŵ
θ˜
in TE∗θ . From equation (3.14)
we obtain
ŵ
θ˜
=
σ − 1
σ
κ̂
θ˜
+
σ − 1
σ
φ̂
θ˜
− 1
σ
l̂
θ˜
− 1
σ
ĥ
θ˜
(B.28)
and from equation (B.6):
φ̂∗
θ˜
=
σ − 1
(δ − 1)σ + 1
(
κ̂
θ˜
+ l̂
θ˜
+ ĥ
θ˜
)
. (B.29)
Hence, the partial eect of the perturbation l˜∆,θ on ŵθ˜ is
dŵ
θ˜
(l + µl˜∆,θ, φ
∗(l))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= − 1
σ
d
dµ
(
̂
l
θ˜
+ µl˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= − 1
σ
d
dµ
l′
θ˜
+ µl˜′
∆,θ,θ˜
l
θ˜
+ µl˜
∆,θ,θ˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= γCES
 l˜′∆,θ,θ˜
l
θ˜
− l̂
θ˜
l˜
∆,θ,θ˜
l
θ˜
 .
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Analogously, the induced technical change eect is given by
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
=
(σ − 1)2
(δ − 1)σ2 + σ
d
dµ
(
̂
l
θ˜
+ µl˜
∆,θ,θ˜
)
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= ρCES
 l˜′∆,θ,θ˜
l
θ˜
− l̂
θ˜
l˜
∆,θ,θ˜
l
θ˜
 .
Using the last expression and the denition of l˜∆,θ , the term TE∗θ becomes
TE∗θ = lim
∆→0
1
∆2
∫ θ
θ−∆
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)w
θ˜
ρCES
(
1− l̂
θ˜
(θ˜ − θ + ∆)
)
dθ˜
+
1
∆2
∫ θ+∆
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)w
θ˜
ρCES
(
−1− l̂
θ˜
(θ − θ˜ + ∆)
)
dθ˜ .
Applying L’Hôspital’s rule yields:
TE∗θ = lim
∆→0
1
2∆
1− T ′(yθ−∆)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−Hθ−∆
hθwθ
(1− g˜θ−∆)wθ−∆ρCES
− 1
2∆
∫ θ
θ−∆
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)w
θ˜
ρCES l̂
θ˜
dθ˜
− 1
2∆
1− T ′(yθ+∆)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−Hθ+∆
hθwθ
(1− g˜θ+∆)wθ+∆ρCES
− 1
2∆
∫ θ+∆
θ
1− T ′(y
θ˜
)
1− T ′(yθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθwθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)w
θ˜
ρCES l̂
θ˜
dθ˜ .
Rearranging and replacing marginal retention rates by workers’ rst-order condition (3.2), we
obtain:
TE∗θ = lim
∆→0
1
2∆
ρCES
[
v′(lθ−∆
v′(lθ)
1−Hθ−∆
hθ
(1− g˜θ−∆)− v
′(lθ+∆
v′(lθ)
1−Hθ+∆
hθ
(1− g˜θ+∆)
]
− 1
2∆
∫ θ
θ−∆
v′(l
θ˜
v′(lθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)ρCES l̂
θ˜
dθ˜
− 1
2∆
∫ θ+∆
θ
v′(l
θ˜
v′(lθ)
1−H
θ˜
hθ
(1− g˜
θ˜
)ρCES l̂
θ˜
dθ˜ .
Next, we apply L’Hôspital’s rule a second time and obtain:
TE∗θ = −
v′′(lθ)
v′(lθ)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1−g˜θ)l′θρCES+(1−g˜θ)ρCES+
1−Hθ
hθ
g˜′θρ
CES−1−Hθ
hθ
(1−g˜θ)l̂θρCES .
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Using the denition of the elasticity eθ yields:
TE∗θ = −
1
eθ
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES+(1− g˜θ)ρCES+ 1−Hθ
hθ
g˜′θρ
CES− 1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES .
Finally, it is straightforward to show that
g˜′θ = (g˜θ − gθ)
hθ
1−Hθ .
Inserting this into the previous expression for TE∗θ , we obtain:
TE∗θ = −
1
eθ
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES + (1− g˜θ)ρCES + (g˜θ − gθ)ρCES − 1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES
and after rearranging:
TE∗θ = (1− gθ)ρCES −
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θρCES ,
which is the desired expression.
Besides providing an important step in the derivation of equation (3.33), Lemma 16 allows to
revisit the sign of TE∗θ at the bottom and the top of the type distribution. In the general case,
Proposition 4 shows that the directed technical change term is weakly positive at the top and
weakly negative at the bottom. For the CES case, Lemma 16 implies4
TE∗
θ
= (1− g˜θ)ρCES > 0
and
TE∗θ = (1− gθ)ρCES < 0 .
Hence, in the CES case the sign restrictions on the directed technical change term hold strictly.
Moreover, Lemma 16 implies the opposite signs for the substitution term at the top and bottom
types:
SE∗
θ
= (1− g˜θ)γCES > 0
and
SE∗θ = (1− gθ)γCES < 0 .
4This again assumes that lim supθ→θ l
′
θ < ∞ and lim infθ→θ l′θ > −∞ under the optimal tax, as in the second
part of Proposition 4. Moreover, the strict inequalities below require that marginal welfare weights are strictly
decreasing at the optimum over parts of type distribution.
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Hence, at the highest and lowest income levels, directed technical change and within-technology
substitution eects push optimal marginal tax rates in opposing directions.
With the expressions from Lemma 16, we are now in a position to derive equation (3.33).
Proof of Proposition 5. We start with equation (B.25) from the proof of Proposition 4 and replace
SE∗θ and TE∗θ by the expressions from Lemma 16. This yields:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)ŵθ (B.30)
+ (γCES + ρCES)
[
(1− gθ)−
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θ
]
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)
(
ŵθ − (γCES + ρCES)l̂θ
)
(B.31)
+ γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) . (B.32)
The wage growth rate ŵθ can be computed from equations (B.28) and (B.29) as
ŵθ = (1 + γ
CES + ρCES)κ̂θ + (γ
CES + ρCES)ĥθ + (γ
CES + ρCES)l̂θ .
Using this in the previous expression for marginal tax rates yields
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)
[
(1 + γCES + ρCES)κ̂θ + (γ
CES + ρCES)ĥθ
]
+ γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
Now we use the denition of β,
βθ := κ
1+γCES+ρCES
θ h
γCES+ρCES
θ ,
to note that
(1 + γCES + ρCES)κ̂θ + (γ
CES + ρCES)ĥθ = β̂θ
and hence
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)β̂θ + γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
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Finally, with the change-of-variable hθ = bβθβ′θ , we obtain equation (3.33):
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
Finally, we prove Corollary 11, which characterizes the optimal asymptotic tax in the Pareto
tail of the income distribution for the CES case.
Proof of Corollary 11. The corollary starts from the assumption that, under some initial tax T with
constant marginal top tax rate, the income distribution has the Pareto property (i.e., its inverse
hazard ratio is constant). We trace the Pareto property of the income distribution back to the
distribution of the exogenous inequality measure β. Inserting this distribution into the optimal
tax formula (3.33) from Proposition 5 then yields the desired result.
First, by two changes-of-variable we obtain
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
=
1−Hθ
hθ
β̂θ =
1−Myθ
myθyθ
β̂θ
ŷθ
, (B.33)
where all incomes are assessed at the given tax T . Now we use
ŷθ = ŵθ + l̂θ = (1 + 
w
θ )ŵθ
to express the growth rate of income as a function of the growth rate of wages under tax, again
assessing all endogenous variables at equilibrium under the given tax T . For β̂θ we obtain
β̂θ = ŵθ − (γCES + ρCES)l̂θ =
(
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
)
ŵθ .
It follows that
β̂θ
ŷθ
=
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
1 + wθ
and, with equation (B.33),
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
=
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
1 + wθ
, (B.34)
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where incomes and the labor supply elasticity wθ are assessed under the tax T . In particular,
wθ =
(1− PT (yθ))eθ
1 + eθPT (yθ)
.
Since the tax T features a constant top tax rate, we have limθ→θ PT (yθ) = 0 and hence
lim
θ→θ
wθ = eθ = e ,
where the last equality reects the assumption that the disutility of labor is isoelastic. Moreover,
we know by hypothesis that
lim
θ→θ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
=
1
a
.
Combining these limits, we obtain
lim
θ→θ
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
= lim
θ→θ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
1 + wθ
=
1− (γCES + ρCES)e
a(1 + e)
.
In words, from the observed Pareto tail of the income distribution under tax T we can infer that
the exogenous inequality measure β must also have a Pareto tail with tail parameter given by the
previous equation. Using this parameter in the optimal tax equation (3.33) from Proposition 5, we
obtain the following expression for the optimal marginal tax rate in the upper tail of the income
distribution:
lim
θ→θ
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
e
)
1− (γCES + ρCES)e
a(1 + e)
(1− gtop) + γCES(1− gtop) + ρCES(1− gtop)
=
1− gtop
ae
+
a− 1
a
γCES(1− gtop) + a− 1
a
ρCES(1− gtop) ,
where gtop is the asymptotic welfare weight dened in the Corollary.
Exogenous Technology Planner
As described in the main text, the exogenous technology planner believes that the economy works
according to all equilibrium conditions from Section 3.3.1 with the exception of the condition
for equilibrium technology (3.8). Instead of following equation (3.8), the exogenous technology
planner believes that technology remains xed at its equilibrium value under a given tax T ,
φ∗(l(T )). The idea is that the planner observes the economy under the tax T when computing
optimal taxes and believes technology to be exogenous.
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The exogenous technology planner’s optimal tax T ex
T
then satises the conditions provided by
the following Proposition.
Proposition 12. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 are satised and F and Φ take the CES
form introduced in Section 3.3.4. Suppose equilibrium variables are determined according to conditions
(3.2), (3.1), (3.7), and (3.9), plus the (exogenous) technology equation
φ∗(l) = φ∗(l(T )) = argmax
φ∈Φ
F (l(T ), φ) ∀l ,
where T is a given initial tax function.
Then, at every type θ, the exogenous technology planner’s preferred tax T ex
T
satises the following
conditions.
T ex′
T
(yθ)
1− T ex′
T
(yθ)
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) ,
where all variables satisfy the equations listed above under the tax T ex
T
; the function β : θ 7→ βθ is
given by
βθ := κ
1+γCES
θ h
γCES
θ
(
φ∗(T )
)1+γCES ∀ θ ;
and B and b are the cumulative distribution and the density function of β.
Proof. It can be veried that all steps in the proof of Proposition 4 hold for the case of the exogenous
technology planner when imposing
dŵ
θ˜
(l, φ∗(l + µl˜∆,θ))
dµ
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= 0 .
With this constraint, we can derive a counterpart to equation (B.25) for the exogenous technology
planner:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
(1− g˜θ)1−Hθ
hθ
ŵθ − SE∗θ .
Using Lemma 16 to replace SE∗θ , we obtain:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)ŵθ
+ γCES
[
(1− gθ)−
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)l̂θ
]
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)
(
ŵθ − γCES l̂θ
)
+ γCES(1− gθ) .
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From the perspective of the exogenous technology planner, the wage growth rate is now given by
ŵθ = (1 + γ
CES)κ̂θ + (1 + γ
CES)φ̂∗θ(T ) + γ
CESĥθ + γ
CES l̂θ ,
where φ̂∗θ(T ) denotes the growth rate of technology that prevails in equilibrium under the initial
tax system T . Using this in the previous expression for the exogenous technology planner’s
optimal tax rates and applying the denition of β yields:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1− g˜θ)β̂θ + γCES(1− gθ) .
With the change of variable hθ = bβθβ
′
θ , we obtain equation (3.35),
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) ,
which completes the proof.
For the optimal tax in the upper Pareto tail of the income distribution, the exogenous technology
planner obtains the following characterization.
Corollary 13. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 are satised and F and Φ take the CES form
introduced in Section 3.3.4. Suppose equilibrium variables were determined by conditions (3.2), (3.1),
(3.7), and (3.9), and by the (exogenous) technology equation
φ∗(l) = φ∗(l(T )) = argmax
φ∈Φ
F (l(T ), φ) ∀l ,
where T is a given initial tax function with T ′(y) = τ top for all y ≥ y˜ and some threshold y˜.
Moreover, assume that under the tax T the income distribution satises
lim
θ→θ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
=
1
a
for some a > 1. Finally, let the disutility of labor be isoelastic with eθ = e for all θ, and let welfare
weights satisfy
lim
θ→θ
gθ = g
top
at the exogenous technology planner’s preferred tax.
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Then, the exogenous technology planner’s preferred tax T ex
T
satises
lim
θ→θ
T ex′
T
(yθ)
1− T ex′
T
(yθ)
=
1− gtop
ae
+
a− 1
a
γCES(1− gtop) .
Proof. The corollary can be derived from Proposition 12 in the same way as Corollary 11 is derived
from Proposition 5. In particular, consider rst the implications of the Pareto shape of the income
distribution under tax T for the exogenous inequality measure β. Using changes-of-variable, we
obtain
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
=
1−Hθ
hθ
β̂θ =
1−Myθ
myθyθ
β̂θ
ŷθ
, (B.35)
where all incomes are assessed at the given tax T . The exogenous technology planner’s measure
of exogenous inequality β now evolves over the type space according to
β̂θ = ŵθ − γCES l̂θ =
(
1− γCESwθ
)
ŵθ ,
while
ŷθ = ŵθ + l̂θ = (1 + 
w
θ )ŵθ ,
where all endogenous variables are assessed at equilibrium under the given tax T .5 Combining
the previous expressions, we nd that
β̂θ
ŷθ
=
1− γCESwθ
1 + wθ
and, with equation (B.35),
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
=
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1− γCESwθ
1 + wθ
, (B.36)
where incomes and the labor supply elasticity wθ are assessed under the tax T . Inserting this ex-
pression into equation (3.35) for optimal marginal tax rates computed by the exogenous technology
5Note that under the initial tax T the exogenous and the endogenous planner agree about the equilibrium and in
particular about the equilibrium technology. Hence, there is no need to distinguish the equilibrium values of the
endogenous variables under tax T as perceived by the exogenous technology planner and their true equilibrium
values.
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planner and taking limits yields:6
lim
θ→θ
T ex′
T
(yθ)
1− T ex′
T
(yθ)
=
(
1 +
1
e
)
1− γCESe
a(1 + e)
(1− gtop) + γCES(1− gtop)
=
1− gtop
ae
+
a− 1
a
γCES(1− gtop) .
Comparison between Optimal Taxes and Exogenous Technology Planner
As discussed in the main text, the conditions for optimal taxes and for the exogenous technology
planner’s preferred taxes feature two dierences. First, the exogenous technology planner neglects
the progressive term ρCES(1 − gθ). Second, he uses β instead of β to measure the degree of
exogenous inequality in the economy. Here I show that the exogenous technology planner thereby
overestimates exogenous inequality: the function β progresses at a higher rate in θ than the
function β, such that equation (3.36) holds.
First, let l be the equilibrium labor input under the initial tax system T . Then, by construction
the growth rates of β and β must satisfy
β̂θ = ŵθ(l, φ
∗(l))− (γCES + ρCES )̂lθ
and
β̂θ = ŵθ(l, φ
∗(l))− γCES l̂θ .
Moreover, by Assumption 3, the marginal rate of tax T is strictly below 1 everywhere and hence
its rate of progressivity is below 1 as well. Then, equation (3.11) implies that wθ > 0 and hence
l̂θ = 
w
θ ŵθ(l, φ
∗(l)) > 0 for all θ. Combining this with the expressions for β̂θ and β̂θ , we nd that
β̂θ < β̂θ . Now use a change-of-variable to obtain
bβθβθ =
fθ
β̂θ
>
fθ
β̂θ
= bβθ
βθ ,
and hence
1−Bβθ
bβθβθ
<
1−Bβθ
bβθ
βθ
,
which proves equation (3.36) in the main text.
6The limit computations are analogous to those in the proof of Corollary 11, so I omit the details here.
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Intuitively, since labor supply increases in skill θ under tax T , technology under this tax must
be skill-biased. The exogenous technology planner falsely believes this skill bias to be exogenous
and to persist irrespective of changes in labor supply. Thereby, he overestimates the degree of
exogenous inequality in the economy.
B.2 Calibration Details
This Appendix provides more detailed information on two steps of the calibration procedure
described in Section 3.7.1 of the main text: the calibration of the directed technical change elasticity
ρCES and of the exogenous technology parameter κ : θ 7→ κθ .
B.2.1 Calibration of Directed Technical Change Eects
The parameter ρCES , which controls the strength of directed technical change eects, is calibrated
on the basis of the empirical estimates summarized in Table 3.1. The long-run estimates in Table
3.1 (10 years or more) are equated with the sum of within-technology substitution and directed
technical change elasticities γCES + ρCES . The short-run estimate (2 years, from Carneiro et al.
(2019)) is equated with γCES , in line with other short-run estimates as discussed in the main text.
Here, I give a brief overview over each of the studies listed in Table 3.1 and explain how I obtain
the estimates in the last column of the table.
Carneiro et al. (2019) Carneiro et al. (2019) estimate the responses of relative supply and
relative wages of college versus non-college workers to plausibly exogenous college openings in
Norwegian municipalities in the 1970s, using synthetic control methods. They nd that relative
supply in a municipality starts rising shortly after the college opening and follows an upwards
trend throughout the observation period of up to 17 years, compared to the synthetic control
municipality. The relative wage rst declines and then reverses its trend, surpassing the relative
wage in the control municipality slightly more than 10 years after the college opening (see Figures
4 and 5 in Carneiro et al. 2019).
The numbers in Table 3.1 are derived from the estimates presented in Carneiro et al. (2019)
as follows. First, measuring relative supply and relative wage changes two years after a college
opening, Carneiro et al. (2019) estimate an elasticity of the relative wage with respect to relative
supply of −0.549, reported in column 1 of their Table 2. This produces the rst row of Table 3.1
in the present paper.
Second, Figures 4 and 5 imply that after 10 years, relative wages in the treated municipalities
and their synthetic controls were equal. Hence, when measured after 10 years, there is a zero
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eect of the exogenous relative supply increase in the relative wage, leading to the second row of
Table 3.1 in the present paper.
Finally, the third row of Table 3.1 is obtained from the plots presented in Figure 4 in Carneiro
et al. (2019) as follows. The plots show that after 17 years, the log change in the relative wage,
compared to the synthetic control municipality, is
log
(
w17c
w17nc
)
− log
(
w0c
w0nc
)
≈ 0.02 .
At the same time, the log change in the share of college workers in the total workforce was
log
(
l17c
l17c + l
17
nc
)
− log
(
l0c
l0c + l
0
nc
)
≈ 0.04 .
To map this change into the change in the ratio of college over non-college workers, I rewrite the
log change as follows:
log
(
l17c
l17c + l
17
nc
)
− log
(
l0c
l0c + l
0
nc
)
= log(l17c )− log(l17nc)− log(l0c ) + log(l0nc)
− log(l17c + l17nc) + log(l17nc) + log(l0c + l0nc)− log(l0nc) .
Carneiro et al. (2019) report that the share of college workers was close to zero in most of the
treated municipalities at the beginning of the observation period and still small at the end of the
period. Hence, I apply the approximations
log(l17c + l
17
nc)− log(l17nc) ≈ log(l0c + l0nc)− log(l0nc) ≈ 0
to obtain
log
(
l17c
l17c + l
17
nc
)
− log
(
l0c
l0c + l
0
nc
)
≈ log(l17c )− log(l17nc)− log(l0c ) + log(l0nc) ≈ 0.04 .
Finally, relating the change in relative supply to the change in relative wages, I obtain
log
(
w17c
w17nc
)
− log
(
w0c
w0nc
)
log
(
l17c
l17nc
)
− log
(
l0c
l0nc
) ≈ 0.05 ,
which is the estimate used in Table 3.1.
Note that relative supply did not change instantaneously at the beginning of the observation
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period but steadily increased throughout (Figure 4 in Carneiro et al. 2019). Hence, part of the
relative supply increase occurred only shortly before the relative wage increase is measured at
year 17 of the observation period. To the extent that technology adjustments to the more recent
part of the rise in relative supply are not yet reected in the measured increase in relative wages,
the above procedure underestimates the actual long-run eect of an exogenous relative supply
increase on relative wages.
Lewis (2011) Lewis (2011) uses plausibly exogenous variation in immigrant inows across US
metropolitan areas in the 1980s and 1990s to estimate the relationship between the relative supply
of high-school graduates versus high-school dropouts on their relative wages. He studies changes
over 10 year intervals, thereby capturing a rather long-run elasticity. He also provides evidence
showing that rms’ decisions to adopt a range of automation technologies in the manufacturing
sector respond to the (exogenous component) of changes in relative supply in the way predicted
by theory. This supports the view that the estimated long-run wage elasticity captures directed
technical change eects.
In column 1 of Table VIII, Lewis (2011) reports a wage elasticity estimate of −0.136. This is the
estimate I use in Table 3.1.
Dustmann and Glitz (2015) Dustmann and Glitz (2015) exploit the arguably exogenous com-
ponent of immigration inows to German regions between 1985 and 1995 to analyze how regions
absorb changes in relative skill supply. They decompose the change in relative employment levels
between skill groups into a component due to between-rm scale adjustments and within-rm fac-
tor intensity adjustments. The latter turns out vastly more important, suggesting that Rybcinsky
type output mix adjustments are small. Moreover, they nd that relative wages hardly respond to
relative supply changes. This leaves technology adjustments biased towards the skill group that
becomes more abundant as the main margin of adjustment.
The authors distinguish between workers without postsecondary education (low-skilled), with
postsecondary vocational or apprenticeship degrees (medium-skilled), and with college education
(high-skilled). Due to extensive right-censoring of wages in the data, they consider their results
for college workers less reliable and focus mainly on medium- and low-skilled workers.
For the relative wage of medium- versus low-skilled workers, Dustmann and Glitz (2015)
estimate an elasticity with respect to relative supply of −0.091 (row 2, column 4, Table 2) over a
period of ten years. This estimate uses data for the tradable goods sector (which includes, but is
not limited to, the manufacturing sector). For the non-tradable sector, the authors nd a much
smaller wage elasticity. Yet, when they pool all industries, results are close to those for the tradable
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goods sector again (see description on page 727, Dustmann and Glitz 2015). Hence, I use the
estimate for the tradable sector in Table 3.1.
Morrow and Trefler (2017) Morrow and Treer (2017) start from a detailed neoclassical model
of international trade building on Eaton and Kortum (2002). They estimate their model on sectoral
factor input and price data for a cross-section of 38 countries in 2006. Country selection is driven
by data availability in the World Input Output Database. Labor is partitioned into skilled and
unskilled labor. Skilled workers are those with at least some tertiary education, unskilled workers
are those without.
In the model, the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers in each country is deter-
mined by the relative labor input and exogenous factor-augmenting productivity. To separately
identify factor-augmenting productivity and the elasticity of substitution between labor types,
Morrow and Treer (2017) augment their model’s equilibrium conditions by a directed technical
change equation similar to equation (B.6). Unfortunately, their approach requires to x the tech-
nology substitution parameter δ exogenously. In their directed technical change equation, they
(implicitly) assume δ = 1. Given a value for δ, the directed technical change equation and the
equation for relative wages at given technology identify the elasticity of substitution σ (without
observing technology).
In their most elaborate estimation, Morrow and Treer (2017) nd a value for σ of 1.89,
which translates into a wage elasticity at exogenous technology (or, short-run wage elastic-
ity) of −1/1.89 = −0.53. This is the rst value from Morrow and Treer (2017) I use in Table
3.1. Combining relative wage and directed technical change equations, the total wage elasticity,
including directed technical change eects, is then obtained as σ−2 = −0.11, the second estimate
from Morrow and Treer (2017) reported in Table 3.1.
Relative to the other studies listed in Table 3.1, a major shortcoming of Morrow and Treer
(2017) is that they do not have a strategy to isolate exogenous variation in factor inputs when
estimating their directed technical change equation. Hence, part of the estimated relationship
between technology and factor inputs may be driven by reverse causality, which leads to an
overestimate of directed technical change eects. On the other hand, the fact that they estimate
their model on cross-sectional data may imply underestimation of directed technical change
eects, because the observed technology levels may not yet have fully adjusted to the most recent
factor input changes.
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B.2.2 Calibration of the Exogenous Technology Parameter
To calibrate the exogenous technology parameter κ, an estimate of the earnings distribution
under the initial tax system T is needed. As explained in the main text, the initial tax system is
set to approximate the US income tax in 2005. Hence, the income distribution under T should
approximate the empirical earnings distribution of the US in 2005.
As is standard in the literature (e.g. Mankiw et al., 2009; Diamond and Saez, 2011), I approximate
the empirical earnings distribution by merging a lognormal distribution (for the bulk of incomes)
and a Pareto distribution (for the upper tail). I also assume that there is a mass point of workers
with zero income (as, e.g., in Mankiw et al., 2009; Brewer et al., 2010), which I set to 2%.7
Since the earnings distribution enters most of the formulae used in the simulations via its hazard
ratio ymy/(1−My), I directly target the empirical hazard ratio in 2005. In particular, I construct
the hazard ratio as
ymy
1−My =
ymlognormaly
1−M lognormaly
(
1− Φ
(
y − 200000
σnormal
))
+
ymParetoy
1−MParetoy
Φ
(
y − 200000
σ
)
,
where the normal distribution used for smoothing has a mean $200k, reecting the region in the
earnings distribution where the transition from lognormal to Pareto occurs. I then choose the
parameters of the lognormal and the Pareto distribution to match key properties of the empirical
hazard ratio in 2005. The Pareto shape parameter is set to 1.5, which is the hazard ratio of the
empirical earnings distribution for high incomes (see, e.g., Figure 2 in Diamond and Saez 2011).
The lognormal mean and variance and the variance σnormal of the smoothing function are set
to 10.6, 0.85, and 75000, respectively. These values ensure that the average income matches its
empirical counterpart of about $63k and that the resulting hazard ratio peaks at about $150k,
decreases until about $350k, and attens out afterwards, as depicted in Figure B.1 (see again Figure
2 in Diamond and Saez 2011 for comparison with the empirical US hazard ratio in 2005).
Given the hazard ratio of incomes, I obtain the cumulative distribution function by solving the
corresponding dierential equation. Specically, when ky denotes the hazard ratio of the earnings
distribution, the cumulative distribution function solves
dMy
dy
=
ky
y
− ky
y
My .
Finally, the density function of incomes is obtained as the numerical derivative of M .
Since the distribution of types on the type space is uniform, the cumulative distribution function
of incomes M returns for each income the type who earns this income under the initial tax T .
7The main results are robust to other values of the mass point between 0% and 10%.
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Figure B.1. The gure shows the hazard ratio of the income distribution under the initial tax T used
to calibrate the exogenous technology parameter κ. The construction of the hazard ratio follows the
description in the text. The hazard ratio approximates the empirical hazard ratio of the US earnings
distribution in 2005, as depicted, for example, in Figure 2 in Diamond and Saez (2011).
Hence, the income function y : θ 7→ yθ is given by the inverse of M .
Given yθ, it is straightforward to compute κθ from workers’ rst-order condition and the
condition that wages equal marginal products of labor in aggregate production. First, multiplying
the rst-order condition (3.2) by lθ and solving for it yields
lθ =
(
R′
T
(yθ)yθ
) e
1+e ,
where I used that the disutility of labor is isoelastic in the quantitative analysis. With the estimate
of T described in the main text, the previous equation allows to compute labor inputs under T .
For the second step, start from equations (3.14) and (B.7), copied here for convenience:
wθ(l, φ) = (κθφθ)
σ−1
σ (lθhθ)
− 1
σ F (l, φ)
1
σ
φ∗θ = C
1
δ (κθhθlθ)
σ−1
(δ−1)σ+1
[∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
]− 1
δ
.
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The total amount of R&D resources C is not identied separately from κ, so I normalize it to
satisfy
C =
∫ θ
θ
(κθhθlθ)
(σ−1)δ
(δ−1)σ+1 dθ
under the initial tax. Using this normalization in the above equation for φ∗θ , plugging the equation
into the expression for the wage wθ , multiplying by lθ , and solving for κθ yields:
κθ = y
1
1+γCES+ρCES
θ l
−1
θ F
γCES
1+γCES+ρCES .
With F =
∫ θ
θ yθmy dy by Euler’s theorem, this allows to compute κ.
Finally, the optimal tax formulae in Proposition 5 and Proposition 12 require the inverse hazard
ratio of the exogenous parameters β and β, respectively. In principle, β and β can be computed
from κ and from the equilibrium technology under initial taxes via their denitions. Then, their
pdf and cdf, and nally their hazard ratios can be computed. Here, to avoid unnecessary rounds
of approximations, I choose a more direct way and compute the inverse hazard ratios of β and
β directly from the hazard ratio of the income distribution, using equations (B.34) and (B.36).
This ensures that the two hazard ratios inherit their shape directly from the shape of the initial
hazard ratio of incomes (which is calibrated to match its empirical counterpart), without numerical
dierentiation or integration steps and the associated approximation errors in between.
B.3 Supplementary Material
This appendix contains several results complementary to those presented in the main text. Section
B.3.1 presents an alternative representation of the labor inputs eects of tax reforms, which
claries the relationship between the corresponding results in the main text and those presented
in Sachs et al. (2020). Section B.3.2 provides results for the welfare eects of tax reforms, extending
the analysis of the tax reform eects on wage inequality in the main text. Section B.3.3 derives
an alternative optimal tax formula for the CES case, which gives rise to an alternative intuition
behind the impact of directed technical change on optimal taxes. Sections B.3.4 and B.3.5 extend
the quantitative analysis from the main text, computing welfare eects of the progressive tax
reform analyzed in the main text and optimal marginal tax rates for a Rawlsian welfare function,
respectively. Finally, Section B.3.6 contains all proofs of the results presented in this appendix.
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B.3.1 Alternative Representation of Labor Input Responses to Tax Reforms
In this section, I compare equation (3.26) for the eects of a tax reform on labor inputs (Lemma 8)
with an alternative expression for these eects obtained by following the iteration approach of
Sachs et al. (2020).
For that, I rst dene elasticities of aggregate labor supply of a given type with respect to the
marginal retention rate and the wage. In particular, note that, if all workers of type θ change their
labor supply jointly, the wage wθ will react. The wage response then induces a change in labor
supply in addition to the direct response described by the individual labor supply elasticities Rθ
and wθ . Starting from the individual labor supply elasticities, we can construct elasticities that
account for this feedback eect as follows:
Rθ (T, l, w) :=
Rθ (T, l, w)
1− (γθ,θ + ρθ,θ)wθ (T, l, w)
(B.37)
and
wθ (T, l, w) :=
wθ (T, l, w)
1− (γθ,θ + ρθ,θ)wθ (T, l, w)
. (B.38)
Relative to the individual elasticities, the aggregate elasticities are scaled by the feedback from
the wage to labor supply. If the own-wage eect γθ,θ + ρθ,θ is negative (positive), the individual
elasticity is scaled down (up), as an increase in labor supply depresses (raises) the wage, which
then counteracts (amplies) the initial labor supply change.
We can now use the aggregate labor supply elasticities to rearrange equation (3.22) as follows:
l̂θ,τ = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
θ,θ˜
)l̂
θ˜,τ
(T ) dθ˜ . (B.39)
This xed point equation can be solved by iteratively inserting the right-hand side of the equation
into itself (see the proof below for details).
Lemma 17. Fix an initial tax T and let (γCES + ρCES)wθ < 1 under T such that the aggregate
elasticities Rθ and 
R
θ are well dened. Moreover, suppose that under T ,
8
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(wθ (γθ,θ˜ + ρθ,θ˜))
2 dθ˜dθ < 1 and
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(wθ ρθ,θ˜)
2 dθ˜dθ < 1 .
8These conditions serve the same purpose as conditions (3.23) and (3.24) in Lemma (8).
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Then, the eect of tax reform τ on labor supply can be written as
l̂θ,τ = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ , (B.40)
where
ρ
θ,θ˜
=
∞∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
ρ
(1)
θ,θ˜
= ρ
θ,θ˜
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
=
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
dθ̂ ∀n > 1
and
γ
θ,θ˜
=
∞∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
γ
(1)
θ,θ˜
= γ
θ,θ˜
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
=
∫ θ
θ
γ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
w
θ̂
(γ
θ̂,θ˜
+ ρ
θ̂,θ˜
) dθ̂ +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
w
θ̂
γ
θ̂,θ˜
dθ̂ ∀n > 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.6.
The dierence between the expressions provided by Lemma 8 and those given by Lemma 17
is that Lemma 17 uses the aggregate labor supply elasticities Rθ and wθ whereas Lemma 8 uses
individual labor supply elasticities. As can be seen from equations (B.37) and (B.38), the aggregate
elasticities already contain the own-wage elasticities γθ,θ and ρθ,θ. This makes it dicult to
disentangle directed technical change from within-technology substitution eects on the basis of
Lemma 17. For example, when decomposing the total labor supply eect given by Lemma 17 along
the lines of the decomposition provided in equation (3.26) of Lemma 8, we would end up with a
directed technical change component that still contains within-technology substitution eects
via the aggregate labor supply elasticities. Signing the impact of the directed technical change
component on relative wages would then require much more demanding restrictions. Specically,
we would have to restrict heterogeneity in own-wage elasticities, which would require restrictions
on the aggregate production F , beyond the restrictions already necessitated by the application of
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directed technical change theory.
B.3.2 Welfare Eects of Tax Reforms
Given that under certain conditions progressive tax reforms induce equalizing technical change
it is natural to suspect that taking into account directed technical change eects of tax reforms
should raise the expected welfare gains from progressive reforms. This conjecture is examined in
the following.
To analyze the welfare eects of a tax reform τ , write welfare as a function of the tax system:
W˜ (T ) := V ({uθ(cθ(T ), lθ(T ))}θ∈Θ) .
Given the welfare function W˜ (T ), the welfare eect of a tax reform can now be decomposed as
follows.
Proposition 13. Fix an initial tax T . The welfare eect of a tax reform τ can be written as
DτW˜ (T ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1− gθ)τ(yθ(T ))hθ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=MEτ (T )
+
∫ θ
θ
T ′(yθ(T ))yθ(T )(−Rθ )
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T ))hθ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=BEτ (T )
+
∫ θ
θ
[
gθ(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) + T ′(yθ(T ))(1 + wθ )
]
yθ(T )
1
wθ(T )
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=TEWτ (T )
+
∫ θ
θ
[
gθ(1− T ′(yθ(T ))) + T ′(yθ(T ))(1 + wθ )
]
yθ(T )
1
wθ(T )
Dτwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=SEWτ (T )
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.6.
Proposition 13 shows that a tax reform has four distinct eects on welfare. The mechanical eect
MEτ (T ) captures the eect from changing taxes and redistributing revenue in the absence of
any behavioral responses. The behavioral eect BEτ (T ) captures the eect of the direct response
of labor supply, holding wages constant. Both eects are well known in the literature.
The third term TEWτ (T ) represents the welfare implications of the technical change induced
by the tax reform. The rst part,
∫ θ
θ
gθ(1− T ′(yθ(T )))yθ(T ) 1
wθ(T )
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ ,
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captures the direct eect of the technology-induced wage changes on workers’ utility: from the
change in pre-tax income, only the share 1− T ′(yθ(T )) translates directly into a change of utility
as the remaining share is taxed away. The second part,
∫ θ
θ
T ′(yθ(T ))(1 + wθ )yθ(T )
1
wθ(T )
Dφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ ,
is the welfare eect of the lump-sum redistribution of the revenue gain or loss induced by the
wage adjustments to technical change. Here, the pre-tax income change is scaled by 1 + wθ , as
the wage change induces a labor supply adjustment of wθ .9
Importantly, even if the induced technical change reduces the skill premium (e.g., because τ is
progressive and the conditions of Corollary 9 are satised), we cannot sign the directed technical
change eects on welfare unambiguously. This is because, when for example starting from a
progressive tax T , the reduction in high-skilled workers’ wages passes through to the government
budget to a larger extent than the simultaneous rise in low-skilled workers’ wages, as marginal
tax rates are higher for the high-skilled. Hence, directed technical change may reduce tax revenue
following a progressive reform, which aects welfare negatively via reduced lump-sum transfers.
This negative welfare eect potentially outweighs the positive eect coming from the reduction
in pre-tax wage inequality through the induced technical change.10
The nal term in Proposition 13, SEWτ (T ) captures the welfare eect of the within-technology
substitution eects on wages caused by the tax reform. Its structure is analogous to that of
TEWτ (T ). Given that even the directed technical change component TEWτ (T ) has an ambiguous
eect on welfare, it is not surprising that also the substitution component SEWτ (T ) can generally
not be signed.
Importantly, however, Proposition 13 can be combined with equations (3.28) and (B.16) for the
relative wage eects of tax reforms from Propositions 3 and 11 (in Appendix B.1.3). This yields
a formula for the welfare eects of tax reforms in terms of empirically observable quantities
and welfare weights. I use this combination of expressions to quantify the welfare eects of tax
reforms and the contribution of directed technical change in Appendix B.3.4.
The implications of Proposition 13 may be somewhat unexpected in light of the previous
section’s result. After all, if a progressive reform induces equalizing technical change and the
welfare function values equity, directed technical change eects should make progressive reforms
in some way more attractive. To see precisely in which way this is indeed true, we must slightly
9The labor supply adjustment does not enter the rst part of TEWτ (T ) because it does not aect workers’ utility by
the envelope theorem.
10This is similar to the observation by Sachs et al. (2020) that within-technology substitution eects may increase the
revenue gains from progressive tax reforms if the initial tax schedule is already progressive.
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adjust the question posed by Proposition 13.
Concretely, instead of asking how directed technical change alters the welfare eects of a given
progressive tax reform, we now study how accounting for directed technical change aects the set
of initial taxes under which welfare can be improved by some progressive reform. In particular, let
T :=
{
T | T is CRP, ∃τ progressive s.t. DτW˜ (T ) > 0
}
denote the set of CRP tax schedules that can be improved in a welfare sense by a progressive tax
reform. The restriction to CRP taxes is imposed to invoke Corollary 9. Specically, combining
the CRP restriction with isoelastic disutility of labor and the CES production structure from
Section 3.3.4 ensures, according to Corollary 9, that any progressive tax reform induces equalizing
technical change.
Note at this point that CRP tax schedules provide good approximations to the actual income
tax in the US at several points in time over the last ve decades, including the current US tax
system (Heathcote et al., 2017). Hence, the restriction to initial taxes that take the CRP form seems
without much loss for application to empirical tax schedules.
As a benchmark for comparison that does not include directed technical change eects, let
Dexτ W˜ (T ) := DτW˜ (T )
∣∣∣
ρ
θ,θ˜
=0 ∀ θ,θ˜
(B.41)
denote the welfare eect of a reform τ when counterfactually setting all technical change elastici-
ties to zero (or, put dierently, when holding technology xed). Then, we can dene
T ex :=
{
T | T is CRP, ∃τ progressive s.t. Dexτ W˜ (T ) > 0
}
as the set of CRP schedules that one would perceive to be improvable by progressive reforms if
one were to ignore directed technical change.
Comparing the two thus dened sets I nd that accounting for directed technical change
expands the set of tax schedules under which welfare can be improved by a progressive reform.
Proposition 14. Suppose F and Φ are CES as introduced in Section 3.3.4 and the disutility of labor
is isoelastic. Then,
T ex ⊆ T ,
that is, the set of initial tax schedules that can be improved by a progressive reform becomes larger
when accounting for directed technical change eects.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.6.
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This result proposes a way in which directed technical change eects make progressive reforms
more attractive. Specically, accounting for directed technical change increases the scope for
welfare improvements by progressive tax reforms. It aligns neatly with Corollary 9, whereby
progressive reforms induce equalizing technical change.
The idea behind Proposition 14 relies on the mechanism design approach to income taxation.
Consider a progressive tax reform that a tax planner who neglects directed technical change
eects (the exogenous technology planner, he, henceforth) expects to raise welfare. For any such
reform, a planner who correctly anticipates directed technical change eects (the endogenous
technology planner, she, henceforth) can nd another progressive reform that exactly replicates
the labor allocation expected by the exogenous technology planner following his reform. But
since progressive tax reforms induce equalizing technical change, the endogenous technology
planner anticipates a more equal wage distribution after her reform than the exogenous technology
planner expects to nd after his reform. Via incentive compatibility constraints, a more equal wage
distribution allows to distribute consumption more equally as well. Hence, while the two planners
expect the same labor allocation to materialize, the endogenous technology planner anticipates a
more equal consumption distribution than the exogenous technology planner. Since this reasoning
holds for any progressive reform of the exogenous technology planner, the endogenous technology
planner can nd a welfare-improving progressive reform whenever the exogenous technology
planner can nd one. Hence, the endogenous technology planner perceives the scope for welfare
improvements through progressive tax reforms to be greater.
B.3.3 Alternative Optimal Tax Formula
In the following, I provide an alternative expression for optimal marginal tax rates in the CES
case, which allows for an interpretation of directed technical change eects via their eect on the
aggregate labor supply elasticity Rθ (see Appendix B.3.1).
Proposition 15. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 are satised and F and Φ take the CES
form introduced in Section 3.3.4. Additionally, let (γCES + ρCES)wθ < 1 at the optimal tax T . Then,
the conditions for optimal marginal tax rates can be written as
T ′(y)
1− T ′(y) =
1
Rθy
1−My
myy
(1− g˜θy) + γCES(1− gθy) + ρCES(1− gθy) , (B.42)
where
Rθy(T, l, w) :=
Rθy(T, l, w)
1− (γθy ,θy + ρθy ,θy)wθy(T, l, w)
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denotes the elasticity of aggregate labor supply of type θ with respect to the marginal retention rate
(see Appendix B.3.1); all variables are evaluated at equilibrium under the optimal tax T ;M andm
denote the cumulative distribution and the density function of y at the optimum; and θy denotes the
type of workers who earn income y at the optimum.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.6.
Equation (B.42) oers an alternative perspective on the role of directed technical change in the
CES case. It extends the expression in Proposition 3 of Sachs et al. (2020) to account for directed
technical change.
The adjustment term ρCES(1− gθy) is the same as in equation (3.33) and does not provide any
new insights. As described in the main text, it calls for a progressive adjustment of marginal tax
rates.
The second place in equation (B.42) where directed technical change elasticities appear is the
aggregate labor supply elasticity Rθ . This elasticity measures the response of labor supply of type
θ to an increase in the marginal retention rate when taking into account the change in type θ’s
wage induced by the labor supply response. The change in type θ’s wage is modied by directed
technical change eects. Specically, when labor supply of type θ falls due to an increase in the
marginal tax rate, directed technical change reduces the wage of type θ and thereby amplies the
fall in labor supply. In this way, directed technical change magnies the labor supply response to
marginal tax changes, which leads to a downwards adjustment of optimal marginal tax rates.
B.3.4 antitative Analysis: Welfare Eects of Tax Reforms
Here, I complement the quantitative analysis of the wage eects of progressive tax reforms
in Section 3.7 by assessing the welfare eects of these reforms. In particular, I consider the
same progressive tax reform as described in Section3.7 and compute its welfare eects based on
Proposition 13 from Appendix B.3.6. The calibration is the same as described in the main text.
Figure B.2 displays (lump-sum) consumption changes equivalent to the welfare change induced
by the tax reform for dierent values of the relative inequality aversion parameter r. The lump-sum
consumption changes are expressed in percent of initial average income.
As observed analytically (see Proposition 13 and the subsequent discussion), the inuence
of directed technical change eects on the welfare assessment of a given progressive reform is
ambiguous. The gure shows that for lower degrees of inequality aversion, directed technical
change raises the welfare gains from the progressive reform. Here, the reduction in pre-tax
wage inequality induced by directed technical change outweighs the loss in tax revenue, which
translates into a reduction in the lump-sum payment to all workers. For high values of inequality
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Figure B.2. The gure displays changes in the lump-sum payment that are equivalent to the welfare
eect of the progressive tax reform described in the text. These changes are measured in % of the pre-
reform average income and displayed for dierent values of the relative inequality aversion parameter
r. The baseline calibration described in the main text applies.
aversion, for which the welfare function approaches a Rawlsian objective, the negative revenue
eect from directed technical change becomes dominant, reducing the welfare gains from the
reform. Interestingly, for very high levels of inequality aversion, accounting for directed technical
change even switches the sign of the welfare eect. When ignoring directed technical change,
the reform appears to raise welfare; accounting for directed technical change makes the reform
undesirable.
Notwithstanding these results, Proposition 14 implies that even for such very high values
of inequality aversion, there must be a dierent progressive reform that raises welfare when
accounting for directed technical change.
B.3.5 antitative Analysis: Rawlsian Optimal Taxes
To complement the quantitative analysis of optimal taxes in the main text, I compute optimal
marginal tax rates for an inequality aversion parameter of r = 50, approximating a Rawlsian
welfare function. For comparison, Figure B.3 also displays the corresponding marginal tax rates
preferred by the exogenous technology planner.
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Figure B.3. The gure displays optimal marginal tax rates by income level for a relative inequality
aversion parameter of r = 50. Otherwise, the baseline calibration described in the main text applies.
The qualitative insights from Section 3.7 remain valid with Rawlsian welfare. Directed technical
change still reduces optimal marginal tax rates below the median income and increase them
above. There are dierences in the magnitudes of these adjustments, however. The reduction
in marginal tax rates below the median is somewhat smaller than in the baseline scenario (at
the 10th percentile: 4 vs. 5 pp in the conservative case and 12 vs. 17 pp in the strong bias case),
while the increase in marginal tax rates above the median becomes more pronounced (at the 90th
percentile: 6 vs. 3 pp in the conservative case and 14 vs. 8 pp in the strong bias case). Optimal
marginal tax rates are U-shaped now even in the strong bias case.
The reason for these dierences is that, with a Rawlsian welfare function, incomes below the
median are not relevant from a social perspective except for their contribution to tax revenue.
Hence, the incentive to redistribute pre-tax income from high earners to earners below the median
via directed technical change eects disappears. This, however, was the driving force behind the
low optimal marginal tax rates on below-median incomes in the baseline scenario.
The welfare gains from optimal taxes relative to those of the exogenous technology planner
generally become larger with Rawlsian welfare. In the strong bias case, they are equivalent to
an increase in the lump-sum payment of $850 annually, which corresponds to 1.4% of average
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income under the exogenous technology planner’s taxes.
B.3.6 Proofs for the Supplementary Material
This section contains all proofs for the results presented in Appendix B.3.
Alternative Representation of Labor Input Responses to Tax Reforms
Proof. Following Sachs et al. (2020), I solve the xed point equation (B.39) by iteration. Within the
iteration steps, I separate the directed technical change from the (within-technology) substitution
eects to obtain a decomposition of the total labor input response along the lines of Lemma 8.
Step 1. The rst part of the proof proceeds by induction. We start by substituting equation
(B.39) into itself:
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
θ,θ˜
)
[
−R
θ˜
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
+ w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ˜,θ̂
+ ρ
θ˜,θ̂
)l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
]
dθ˜
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ˜,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ˜,θ̂
+ ρ
θ˜,θ̂
)l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ˜,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ dθ˜ .
Changing the order of integration in the terms containing l̂
θ̂,τ
and summarizing the last two terms,
we obtain
l̂θ,τ = −Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
ρ
θ˜,θ̂
dθ˜l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
[∫ θ
θ
γ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
(γ
θ˜,θ̂
+ ρ
θ˜,θ̂
) dθ˜ +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
γ
θ˜,θ̂
dθ˜
]
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ .
206
B.3 Supplementary Material
Using the denitions of ρ(n)
θ,θ˜
and γ(n)
θ,θ˜
given in the lemma, this expression can be rewritten as
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(2)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(2)
θ,θ˜
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ .
This constitutes the base case for induction. As an induction hypothesis, suppose now that for
any N ≥ 1 the following holds:
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N+1)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ . (B.43)
Then, using equation (B.39) to substitute for l̂
θ̂,τ
on the right-hand-side yields
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
ρ
θ˜,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
[
γ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
(γ
θ˜,θ̂
+ ρ
θ˜,θ̂
)l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ + ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
∫ θ
θ
γ
θ˜,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
]
dθ˜ .
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Changing again the order of integration in the terms containing l̂
θ̂,τ
yields
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
ρ
θ˜,θ̂
dθ˜l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
N∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
[∫ θ
θ
γ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
(γ
θ˜,θ̂
+ ρ
θ˜,θ̂
) dθ˜ +
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+1)
θ,θ˜
w
θ˜
γ
θ˜,θ̂
dθ˜
]
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
=− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
N+1∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N+2)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
N+1∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N+2)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ .
Hence the induction hypothesis (B.43) holds for any N ≥ 1.
Step 2. I take the induction hypothesis from step 1 and let N go to innity:
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
∞∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
∞∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ + wθ lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ .
The goal is to prove that the innite series are convergent while the limit expressions containing
l̂
θ̂,τ
vanish on the right-hand side. Let
An :=
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
Bn :=
∫ θ
θ
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ .
I start with the series
∑∞
n=1An. First, using the denition of ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
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ity implies
(
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
)2
=
(∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
dθ̂
)2
≤
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
)2
dθ̂
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)2
dθ̂ .
Integrating over θ˜ yields
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ ≤
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
)2
dθ̂
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)2
dθ̂ dθ˜ .
Then, applying the inequality iteratively n− 2 times, we obtain
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜ ≤
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
θ,θ̂
)2
dθ̂
[∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)2
dθ̂ dθ˜
]n−1
.
Moreover, again applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
A2n ≤
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
)2
dθ˜
∫ θ
θ
(
−R
θ˜
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
)2
dθ˜
and hence,
|An| ≤

√√√√∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)2
dθ̂ dθ˜

n−1√√√√∫ θ
θ
(
ρ
θ,θ̂
)2
dθ̂
√√√√∫ θ
θ
(
−R
θ˜
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
)2
dθ˜
=:An .
The sequence {An}n∈N is geometric. Moreover, since∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)2
dθ̂ dθ˜ < 1 ,
it converges to zero. Hence, {An}n∈N is dominated in absolute value by a geometric sequence
converging to zero. The series
∑∞
n=1An is therefore convergent.
For convergence of
∑∞
n=1Bn, I show that
∑
n=1(An + Bn) converges. Convergence of∑∞
n=1An and
∑∞
n=1(An + Bn) then immediately implies convergence of
∑∞
n=1Bn. By def-
inition we have
An +Bn =
∫ θ
θ
(γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
)(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
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and
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
+ ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
=
∫ θ
θ
(γ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
+ ρ
(n−1)
θ,θ̂
)w
θ̂
(γ
θ̂,θ˜
+ ρ
θ̂,θ˜
) dθ̂ .
Convergence of
∑∞
n=1(An + Bn) now follows from exactly the same steps as convergence of∑∞
n=1An, with the only dierence that ρθ,θ˜ is replaced by γθ,θ˜ + ρθ,θ˜ in every step. Following
these steps, the condition
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(
w
θ̂
(γ
θ̂,θ˜
+ ρ
θ̂,θ˜
)
)2
dθ̂ dθ˜ < 1
implies that the sequence {An +Bn}n∈N is dominated in absolute value by a geometric sequence
converging to zero, which establishes convergence of
∑∞
n=1(An +Bn).
Finally, consider the limits
lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ and lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ .
We have already shown that
∞∑
n=1
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
converges independently of the specic values of R
θ˜
and τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))/(1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))). Thus, by
the same reasoning the series
∞∑
n=1
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)l̂
θ˜,τ
dθ˜
converges. We must therefore have
lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
ρ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ = 0 .
Analogous reasoning shows that
lim
N→∞
∫ θ
θ
γ
(N)
θ,θ̂
l̂
θ̂,τ
(T ) dθ̂ = 0 .
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So, we have shown that, as N →∞, the induction hypothesis of step 1 becomes
l̂θ,τ =− Rθ
τ ′(yθ(T ))
1− T ′(yθ(T )) + 
w
θ
∫ θ
θ
∞∑
n=1
ρ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜
+ wθ
∫ θ
θ
∞∑
n=1
γ
(n)
θ,θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
τ ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
1− T ′(y
θ˜
(T ))
dθ˜ ,
which proves Lemma 17.
Welfare Eects of Tax Reforms
Proof of Proposition 13. Welfare can be written as
W˜ (T ) = V
({RT (wθ(T, φ∗(T ))lθ(T,wθ)) + S (l(T,w), w(T, φ∗(T )), T )− v (lθ(T,wθ))}θ∈Θ) ,
where
S (l(T,w), w(T, φ∗(T )), T ) =
∫ θ
θ
T (wθ(T, φ
∗(T ))lθ(T,wθ))hθ dθ .
Taking the derivative Dτ yields:
DτW˜ (T ) =
∫ θ
θ
(
−gθhθτ(wθlθ) + gθhθ
∫ θ
θ
h
θ˜
τ(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
) dθ˜
)
dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ
∫ θ
θ
h
θ˜
T ′(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
)w
θ˜
(−R
θ˜
)
l
θ˜
1− T ′(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
)
τ ′(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
) dθ˜ dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ(1− T ′(wθlθ))lθDφ,τwθ(T, φ∗(T )) dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ
∫ θ
θ
h
θ˜
T ′(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
)
(
l
θ˜
Dφ,τwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) + w
θ˜
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
w
θ˜
Dφ,τwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T ))
)
dθ˜ dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ(1− T ′(wθlθ))lθDτwθ(T, φ∗(T )) dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ
∫ θ
θ
h
θ˜
T ′(w
θ˜
l
θ˜
)
(
l
θ˜
Dτwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) + w
θ˜
w
θ˜
l
θ˜
w
θ˜
Dτwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T ))
)
dθ˜ dθ .
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Using
∫ θ
θ hθgθ dθ = 1, we can rearrange this expression to obtain
DτW˜ (T ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1− gθ)τ(wθlθ)hθ dθ +
∫ θ
θ
T ′(wθlθ)wθlθ(−Rθ )
τ ′(wθlθ)
1− T ′(wθlθ)hθ dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
[
gθ(1− T ′(wθlθ)) + T ′(wθlθ)(1 + wθ )
]
lθDφ,τwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
[
gθ(1− T ′(wθlθ)) + T ′(wθlθ)(1 + wθ )
]
lθDτwθ(T, φ
∗(T ))hθ dθ .
Proof of Proposition 14. Take any initial tax T ∈ T ex and any reform τ ex that is progressive and
raises welfare when neglecting induced technical change eects, that is, DexτexW˜ (T ) > 0 (see
equation (B.41)). The strategy of the proof is to construct another progressive reform τ en that
raises welfare when accounting for induced technical change eects, that is, DτenW˜ (T ) > 0.
Constructing such a reform proves that T ∈ T and hence T ex ⊆ T .
I will construct the reform τ en such that it exactly replicates the labor input changes that τ ex
would induce if there were no induced technical change eects. To move back and forth between
induced labor input changes and progressive reforms, I use Lemma 14. In particular, note that
Proposition 14 considers reforms of CRP tax schedules when the disutility of labor is isoelastic.
Under these conditions the elasticities Rθ and wθ are constant in θ. Lemma 14 then says that any
progressive reform τ induces labor input responses l̂θ,τ that decrease in θ and, conversely, any
reform that induces labor input changes that decrease in θ is progressive.
After these preparations, take any T ∈ T ex and a progressive reform τ ex that would raise
welfare if technology remained constant, that is, DexτexW˜ (T ) > 0. We can write welfare as a
function of consumption and labor inputs only, that is,
W (c, l) := V ({uθ(cθ, lθ)}θ∈Θ}) .
Then, the eect of reform τ ex on welfare, ignoring induced technical change eects, is fully
determined by the responses of consumption and labor supply to τ ex that we would obtain if
technology were xed. I analyze these responses in the following.
Step 1. Denote the labor input response to τ ex that ignores induced technical change eects by
Dexτex lθ(T ) := Dτex lθ(T )|ρ
θ,θ˜
=0 ∀ θ,θ˜
and similarly the consumption response that ignores induced technical change eects byDexτexcθ(T ).
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I now characterize the consumption response contingent on the labor input response using
incentive compatibility constraints. In particular, at any tax T˜ , consumption and labor allocations
must satisfy
c
θ˜
(T˜ )− v
(
w
θ˜
(T˜ , φ∗(T˜ ))l
θ˜
(T˜ )
wθ(T˜ , φ∗(T˜ ))
)
≤ cθ(T˜ )− v(lθ(T˜ )) for all θ, θ˜ .
Via an envelope argument this implies
c′θ(T˜ ) = v
′(lθ(T˜ ))
[
l′θ(T˜ ) + ŵθ(T˜ , φ
∗(T˜ ))lθ(T˜ )
]
for all θ .
Here, ŵθ = w′θ/wθ and the notation x′θ(T ) is exclusively used to denote dierentiation with
respect to the type index θ. So, l′θ(T ) is the derivative of lθ(T ) with respect to θ (and at θ), holding
T constant. Integrating over θ, the envelope condition yields:
cθ(T˜ ) = cθ(T˜ ) +
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T˜ ))
[
l′
θ˜
(T˜ ) + ŵ
θ˜
(T˜ , φ∗(T˜ ))l
θ˜
(T˜ )
]
dθ˜ for all θ . (B.44)
The level cθ is determined via the resource constraint:∫ θ
θ
cθ(T˜ )hθ dθ = F (l(T˜ ), φ
∗(l(T˜ ))) . (B.45)
Using equation (B.44), the response of consumption to tax reform τ ex, ignoring induced technical
change eects, can be expressed as
Dexτexcθ(T ) = D
ex
τexcθ(T ) +
∫ θ
θ
v′′(l
θ˜
(T ))
(
Dexτex lθ˜(T )
) [
l′
θ˜
(T ) + ŵ
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))l
θ˜
(T )
]
dθ˜
+
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T ))
[
Dexτex l
′
θ˜
(T ) + ŵ
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))Dexτex lθ˜(T )
]
dθ˜
+
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T ))l
θ˜
(T )Dexτexŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) dθ˜ . (B.46)
Note that the last line contains only the constant-technology eect Dexτexŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) but not
the induced technical change eect Dexφ,τexŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )). The resource constraint (B.45) implies
∫ θ
θ
hθD
ex
τexcθ(T ) dθ =
d
dµ
F (l(T + µτ ex), φ∗(l(T )))
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
. (B.47)
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Step 2. Suppose now that we can nd a reform τ en that replicates the labor input change
Dexτex lθ(T ) while accounting for induced technical change eects. That is, take τ en such that
Dτen lθ(T ) = D
ex
τex lθ(T ) for all θ .
I verify below that such a reform exists. Again using equation (B.44), the consumption response
to τ en, also accounting for induced technical change eects, can be expressed as
Dτencθ(T ) = Dτencθ(T ) +
∫ θ
θ
v′′(l
θ˜
(T ))
(
Dτen lθ˜(T )
) [
l′
θ˜
(T ) + ŵ
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))l
θ˜
(T )
]
dθ˜
+
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T ))
[
Dτen l
′
θ˜
(T ) + ŵ
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))Dτen lθ˜(T )
]
dθ˜
+
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T ))l
θ˜
(T )
[
Dτenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) +Dφ,τenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T ))
]
dθ˜ . (B.48)
Note that here the last line contains the total eect of τ en on the wage growth rate ŵ
θ˜
, that is,
the sum of the direct and the induced technical change eect. The resource constraint (B.45) now
implies ∫ θ
θ
hθDτencθ(T ) dθ =
d
dµ
F (l(T + µτ en), φ∗(l(T + µτ en)))
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
. (B.49)
The principle of taxation says that every incentive compatible and resource feasible consumption-
labor allocation can be implemented by some tax T˜ . By implication, the allocation change
{Dτen lθ(T ), Dτencθ(T )}θ∈Θ can be implemented by some reform τ˜ . Hence, a reform τ en as
analyzed above indeed exists.
Step 3. Having characterized the relevant consumption and labor input changes, we can now
compare the welfare eect of reform τ ex while ignoring induced technical change eects with the
welfare eect of reform τ en while accounting for induced technical change eects. Since the labor
input changes are identical in both scenarios, the only dierence in the two welfare eects stems
from the dierent consumption responses:
DτenW˜ (T )−DexτexW˜ (T ) =
∫ θ
θ
gθhθ (Dτencθ(T )−Dexτexcθ(T )) dθ . (B.50)
From equations (B.46) and (B.48), the dierence in consumption responses can be expressed as,
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for every θ,
Dτencθ(T )−Dexτexcθ(T ) =
∫ θ
θ
v′(l
θ˜
(T ))l
θ˜
(T )Dφ,τenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) dθ˜ . (B.51)
Here I used that the labor response is the same in both scenarios, such that the constant-technology
eect on the wage growth rate is the same as well, that is,
Dexτexŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) = Dτenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) .
Next, consider the induced technology eect on the wage growth rate:
Dφ,τenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) =Dφ,τen
[
d
dθ
log
(
w
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))
)]
=
d
dθ
[
Dφ,τen log
(
w
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))
)]
=
d
dθ
[
1
w
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))
Dφ,τenwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T ))
]
.
Since τ ex is progressive, the labor response (1/l
θ˜
)Dexτex lθ˜(T ) is decreasing in θ˜ by Lemma 14.
Hence, the identical response (1/l
θ˜
)Dτen lθ˜(T ) decreases in θ˜ as well. Then by Lemma 6, the
induced technical change eect (1/w
θ˜
)Dφ,τenwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) must also decrease in θ˜. We therefore
obtain
0 ≥ d
dθ
[
1
w
θ˜
(T, φ∗(T ))
Dφ,τenwθ˜(T, φ
∗(T ))
]
=Dφ,τenŵθ˜(T, φ
∗(T )) .
By equation (B.51), this implies that the consumption dierence Dτencθ(T ) − Dexτexcθ(T ) is
decreasing in θ. Moreover, from equations (B.47) and (B.49), we have
∫ θ
θ
hθDτencθ(T ) dθ =
d
dµ
F (l(T + µτ en), φ∗(l(T + µτ en)))
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
=
d
dµ
F (l(T + µτ ex), φ∗(l(T )))
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
=
∫ θ
θ
hθD
ex
τexcθ(T ) dθ ,
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where the second equality uses an envelope argument. By implication:
∫ θ
θ
hθ (Dτencθ(T )−Dexτexcθ(T )) dθ .
So, inspecting equation (B.50) reveals that if gθ were constant in θ, we would have
DτenW˜ (T )−DexτexW˜ (T ) = 0 .
But since both gθ and Dτencθ(T )−Dexτexcθ(T ) are decreasing in θ, we must have∫ θ
θ
gθhθ (Dτencθ(T )−Dexτexcθ(T )) dθ ≥ 0
and thereby
DτenW˜ (T )−DexτexW˜ (T ) ≥ 0 .
So,
DτenW˜ (T ) > 0 .
Step 4. Finally, we know that the labor response (1/lθ)Dτen lθ(T ) decreases in θ. Thus, we can
again invoke Lemma 14 to obtain that τ en must be progressive. We have thereby shown that
DτenW˜ (T ) > 0
for a progressive reform τ en. So, T ∈ T .
Since the preceding reasoning applies to any T ∈ T ex, we have shown that T ex ⊆ T .
Alternative Optimal Tax Formula
Proof of Proposition 15. To derive equation (B.42), we start from equation (B.32) and replace l̂θ by
wθ ŵθ:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Hθ
hθ
(1−g˜θ)ŵθ
(
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
)
+γCES(1−gθ)+ρCES(1−gθ) .
Using my and My to denote density and cumulative distribution function of income, a change-of-
variable implies hθ = myθy′ − θ. Using this in the previous expression for marginal tax rates, we
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obtain:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1
ŵθ + l̂θ
(1− g˜θ)ŵθ
(
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
)
+ γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ)
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1
ŵθ(1 + 
w
θ )
(1− g˜θ)ŵθ
(
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
)
+ γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ)
=
(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1−Myθ
myθyθ
1
1 + wθ
(1− g˜θ)
(
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
)
+ γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
From the expression for wθ and Rθ in Section 3.3.2, it is straightforward to show that(
1 +
1
eθ
)
1
1 + wθ
=
1
Rθ
,
and hence
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
1− (γCES + ρCES)wθ
Rθ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
By denition of the aggregate elasticity Rθ (see Appendix B.3.1), this yields equation (B.42) from
Proposition 5:
T ′(yθ)
1− T ′(yθ) =
1
Rθ
1−Myθ
myθyθ
(1− g˜θ) + γCES(1− gθ) + ρCES(1− gθ) .
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C.1 Omied Proofs
This section collects all proofs omitted from the main text.
C.1.1 Discussion of Assumption (4.6)
To gain insights about the properties of W , v, and c, under which assumption (4.6) holds, we
rewrite the expert’s quality choice as a direct choice of consumer utility. In particular, using
ub = v(ab)− pb ,
we can write expert utility as (in the bilateral setting of Section 4.4)
ue = W (pb − c˜(ub + pb)) + ub .
Here, c˜(x) ≡ c(v−1(x)) measures the cost of providing utility-from-treatment (i.e., utility gross
of the price) of x to the consumer.
Given a price oer pb, expert e now chooses ub to maximize her utility ue. The derivative of ue
with respect to ub is
−W ′(pb − c˜(ub + pb))c˜′(ub + pb) + 1 .
By assumption (4.4), this derivative is weakly negative at pb = c˜(v(0)) and ub = v(0)− c˜(v(0)).
For concreteness, suppose now that this assumption indeed holds exactly, that is,
W ′(0)c˜′(v(0)) = 1 .
Then, since the second derivative of ue with respect to ub is strictly negative everywhere, the
eect of raising pb on the optimal choice ub is qualitatively given by the sign of
∂2ue
∂ub∂pb
= −W ′′(pb− c˜(ub + pb))(1− c˜(ub + pb))c˜′(ub + pb)−W ′(pb− c˜(ub + pb))c˜′′(ub + pb) .
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At the competitive equilibrium values pb = c˜(v(0)) andub = v(0)−c˜(v(0)), the cross-derivative
is positive if and only if
−W
′′(0)
W ′(0)
(1− c˜′(v(0))) > c˜
′′(v(0))
c˜(v(0))
.
If and only if this is satised, assumption (4.6) holds and the collectively optimal price oer of
consumers exceeds the competitive price c˜(v(0)). Hence, for this to be true, the cost function c˜
must have suciently small curvature at v(0). Put dierently, the marginal cost of providing addi-
tional utility-from-treatment to consumers must not increase too quickly around the competitive
equilibrium.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Let
A(pb, ye, ab) := W
′(ye) [pb − c(ab)] + v(ab)− pb
denote the marginal utility for expert e of adding consumer b to her set of clientsBe if she provides
quality ab to b.
Expert e’s actual quality choice for consumer b follows from conditions (4.7) as a function of
the expert’s income ye. Denote this quality by aICb (ye). Then, the expert’s actual marginal utility
from serving consumer b, taking into account her quality choice aICb (ye), becomes
AIC(pb, ye) := A(pb, ye, a
IC
b (ye)) .
Expert e will accept an oer pb if and only if AIC(pb, ye) ≥ 0. Hence, the equality AIC = 0
denes the acceptance threshold described by Lemma 9.
Before deriving the claimed properties of the threshold, note that
AIC(pb, ye) = max
a≥0
A(pb, ye, a) (C.1)
by denition of aICb (ye). In words, the expert chooses the service quality for b such as to maximize
her utility from serving b.
Case 1: ye ≤ 0. By assumption (4.4), we have aICb (ye) = 0 for all ye ≤ 0. Hence,AIC(c(0), ye) =
0 for all ye ≤ 0. That is, if the expert has negative income, she just accepts an oer at c(0). Since
AIC is strictly increasing in pb, we have that for all ye ≤ 0, AIC(pb, ye) ≥ 0 if and only if
pb ≥ c(0). This proves the rst piece of the acceptance threshold in Lemma 9.
Case 2: ye > 0. As in Lemma 9, denote the acceptance threshold for ye > 0 by p˜(ye), that is,
AIC(p˜(ye), ye) = 0.
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First note that A(c(0), ye, 0) = 0 for all ye. Hence, AIC(c(0), ye) ≥ 0 for all ye. Therefore, the
acceptance threshold satises p˜(ye) ≤ c(0) for all ye.
It remains to show that p˜(ye) is decreasing in ye. For that, consider y(2)e > y(1)e > 0. From the
denition of A we see that A is increasing in ye if pb ≤ c(0). Since p˜(y(1)e ) ≤ c(0), we obtain the
following inequalities:
AIC
(
p˜
(
y(2)e
)
, y(2)e
)
= 0
= A
(
p˜
(
y(1)e
)
, y(1)e , a
IC
b
(
y(1)e
))
≤ A
(
p˜
(
y(1)e
)
, y(2)e , a
IC
b
(
y(1)e
))
by (C.1)
≤ A
(
p˜
(
y(1)e
)
, y(2)e , a
IC
b
(
y(2)e
))
= AIC
(
p˜
(
y(1)e
)
, y(2)e
)
.
Using that AIC is always increasing in pb, the inequality between the rst and the last expression
implies p˜(y(2)e ) ≤ p˜(y(1)e ).
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We prove Proposition 6 via the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Consider the game described by stages 1 and 2. In any subgame perfect equilibrium
all oers are symmetric, pb = pb′ for all b, b′ ∈ B, all oers are accepted, and all quality levels are
symmetric, ab = ab′ for all b, b′ ∈ B.
Proof. Step 1. The thresholds in Lemma 9 imply that an oer pb = c(0) is always accepted.
Since v(0)− c(0) ≥ v and agents always opt against their outside option in case of indierence,
consumers always prefer to make the oer c(0) over any oer that is not accepted. Hence, oers
that are not accepted are strictly dominated and cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Step 2. Consider now all consumers b ∈ Be for a given expert e. By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(4.7), these consumers all receive the same quality level. Moreover, they face the same acceptance
threshold. Since all consumers take expert e’s income as given, they anticipate the quality they
receive to be independent of their oers. Hence, they oer exactly the acceptance threshold,
which is the same across all consumers.
Step 3. By Step 2, any expert e receives the same oers from all consumers matched to her.
Suppose now that these oers are strictly higher for some expert e than for another expert e′.
Denote the oer level for e by p and for e′ by p′. By Step 1, all oers are accepted. So, experts’
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revenue equals their oer level,∫
Be
pb db = p >
∫
Be′
pb db = p
′ .
Using this in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7), it is easy to show that expert e will also have
greater income than expert e′, ye ≥ ye′ . But then, by Lemma 9, the acceptance threshold of expert
e is smaller than that of expert e′. Hence, consumers matched to e oer lower payments than
consumers matched to e′. This contradicts the initial assumption of p > p′.
We have therefore established that all consumers oer the same payments and all oers are
accepted in any subgame perfect equilibrium. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) then immediately
imply that quality levels are the same for all consumers in any subgame perfect equilibrium as
well.
Proposition 6 is now proven as follows. By Lemma 18, there is a common oer level p = pb for
all b ∈ B. By Lemma 9, oers pb = c(0) are always accepted. Moreover, consumers always oer
payments exactly equal to the expert’s acceptance threshold. So, the common oer level p can be
at most c(0).
Suppose that p < c(0). Then, any expert e has negative income, ye ≤ 0. But for ye ≤ 0, Lemma
9 says that oers below c(0) are rejected. Hence, we must have p = c(0) in any subgame perfect
equilibrium. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) then imply ab = 0 for all b ∈ B in any subgame
perfect equilibrium.
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 8
The only part of the proposition that remains to be shown is that an allocation is fully ecient if
and only if ab = a∗∗ for almost all b ∈ B.
(⇒) We rst prove the “only if” part of the claim. To show that no allocation other than those
described above is fully ecient, take an arbitrary allocation q, {pqb}b∈B , {Be}e∈E , {aqb}b∈B , with
aqb 6= a∗∗ for some non-zero measure of consumers. Construct a new allocation r with arb = a∗∗
for all b ∈ B, Bre = Bqe for all e ∈ E, and
prb = p
q
b + v(a
r
b)− v(aqb) .
Comparing r to q, the utility of consumers is unchanged by construction of r. For an expert e the
utility change is W (yre)−W (yqe). Its sign depends on the dierence in incomes yre − yqe . Using
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the construction of payments prb in allocation r, this income dierence becomes
yre − yqe =
∫
Bqe
[
v(arb)− c(arb)− v(aqb) + c(aqb)
]
db .
Since a∗∗ uniquely maximizes v(a)− c(a), the income dierence is positive, yre − yqe > 0. Hence,
experts strictly prefer allocation r to q. Since consumers are indierent between the two, allocation
r Pareto-dominates q. Allocation q can therefore not be fully ecient.
(⇐) To see that any allocation with ab = a∗∗ for almost all b is fully ecient, suppose such
an allocation (call it s) is Pareto-dominated by some other allocation (call it t). If t has ab 6= a∗∗
for a non-zero measure of consumers, part (⇒) above implies that there exists an allocation t′
with at′b = a∗∗ almost everywhere that Pareto-dominates t. By transitivity, t′ will then also
Pareto-dominate s. Hence, we can focus on allocations t that feature atb = a∗∗ for almost all b.
Allocations s and t then only dier in the distribution of payments over experts and consumers.
Since this distribution is zero-sum, none of the allocations can Pareto-dominate the other. We
have thereby established that any allocation with ab = a∗∗ almost everywhere is fully ecient.
C.1.5 Proof of Lemma 10
Given a non-empty set of active experts E, the subgame described by stages 2’ and 3’ is very
similar to the game with exogenous entry described by stages 1 and 2 in Section 4.5. The main
dierence is that expert e’s marginal cost of serving an additional consumer b is c(ab) + k′(|Be|)
instead of c(ab) only. The proof of the acceptance threshold in Lemma 10 therefore proceeds in
close analogy to the proof of the acceptance threshold from the exogenous entry setting in Lemma
9.
Let
Aˆ(pb, Be, yˆe, ab) := W
′(yˆe)
[
pb − c(ab)− k′(|Be|)
]
+ v(ab)− pb − v(0) + k′(|Be|)
denote expert e’s marginal utility from adding consumer b to her set of clients Be if she provides
quality ab to the consumer.
Expert e’s actual quality choice follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) as a function of
yˆe. Denote this quality by aˆICb (yˆe). Then, the expert’s actual marginal utility from accepting the
oer pb, taking into account her quality choice aˆICb (yˆe), becomes
AˆIC(pb, Be, yˆe) := Aˆ(pb, Be, yˆe, aˆ
IC
b (yˆe)) .
Expert e will accept pb if and only if AˆIC(pb, Be, yˆe) ≥ 0. The equality AˆIC = 0 therefore
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denes the acceptance threshold from Lemma 10.
Note at this point that
AˆIC(pb, Be, yˆe) = max
a≥0
A(pb, Be, yˆe, a) (C.2)
by denition of aˆICb (yˆe).
Case 1: yˆe ≤ 0. Assumption (4.4) implies aˆICb (yˆe) = 0 for all yˆe ≤ 0. So, AˆIC(k′(|Be|), yˆe) = 0
for all yˆe ≤ 0. That is, at negative income the expert just accepts an oer at marginal cost k′(|Be|).
Since AˆIC is strictly increasing in pb, it holds for all yˆe ≤ 0 that AˆIC(pb, Be, yˆe) ≥ 0 if and only
if pb ≥ k′(|Be|). We have thus proven the rst piece of the acceptance threshold in Lemma 10.
Case 2: yˆe > 0. Denote the acceptance threshold for yˆe > 0 by pˆ(yˆe, Be), that is, AˆIC(pˆ(yˆe, Be), Be, yˆe) =
0.
Note that Aˆ(k′(|Be|), Be, yˆe, 0) = 0 for all yˆe and Be. Thus, AˆIC(k′(|Be|), Be, yˆe) ≥ 0 for all
yˆe and Be. Hence, we have pˆ(yˆe, Be) ≤ k′(|Be|) for all yˆe and Be.
It remains to prove that pˆ(yˆe, Be) is decreasing in yˆe. Take any Be and any two income levels
yˆ
(2)
e > yˆ
(1)
e > 0. From the denition of Aˆ, it is clear that Aˆ increases in yˆe if pb ≤ k′(|Be|). Since
pˆ(yˆ
(1)
e , Be) ≤ k′(|Be|), the following applies:
AˆIC
(
pˆ
(
yˆ(2)e , Be
)
, Be, yˆ
(2)
e
)
= 0
= A
(
pˆ
(
yˆ(1)e , Be
)
, Be, y
(1)
e , aˆ
IC
b
(
yˆ(1)e
))
≤ Aˆ
(
pˆ
(
yˆ(1)e , Be
)
, Be, yˆ
(2)
e , aˆ
IC
b
(
yˆ(1)e
))
by (C.2)
≤ Aˆ
(
pˆ
(
yˆ(1)e , Be
)
, Be, yˆ
(2)
e , aˆ
IC
b
(
yˆ(2)e
))
= AˆIC
(
pˆ
(
yˆ(1)e , Be
)
, Be, yˆ
(2)
e
)
.
Since AˆIC always increases in pb, the inequality between the rst and the last expression implies
pˆ(yˆ
(2)
e , Be) ≤ pˆ(yˆ(1)e , Be).
C.1.6 Proof of Lemma 11
To prepare the proofs of Lemma 11 and Proposition 9, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Take any non-empty set of active experts E and consider the subgame after E described
by stages 2’ and 3’. In any subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame all oers are symmetric,
pb = pb′ for all b, b′ ∈ B, all oers are accepted, and all quality levels are symmetric, ab = ab′ for
all b, b′ ∈ B.
224
C.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof. Take a non-empty set of active experts E and consider the subgame after E described by
stages 2’ and 3’. This subgame is almost equivalent to the game with exogenous entry described
by stages 1 and 2 in Section 4.5. Hence, the proof of Lemma 19 closely follows the proof of Lemma
18.
Step 1. The maximum size of Be for any expert e is M . Hence, Lemma 10 implies that experts
always accept an oer pb ≥ k′(M). Since v(0)− k′(M) ≥ v and agents always decide against
their outside option in case of indierence, any consumer b prefers the oer pb = k′(M) over any
oer that is not accepted. So, consumers only make oers that are accepted in equilibrium.
Step 2. This step is identical to step 2 in the proof of Lemma 18. We repeat it here for convenience.
Consider all consumers b ∈ Be for a given expert e. By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) (using
yˆe instead of ye in the conditions), these consumers all receive the same quality level. Moreover,
they face the same acceptance threshold. Since all consumers take expert e’s income as given,
they anticipate the quality they receive to be independent of their oers. Hence, they oer exactly
the acceptance threshold, which is the same across all consumers.
Step 3. By Step 2, any expert e receives the same oers from all consumers matched to her.
To derive a contradiction, suppose that these oers are strictly higher for some expert e than
for another expert e′. Denote the oer level for e by p and for e′ by p′. By Step 1, all oers are
accepted. So, the revenues of e and e′ are given by∫
Be
pb db =
M
N
p >
M
N
p′ =
∫
Be′
pb db .
Using this together with the fact that |Be| = |Be′ |, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) imply that
expert e will have a greater income than e′, yˆe ≥ yˆe′ . Then, again because |Be| = |Be′ |, Lemma 10
implies that the acceptance threshold of expert e is smaller than that of e′. So, consumers matched
to e make smaller oers than those matched to e′, contradicting the initial assumption p > p′.
We have therefore established that all consumers oer the same payments and all oers are
accepted in any subgame perfect equilibrium. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) then immediately
imply that quality levels are the same for all consumers in any subgame perfect equilibrium as
well.
We prove now each of the three cases of Lemma 11. Since by Lemma 19 all oers are accepted,
we can set |Be| = M/N for all active experts e ∈ E throughout the proof.
1. We rst show that yˆe > 0 for all e ∈ E. To derive a contradiction, suppose that yˆe ≤ 0 for
some e ∈ E. Using Lemma 10, this implies that all consumers b ∈ Be oer pb = k′(M/N).
Moreover, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) imply that ab = 0 for all b ∈ Be. But then we
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obtain for expert e’s income:
yˆe =
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F > 0 ,
a contradiction.
So, yˆe > 0 for all e ∈ E. From Lemma 10 we then obtain pb ≤ k′(M/N) for all b ∈ B.
For experts’ utility, note that ab ≥ 0 and pb ≤ k′(M/N) for all b imply
v(ab)− pb − v(0) + k′
(
M
N
)
> 0 .
Hence, using yˆe > 0,
W (yˆE) +
∫
Be
[
v(ab)− pb − v(0) + k′
(
M
N
)]
db > W (0)
for all e ∈ E.
2. We show that yˆe = 0 for all e ∈ E. To derive a contradiction, suppose rst that yˆe > 0 for
some e ∈ E. But then pb ≤ k′(M/N) for all b ∈ Be by Lemma 10. Together with ab ≥ 0
for all b, this implies
yˆe ≤ M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F = 0 ,
a contradiction. Suppose now that yˆe < 0 for some e ∈ E. Then, pb = k′(M/N) for all
b ∈ B by Lemma 10. Moreover, expert e’s quality choice yields ab = 0 for all b ∈ Be by
conditions (4.7). Hence we obtain for expert e’s income:
yˆe =
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F = 0 ,
a contradiction.
So, yˆe = 0 for all e ∈ E. Using Lemma 10, we obtain pb = k′(M/N) for all b ∈ B.
Moreover, yˆe = 0 for all e ∈ E implies ab = 0 for all b ∈ B. So,
v(ab)− pb − v(0) + k′(M/N) = 0
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for all b ∈ B. Experts’ utility thus becomes
W (0) +
∫
Be
[
v(0)− k′
(
M
N
)
− v(0) + k′
(
M
N
)]
db = W (0)
for all e ∈ E.
3. We rst show that yˆe < 0 for all e ∈ E. To derive a contradiction, suppose yˆe ≥ 0 for some
e ∈ E. Then, pb ≤ k′(M/N) for all b ∈ Be by Lemma 10. Using ab ≥ 0 for all b, we obtain
yˆe ≤ M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F < 0 ,
a contradiction.
So, yˆe < 0 for all e ∈ E. With Lemma 10 we then obtain pb = k′(M/N) for all b ∈ B.
Moreover, yˆe < 0 for all e implies ab = 0 for all b. Experts’ utility hence satises
W (yˆe) +
∫
Be
[
v(0)− k′
(
M
N
)
− v(0) + k′
(
M
N
)]
db < W (0)
for all e ∈ E.
C.1.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Since all oers are accepted by Lemma 19, we can again set |Be| = M/N throughout the proof.
From conditions (4.11) and (4.12), we have M/N → m as M →∞. Moreover,
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F → 0 .
We rst show that yˆe → 0 for all e ∈ E as M →∞. For that, take any unbounded sequence of
consumer masses M . To derive a contradiction, suppose rst that there exists a subsequence such
that yˆe is positive and bounded away from zero along this subsequence. Since pb ≤ k′(M/N) for
all b ∈ B by Lemma 10 and because ab ≥ 0 for all b, we have
yˆe ≤ M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F .
But the right-hand-side of the inequality converges to zero along the subsequence. Hence, yˆe
cannot be positive and bounded away from zero.
Suppose now that there is a subsequence of consumer masses along which yˆe remains negative
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and bounded away from zero for some e ∈ E. Then by Lemma 10, pb = k′(M/N) along the
subsequence. Moreover, ab = 0 for all b ∈ Be along the subsequence by conditions (4.7). Thus,
yˆe =
M
N
k′
(
M
N
)
− k
(
M
N
)
− F → 0 ,
a contradiction.
We have therefore established that yˆe → 0 for all e ∈ E as M →∞. From conditions (4.7), we
then immediately obtain ab → 0 for all b ∈ B.
Finally by Lemma 19, there is a common payment level p and a common quality level a for all
consumers. Income of expert e thus becomes
yˆe =
M
N
p− M
N
c(a)− k
(
M
N
)
− F ,
and hence
p =
N
M
yˆe + c(a) +
N
M
k
(
M
N
)
+
N
M
F .
Since M/N → m, a → 0, and yˆe → 0, we can use the denition of m to show that the right-
hand-side of the equation goes to k′(m) as M →∞. Therefore, pb → k′(m) for all b ∈ B.
C.1.8 Proof of Proposition 10
Part 1. Consider rst the regulation (pˆ∗, Nˆ). In the main text we have already shown that the
proposed regulation Pareto-dominates the unregulated (or, competitive) outcome for suciently
large M if the actual number of active experts N˜ equals the cap Nˆ . To see that we will indeed
have N˜ = Nˆ , consider the competitive outcome at a given M . From Proposition 9, it is easy to
see that experts’ utility in the competitive outcome approaches W (0) as M →∞. Again from
Proposition 9, we know that pb → k′(m) for all b as M → ∞. Hence, for suciently large M
the regulated price pˆ∗ strictly exceeds the competitive price. Holding the number of active exerts
constant at Nˆ , an increase in the level of payments strictly increases experts’ utility. So for large
M and holding the number of experts at Nˆ , experts’ utility from the regulated price pˆ∗ strictly
exceeds W (0). But that means that all Nˆ experts indeed choose to enter the market under the
regulation (pˆ∗, Nˆ) for suciently large M . Hence, the cap of Nˆ is binding, N˜ = Nˆ .
Part 2. Consider next the pure price regulation (pˆ∗,∞). Denote the number of active experts
under this regulation by N˜ and compare it to the regulated number of experts Nˆ from Part 1.
By Part 1, experts’ utility under the joint regulation (pˆ∗, Nˆ) converges to a level strictly above
W (0). Moreover as M →∞, the impact of an additional entrant on experts’ utility approaches
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zero. Hence, without entry regulation the expert Nˆ + 1 nds it benecial to enter the market. So,
N˜ > Nˆ . Since experts’ utility declines in the number of active experts for given prices, experts’
utility is strictly smaller under the pure price regulation than under the joint regulation of Part 1.
Moreover, suppose that experts’ income yˆe is greater under the pure price regulation than under
the joint regulation. This would imply that service quality is higher under the pure price regulation
as well. But with a higher service quality and a larger number of active experts, income must
be strictly smaller under the pure price regulation than under joint regulation. Hence, experts’
income is indeed strictly smaller under the pure price than under the joint regulation.
Finally, under the joint regulation we have ab > 0 for all consumers. So experts’ quality choice
problem has an interior solution. In the neighborhood of such an interior solution, quality strictly
decreases in income. So, service quality must be strictly smaller under the pure price regulation
than under the joint regulation. Since the payments pb are the same in both cases, we obtain
that consumers’ utility is strictly smaller under the pure price regulation than under the joint
regulation. This establishes that the joint regulation Pareto-dominates the pure price regulation.
C.2 Price Competition
In this section we present an alternative trading mechanism where experts instead of consumers
make price oers. The environment is the same as in the main text, that is, the one introduced in
Section 3.3. The mechanism works as follows.
Stage 1” Each expert e ∈ E makes price oers {pe,b}b∈B to all consumers.
Stage 2” Each consumer b ∈ B observes his oers {pe,b}e∈E but not the oers received by other
consumers. Consumer b then accepts or rejects each of his oers. Each consumer can accept
at most one oer.
Stage 3” For each expert e, let Be ⊂ B denote the set of consumers who accepted e’s oers.
Expert e observes consumers’ acceptance decisions and chooses the service quality ab for
each consumer b ∈ Be.1
For each consumer b ∈ ∪e∈EBe, set pb equal to the oer consumer b accepted, that is,
pb = pe,b for e such that b ∈ Be. Then, each expert receives utility 4.2. Each consumer
b ∈ ∪e∈EBe receives utility 4.1, and all other consumers receive the outside option v.
1Whether experts observe only the acceptance decisions on their own oers or on all experts’ oers does not matter
for our results. For concreteness we assume here that experts observe all acceptance decisions of all consumers.
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Note that in contrast to the consumer-proposing mechanism from the main text, consumers
receive oers from all experts instead of being matched to only one expert each. Our results are
robust to adding a matching stage where consumers are matched to only a few, but at least two,
experts whom they receive oers from. The minimum number of two experts per consumer is
necessary to initiate price competition.
The second noteworthy assumption is that consumers do not observe the oers received by
other consumers. This seems appropriate in the context of service provision, where sellers interact
directly, and often privately, with each buyer to deliver the service. The assumption is not relevant
for our rst result on the existence of an equilibrium that replicates the outcome of the consumer-
proposing mechanism from the main text. The structure of other equilibria however may change
when making a dierent informational assumption.
C.2.1 Competitive Outcome
Stages 1” to 3” describe a sequential game of (complete, but) imperfect information. We study its
perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in the following. We start by constructing a PBE that replicates
the competitive outcome of the consumer-proposing mechanism from Proposition 6.
Proposition 16. Consider the game described by stages 1” to 3”. There exists a PBE in which all
consumers accept oers at marginal cost, pb = c(0) for all b ∈ B, and receive a service of zero quality,
ab = 0 for all b ∈ B.
Proof. We construct a PBE with the desired properties. The PBE consists of the following elements.
• Expert strategies (for all e ∈ E): for any set Be, expert e’s quality choices on stage 3” are
determined by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7). Moreover, expert e’s price oers on stage
1 are pe,b = c(0) for all b ∈ B.
• Consumer strategies (for all b ∈ B): for any set of oers {pe,b}e∈E , consumer b accepts the
smallest oer if
min
e∈E
pe,b ≤ v(0)− v . (C.3)
Otherwise, b rejects all oers. If there are multiple smallest oers satisfying equation (C.3), b
chooses one of them randomly (the exact distribution of the randomization does not matter).
• Expert beliefs: experts’ beliefs about the history at any of their information sets is consistent
with their observations. Since they observe all events, this uniquely identies experts’
beliefs.
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• Consumer beliefs: at any of his information sets, any consumer b ∈ B believes that all
experts e ∈ E oered pe,b′ = c(0) to all other consumers b′ ∈ B \ {b}.
Note rst that the proposed beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies.
Second, strategies strategies are sequentially rational. To see this, start with experts’ quality
choices given Be. Since experts’ problem of choosing quality levels to maximize utility is (strictly
dierentially) concave, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) identify the unique solution to this
problem. Moreover, given that consumers always accept the lowest price if it does not exceed
the threshold v(0)− v and given that all other experts make oers at c(0), there is no protable
deviation from the proposed equilibrium oers. Hence, oers pe,b = c(0) for all b ∈ B are rational
for all experts e ∈ E.
Turning to consumers, note that any consumer b’s belief together with other consumers’
equilibrium strategies implies ye = 0 for all experts e ∈ E and at any information set of b. Hence,
consumers believe to receive zero quality at all of their information sets. So, choosing any of the
lowest oers if they are below v(0)− v and rejecting all oers otherwise is rational for consumers
given their belief.
The intuition behind Proposition 16 is standard. Consumers accept the lowest prices and experts
undercut each other’s prices until they hit marginal cost.
In contrast to standard price competition à la Bertrand, however, equilibria with other outcomes
exist. Such equilibria are of two types. In the rst type, consumers coordinate to buy only from
certain sellers but not from others. Suppose for example that all consumers accept the oer
of expert 1 as long as it does not exceed a certain threshold level. Expert 1 will then oer the
threshold price and all other experts’ oers become irrelevant. Consumers may act rationally
in this situation because all experts except for expert 1 have zero income and would therefore
provide low quality services.
In the second type of equilibrium, consumers coordinate to buy only from those experts who
oer a specic price. As soon as some expert deviates from this oer, consumers believe her
prots to be zero, because they believe that no other consumer buys from this expert anymore.
So, consumers believe that such a deviating expert provides zero quality and may thus indeed
shun her rationally.
Both types of equilibria require a high degree of coordination between consumers. For the rst
type, consumers must believe all other consumers to accept oers only from a certain, arbitrary
set of experts. For the second type, they must believe all other consumers to accept only oers
at a certain, arbitrary price. We consider such coordination among consumers implausible as a
description of many real-world credence goods markets.
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To make this reasoning precise, we propose two criteria for equilibrium selection tailored to
our environment.The criteria restrict consumers’ ability to coordinate. Both of them leave only
those equilibria that lead to the competitive outcome described in Proposition 16.
C.2.2 Equilibrium Selection by Insuicient Reason
Any consumer’s decision problem is aected by other consumers’ actions exclusively via experts’
income levels. Beliefs about experts’ incomes are hence crucial for sustaining coordination among
consumers. In particular, the types of coordination described above require consumers to entertain
dierent beliefs about dierent experts’ incomes at some of their information sets. To curb such
coordination we therefore require consumers’ strategies to be optimal even under a belief that
treats all experts’ incomes identically.
A belief that treats all experts’ incomes identically is reminiscent of the Principle of Insucient
Reason. Facing a set of events and no particular reason to believe that one of them is more likely
than the others, the Principle of Insucient Reason advises to assign equal probability to all events.
Here, from the perspective of a given consumer, dierences in experts’ incomes can only stem
from other consumers’ strategies. Since many such strategies are compatible with PBE, a given
consumer has little reason to perceive one set of other consumers’ strategies as more likely than
another. Hence, according to the Principle of Insucient Reason, he entertains a belief that does
not discriminate between experts.2
Denition 9. A PBE is robust to insucient reason if and only if consumer strategies satisfy
the following. Take any set of oers {pe,b}e∈E for any consumer b. Let∞(e,b) be an indicator
function equal to one if b accepts pe,b and zero otherwise, and let aIC(ye) denote the solution to
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) given ye. Then, consumer b’s acceptance decision following the
oers {pe,b}e∈E must maximize∫
RN
[∑
e∈E
∞(e,b)
(
v(aIC(ye))− pe,b
)]
pi(y1, y2, ..., yN ) d(y1, y2, ..., yN ) +
(
1−
∑
e∈E
∞(e,b)
)
v
(C.4)
for some probability density function φ such that the marginal distributions of the ye are identical
for all e, that is,
p˜ie = p˜ie′ for all e, e′ ∈ E ,
2The Principle of Insucient Reason is known to fail as a positive theory of choice under uncertainty when individuals
face a decision between a risky (with known probabilities) and an uncertain option (with unknown probabilities).
See the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Here, there is no way for consumers to escape the uncertainty about other
consumers’ choices (and hence experts’ incomes). So, the critique based on the Ellsberg Paradox does not apply.
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where p˜i : ye 7→ R+,
p˜ie(ye) :=
∫
RN−1
pi(y1, y2, ..., yN ) d(y1, ..., ye−1, ye+1, ..., yN ) ,
is the marginal density for ye.
Robustness to insucient reason rules out all PBE with consumer strategies that are optimal
only under beliefs that discriminate between experts. Since consumer coordination as described
above requires such discriminatory beliefs, the robustness criterion excludes all PBE that rely on
consumer coordination.
It turns out that only those PBE survive the selection that lead to the competitive outcome of
Proposition 16.
Proposition 17. Consider the game described by stages 1” to 3”. In any PBE that is robust to
insucient reason (see Denition 9), all consumers accept oers at marginal cost, pb = c(0) for all
b ∈ B, and receive services of zero quality, ab = 0 for all b ∈ B.
Proof. Step 1. Robustness to insucient reason imposes a clear structure on consumer strategies.
In particular, since the marginal distributions of experts’ incomes are identical under pi, maximizing
(C.4) is equivalent to choosing the least price oer if
min
e∈E
pe,b ≤
∫
R
v(aIC(ye))p˜i(ye) dye − v
and rejecting all oers otherwise. Since aIC ≥ 0,∫
R
v(aIC(ye))p˜i(ye) dye ≥ v(0) .
So, if the minimal oer is unique and equal to c(0), it is accepted with certainty.
Step 2. Given the consumer strategies from step 1 the standard logic of Bertrand competition
implies that we can never have a situation where consumers accept oers strictly greater than c(0).
Moreover, suppose some consumer b accepts no oer. Then, some expert e could oer pe,b = c(0)
and consumer b would accept. Both e and b would decide for this deviation, because we assumed
that all agents decide against their outside option in case of indierence. So, the only PBE that are
robust to insucient reason have all consumers accept oers at marginal cost c(0).
Step 3. Finally by step 2, we have ye = 0 for all e ∈ E while all consumers accept some oer.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) then imply ab = 0 for all b ∈ B. This must again hold in any
PBE that is robust to insucient reason.
233
C Appendix to Chapter 4
C.2.3 Equilibrium Selection by Ambiguity Aversion
A critique of robustness to insucient reason is that consumer strategies must be optimal only
under a specic belief pi. If consumers cannot coordinate and there are many dierent equilibrium
strategies for consumers, where should such a specic belief come from?
Our second criterion allows consumers to entertain many beliefs and perceive experts’ incomes
as ambiguous, or uncertain in the Knightian sense. If we additionally assume that consumers are
ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we obtain the following robustness
criterion.
Denition 10. A PBE is robust to strategic ambiguity if and only if consumer strategies satisfy
the following. Take any set of oers {pe,b}e∈E for any consumer b. Let∞(e,b) be an indicator
function equal to one if b accepts pe,b and zero otherwise, and let aIC(ye) denote the solution to
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.7) given ye. Then, consumer b’s acceptance decision following the
oers {pe,b}e∈E must maximize
min
(y1,y2,...,yN )∈RN
∑
e∈E
∞(e,b)
(
v(aIC(ye))− pe,b
)
+
(
1−
∑
e∈E
∞(e,b)
)
v . (C.5)
In a PBE that is robust to strategic ambiguity, consumer strategies are supported by two
considerations. First, as is usual in a PBE, consumers can anticipate other agents’ strategies, form
beliefs about unobserved events accordingly, and choose their strategies as a best response to
the anticipated behavior of others. Second, consumers may perceive the behavior of others as
ambiguous and choose the strategies that optimize the worst-case outcome.3
The only PBE that are robust to strategic ambiguity are those leading to the competitive outcome
of Proposition 16.
Proposition 18. Consider the game described by stages 1” to 3”. In any PBE that is robust to strategic
ambiguity (see Denition 10), all consumers accept oers at marginal cost, pb = c(0) for all b ∈ B,
and receive services of zero quality, ab = 0 for all b ∈ B.
Proof. In analogy to the proof of Proposition 17, robustness to strategic ambiguity has clear
implications for consumer strategies. In particular, the worst-case outcome for consumers for any
acceptance decision they make is when ye ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E. So, maximizing (C.5) is equivalent to
3Moreover, the combination of the usual PBE requirements with robustness to strategic ambiguity allows consumers
to engage in considerations of the following type in equilibrium. Any given consumer anticipates that all other
consumers perceive others’ behavior as ambiguous and optimize their worst-case outcomes. The given consumer
then chooses his strategy as a best response to this anticipated behavior of others.
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maximizing ∑
e∈E
∞(e,b) (v(0)− pe,b) +
(
1−
∑
e∈E
∞(e,b)
)
v .
This expression is maximized by accepting the least price oer if
min
e∈E
pe,b ≤ v(0)− v
and rejecting all oers otherwise. This is essentially the same result as obtained from step 1 in
the proof of Proposition 17. The remainder of the proof is then analogous to steps 2 and 3 of the
proof of Proposition 17.
C.2.4 Special Case: Two Experts
As a nal remark, forN = 2 experts the selection criteria can be relaxed substantially. In particular,
with two experts it is sucient to restrict the o-equilibrium part of consumers’ strategies. For
expositional reasons we focus on robustness to strategic ambiguity here.
Denition 11. A PBE is weakly robust to strategic ambiguity if and only if any consumer b’s
actions following any o-equilibrium set of oers {pe,b}e∈E satisfy the requirements of robustness
to strategic ambiguity described in Denition 10.
The reduction to o-equilibrium actions is substantial. The weakened criterion allows con-
sumers to believe in coordination on any arbitrary set of strategies. Only once they observe an
event that is incompatible with the strategies they believed in, consumers revert to ambiguity-
averse behavior without committing to any specic new belief about other agents’ actions.
For two experts, the weak robustness criterion is sucient to exclude all outcomes except for
the competitive one.
Proposition 19. Consider the game described by stages 1” to 3” and suppose that N = 2. Then in
any PBE that is weakly robust to strategic ambiguity (see Denition 10) and has experts play pure
strategies, all consumers accept oers at marginal cost, pb = c(0) for all b ∈ B, and receive services
of zero quality, ab = 0 for all b ∈ B.
Proof. Note rst that all consumers under all circumstances prefer to accept an oer smaller or
equal to v(0)− v to rejecting all oers.
Suppose now that in some PBE as described in the proposition, some consumer b accepts no
oer. Then in such a PBE, all oers for consumer bmust be strictly above v(0)−v. But then, expert
1 could deviate to oer p1,b = v(0)− v. This deviation makes consumer b optimize his worst-case
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outcome according to weak robustness to strategic ambiguity. Thus, b accepts the least price oer
if it does not strictly exceed v(0) − v. Hence, b accepts p1,b. But since p1,b = v(0) − v ≥ c(0),
expert 1 is better o through her initial deviation. So there cannot be a PBE as described in the
proposition where some consumer rejects all oers.
Next suppose that in some PBE as described in the proposition, some consumer b accepts
an oer p2,b > c(0). Then, expert 1 can deviate to some oer p1,b such that p1,b < p2,b and
p1,b ∈ [c(0), v(0)− v]. The deviation again makes b optimize his worst-case outcome, so b accepts
p1,b. This makes expert 1 better o, so the deviation is protable for expert 1. Thus, there cannot
be a PBE as described in the proposition where some consumer accepts an oer above marginal
cost.
Hence we have shown that in any PBE as described in the proposition, all consumers accept
oers at marginal cost c(0). This immediately implies ye = 0 for all experts and, by conditions
(4.7), ab = 0 for all consumers.
236
Bibliography
Abeliansky, Ana and Klaus Prettner (2017) “Automation and Demographic Change,” May, Working
Paper.
Acemoglu, Daron (1998) “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical
Change and Wage Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4), 1055–1089.
(2002) “Directed Technical Change,” Review of Economic Studies, 69 (4), 781–809.
(2003) “Patterns of Skill Premia,” Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2), 199–230, 10.1111/1467-
937X.00242.
(2007) “Equilibrium Bias of Technology,” Econometrica, 75 (5), 1371–1409.
(2009) Introduction to modern economic growth: MIT Press.
Acemoglu, Daron and David H. Autor (2011) “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for
Employment and Earnings,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 1043–1171.
Acemoglu, Daron and Pascual Restrepo (2018a) “The Race Between Machine and Man: Implications
of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment,” American Economic Review, 108 (6),
1488–1542.
(2018b) “Demographics and Automation,” March, Working Paper.
(2018c) “Modeling Automation,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 48–53.
(2019) “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,” Journal of Political Economy,
forthcoming.
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1992) “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,”
Econometrica, 60 (2), 323–351.
Aghion, Phillippe, Benjamin F. Jones, and Charles I. Jones (2017) “Articial Intelligence and
Economic Growth,” October, Working Paper.
237
Bibliography
Ales, Laurence, Musab Kurnaz, and Christopher Sleet (2015) “Technical Change, Wage Inequality,
and Taxes,” American Economic Review, 105 (10), 3061–3101.
Alvaredo, Facundo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman eds.
(2018) The World Inequality Report: 2018: Harvard University Press.
Andreoni, James, Nikos Nikiforakis, and Jan Stoop (2017) “Are the Rich More Selsh than the Poor,
or Do They Just Have More Money? A Natural Field Experiment,” March, NBER Working Paper
No. 23229.
Arnott, Richard, Bruce Greenwald, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1994) “Information and Economic
Eciency,” Information Economics and Policy, 6 (1), 77–82.
Arntz, Melanie, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zierahn (2016) “The Risk of Automation for Jobs in
OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis,” Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper
189, OECD.
Atkeson, Andrew, Christian Hellwig, and Guillermo Ordonez (2015) “Optimal Regulation in the
Presence of Reputation Concerns,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (1), 415–464.
Atkinson, Anthony B. (1970) “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2,
244–263.
Autor, David H. and David Dorn (2013) “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization
of the U.S. Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 103 (5), 1553–1597.
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney (2006) “The Polarization of the U.S.
Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 96 (2), 189–94.
Backer, Koen De, Carlo Menon, Isabelle Desnoyers-James, and Laurent Moussiegt (2016)
“Reshoring: Myth or Reality?” Science, Technology and Industry Policy Paper 27, OECD.
Bartling, Björn, Vanessa Valero, and Roberto A. Weber (2019) “The Causal Eect of Income Growth
on Consumer Social Responsibility,” Working Paper.
Bester, Helmut and Matthias Dahm (2018) “Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective
Evaluation,” Economic Journal, 128 (611), 1367–1394.
Blum, Bernardo S. (2010) “Endowments, Output, and the Bias of Directed Innovation,” Review of
Economic Studies, 77 (2), 534–559.
238
Bibliography
Blundell, Richard, David Green, and Wenchao Jin (2018) “The UK Wage Premium Puzzle: How Did
a Large Increase in University Graduates Leave the Education Premium Unchanged?”, Working
Paper.
Bound, John and George Johnson (1992) “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations,” American Economic Review, 82 (3), 371–392.
Brewer, Mike, Emmanuel Saez, and Andrew Shepard (2010) “Means-testing and Tax Rates on
Earnings,” in Adam, Stuart, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Stephen Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm
Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles, and James M. Poterba eds. Dimensions of Tax Design: The
Mirrlees Review, 90–201: Oxford University Press.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2017) “Rents, Technical
Change, and Risk Premia – Accounting for Secular Trens in Interest Rates, Returns on Capital,
Earning Yields, and Factor Shares,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 107 (5),
614–620.
Carneiro, Pedro, Kai Liu, and Kjell G. Salvanes (2019) “The Supply of Skill and Endogenous
Technical Change: Evidence From a College Expansion Reform,” June, Working Paper.
Carpenter, Jerey, Eric Verhoogen, and Stephen Burks (2005) “The Eect of Stakes in Distribution
Experiments,” Economics Letters, 86 (3), 393–398.
Chetty, Raj (2012) “Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and
Macro Evidence on Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 80 (3), 96–1018.
Chowdhury, Subhasish M and Joo Young Jeon (2014) “Impure altruism or inequality aversion?: An
experimental investigation based on income eects,” Journal of Public Economics, 118, 143–150.
Ciccone, Antonio and Giovanni Peri (2005) “Long-run Substitutability Between More and Less
Educated Workers: Evidence from US States 1950-1990,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 87
(4), 652–663.
Clemens, Michael A., Ethan G. Lewis, and Hannah M. Postel (2018) “Immigration Restrictions as
Active Labor Market Policy: Evidence from the Mexican Bracero Exclusion,” American Economic
Review, 108 (6), 1468–1487.
Costinot, Arnaud, Dave Donaldson, Jonathan Vogel, and Iván Werning (2015) “Comparative
Advantage and Optimal Trade Policy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (1), 77–128.
239
Bibliography
Costinot, Arnaud and Jonathan Vogel (2010) “Matching and Inequality in the World Economy,”
Journal of Political Economy, 118 (4), 747–786.
(2015) “Beyond Ricardo: Assignment Models in International Trade,” Annual Review of
Economics, 7, 31–62.
Costinot, Arnaud and Ivan Werning (2018) “Robots, Trade, and Luddism: A Sucient Statistic
Approach to Optimal Technology Regulation,” September, Working Paper.
Darby, Michael R. and Edi Karni (1973) “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 16 (1), 67–88.
Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen, Jens Suedekum, and Nicole Woessner (2017) “German
Robots – The Impact of Industrial Robots on Workers,” Discussion Paper 12306, CEPR.
Dechezlepretre, Antoine, David Hemous, Morten Olsen, and Carlo Zanella (2019) “Automating
Labor: Evidence from Firm-level Patent Data,” October, Working Paper.
Diamond, Peter A. (1998) “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of
Optimal Marginal Tax Rates,” American Economic Review, 88 (1), 83–95.
Diamond, Peter and Emmanuel Saez (2011) “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research
to Policy Recommendations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (4), 165–190.
Dixit, Avinash, Gene Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman (1997) “Common Agency and Coordination:
General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” Journal of Political Economy,
105 (4), 752–769.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2002) “The
Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 1–37.
Dulleck, Uwe and Rudolf Kerschbamer (2006) “On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists:
The Economics of Credence Goods,” Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (1), 5–42.
Dulleck, Uwe, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter (2011) “The Economics of Credence Goods:
An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Veriability, Reputation, and Competition,” American
Economic Review, 101 (2), 526–55.
Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso Frattini, and Ian P. Preston (2013) “The Eect of Immigration
along the Distribution of Wages,” Review of Economic Studies, 80 (1), 145–173.
240
Bibliography
Dustmann, Christian and Albrecht Glitz (2015) “How Do Industries and Firms Respond to Changes
in Local Labor Supply?” Journal of Labor Economics, 33 (3), 711–750.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2002) “Technology, Geography, and Trade,” Econometrica, 70
(5), 1741–1779.
Ellsberg, Daniel (1961) “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
75 (4), 643–669.
Emons, Winand (1997) “Credence goods and fraudulent experts,” RAND Journal of Economics,
107–119.
Engel, Christoph (2011) “Dictator games: A meta study,” Experimental Economics, 14 (4), 583–610.
Englmaier, Florian and Achim Wambach (2010) “Optimal incentive contracts under inequity
aversion,” Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2), 312–328.
European Economic and Social Committee (2014) “The State of Liberal Professions Concerning
their Functions and Relevance to European Civil Society,” European Union.
Fadinger, Harald and Karin Mayr (2014) “Skill-Biased Technological Change, Unemployment and
Brain Drain,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 12 (2), 397–431.
Feldstein, Martin S. (1969) “The Eects of Taxation on Risk Taking,” Journal of Political Economy,
77 (5), 755–764.
Feng, Andy and Georg Graetz (2018) “Training Requirements, Automation, and Job Polarization,”
July, Working Paper.
Frey, Carl B. and Michael A. Osborne (2017) “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs
to computerisation?” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114 (C), 254–280.
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz (2008) “The Race between Education and Technology: The
Evolution of U.S. Educational Wage Dierentials, 1890 to 2005,” Working Paper 12984, NBER.
Graetz, Georg and Guy Michaels (2018) “Robots at Work,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 100
(5), 753–768.
Gruber, Jon and Emmanuel Saez (2002) “The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implica-
tions,” Journal of Public Economics, 84 (1), 1–32.
241
Bibliography
Guerreiro, Joao, Sergio Rebelo, and Pedro Teles (2018) “Should Robots be Taxed?” Working Paper
23806, NBER.
Heathcote, Jonathan, Kjetil Storesletten, and Gianluca Violante (2017) “Optimal Tax Progressivity:
An Analytical Framework,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132 (4), 1693–1754.
Hémous, David and Morten Olsen (2018) “The Rise of the Machines: Automation, Horizontal
Innovation and Income Inequality,” March, Working Paper.
Jacobs, Bas and Uwe Thuemmel (2018a) “Optimal Linear Income Taxation and Education Subsidies
under Skill-Biased Technical Change,” September, Working Paper.
(2018b) “Optimal Taxation of Income and Human Capital and Skill-Biased Technical
Change,” September, Working Paper.
Jagadeesan, Ravi (2019) “Optimal Taxation with an Endogenous Growth Rate,” February, Working
Paper.
Jones, Charles I. (2019) “Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas,” July, Working Paper.
Karabarbounis, Loukas and Brent Neiman (2014) “The Global Deline of the Labor Share,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 129 (1), 61–103.
Katz, Lawrence F. and Kevin M. Murphy (1992) “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-87: Supply and
Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (1), 35–78.
Kerschbamer, Rudolf, Matthias Sutter, and Uwe Dulleck (2017) “How Social Preferences Shape
Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods,” Economic Journal, 127 (600), 393–416.
Kiley, Michael T. (1999) “The Supply of Skilled Labour and Skill-Biased Technological Progress,”
Economic Journal, 109 (458), 708–724.
Kleiner, Morris M. and Alan B. Krueger (2013) “Analyzing the Extent and Inuence of Occupational
Licensing on the Labor Market,” Journal of Labor Economics, 31 (2), 173–202.
Korenok, Oleg, Edward L Millner, and Laura Razzolini (2012) “Are Dictators Averse to Inequality?”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 82 (2-3), 543–547.
Kőszegi, Botond (2014) “Behavioral Contract Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature, 52 (4),
1075–1118.
242
Bibliography
Krenz, Astrid, Klaus Prettner, and Holger Strulik (2018) “Robots, Reshoring, and the Lot of Low-Skill
Workers,” Discussion Paper 351, CEGE.
Lewis, Ethan (2011) “Immigration, Skill Mix, and Capital Skill Complementarity,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 126 (2), 1029–1069.
List, John A. (2011) “The Market for Charitable Giving,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (2),
157–180.
Lockwood, Benjamin B., Charles G. Nathanson, and E. Glen Weyl (2017) “Taxation and the
Allocation of Talent,” Journal of Political Economy, 125 (5), 1635–1682.
Loebbing, Jonas (2016) “A LeChatelier Principle for Relative Demand and Implications for Directed
Technical Change,” November, Working Paper.
(2018) “An Elementary Theory of Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality,”
August, Working Paper.
Lordan, Grace and David Neumark (2018) “People Versus Machines: The Impact of Minimum
Wages on Automatable Jobs,” Working Paper 23667, NBER.
Lucas, Robert E. (1988) “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 22 (1), 3–42.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, Matthew Weinzierl, and Danny Yagan (2009) “Optimal Taxation in Theory
and Practice,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23 (4), 147–74.
Meghir, Costas and David Phillips (2010) “Labour Supply and Taxes,” in Adam, Stuart, Tim Besley,
Richard Blundell, Stephen Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles,
and James M. Poterba eds. Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review, 202–274: Oxford
University Press.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1996) “The LeChatelier Principle,” American Economic Review, 86
(1), 173–179.
Milgrom, Paul and Ilya Segal (2002) “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” Econometrica,
70 (2), 583–601.
Milgrom, Paul and Chris Shannon (1994) “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Econometrica, 62 (1),
157–180.
243
Bibliography
Mimra, Wanda, Alexander Rasch, and Christian Waibel (2016) “Price competition and reputation in
credence goods markets: Experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 337–352.
Mirrlees, James A. (1971) “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of
Economic Studies, 38 (2), 175–208.
Morrow, Peter M. and Daniel Treer (2017) “Endowments, Skill-Biased Technology, and Factor
Prices: A Unied Approach to Trade,” Working Paper 24078, NBER.
Naito, Hisahiro (1999) “Re-Examination of Uniform Commodity Taxes Under a Non-Linear Income
Tax System and Its Implications for Production Eciency,” Journal of Public Economics, 71 (2),
165–188.
Nedelkoska, Ljubica and Glenda Quintini (2018) “Automation, skills use and training,” Social,
Employment and Migration Working Paper 202, OECD.
OECD (2011) “Taxation and Employment,” Tax Policy Studies 21, OECD.
Paris, Valérie, Marion Devaux, and Lihan Wei (2010) “Health Systems Institutional Characteristics:
A Survey of 29 OECD Countries,” April, OECD Health Working Papers No. 50.
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Asher Wolinsky (2003) “Second Opinions and Price Competition:
Ineciency in the Market for Expert Advice,” Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2), 417–437.
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez (2007) “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A
Historical and International Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (1), 3–24.
Pitchik, Carolyn and Andrew Schotter (1987) “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information
Transmission,” American Economic Review, 77 (5), 1032–1036.
Prescott, Edward C. and Robert M. Townsend (1984) “Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria
with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,” Econometrica, 52 (1), 21–46.
Rakotoarisoa, Manitra A., Massimo Iafrate, and Marianna Paschali (2012) Why has Africa become
a net food importer? Explaining Africa agricultural and food trade decits: Trade and Markets
Division, FAO.
Rasch, Alexander and Christian Waibel (2018) “What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market?–
Evidence from a Field Study,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 80 (3), 605–624.
Romer, Paul M. (1986) “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy,
94 (5), 1002–1037.
244
Bibliography
(1990) “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), 71–102.
(1994) “The Origins of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (1), 3–22.
Rothschild, Casey and Florian Scheuer (2013) “Redisributive Taxation in the Roy Model,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 128, 623–668.
(2016) “Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking,” Review of Economic Studies, 83 (3), 1225–
1262.
Sachs, Dominik, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin (2020) “Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal
Taxation in General Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 88 (2), 469–493.
Saez, Emmanuel (2001) “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” Review of Economic
Studies, 68 (1), 205–229.
Saez, Emmanuel, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz (2012) “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 50 (1), 3–50.
San, Shmuel (2019) “Labor Supply and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Abrogation
of the Bracero Program in 1964,” November, Working Paper.
Sevinc, Orhun (2018) “Skill-Biased Technical Change and Labor Market Polarization: The Role of
Skill Heterogeneity Within Occupations,” March, Working Paper.
Slavik, Ctirad and Hakki Yazici (2014) “Machines, Buildings, and Optimal Dynamic Taxes,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 66, 47–61.
Smeets, Paul, Rob Bauer, and Uri Gneezy (2015) “Giving behavior of millionaires,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 112 (34), 10641–10644.
Smith, Vincent H, Michael R Kehoe, and Mary E Cremer (1995) “The private provision of public
goods: Altruism and voluntary giving,” Journal of Public Economics, 58 (1), 107–126.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1982) “Self-Selection and Pareto Ecient Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics,
17 (2), 213–240.
Teulings, Coen N. (1995) “The Wage Distribution in a Model of the Assignment of Skills to Jobs,”
Journal of Political Economy, 103 (2), 280–315.
Thuemmel, Uwe (2018) “Optimal Taxation of Robots,” August, Working Paper.
245
Bibliography
de Vries, Gaaitzen, Marcel Timmer, and Klaas de Vries (2015) “Structural Transformation in Africa:
Static Gains, Dynamic Losses,” Journal of Development Studies, 51 (6), 674–688.
Wiepking, Pamala and René Bekkers (2012) “Who gives? A literature review of predictors of
charitable giving. Part Two: Gender, family composition and income,” Voluntary Sector Review,
3 (2), 217–245.
Wolinsky, Asher (1993) “Competition in a market for informed experts’ services,” RAND Journal
of Economics, 380–398.
World Bank (2016) “Digital Dividends,” World Development Report 2016, World Bank.
246
